law of this State require that when a condemnorholds both the land and the money that should be paidtherefore, the condemnee must have just compensation: Article I, Section 17, of the State Constitution: Article IX, Section 20 of the State Constitution; 119 S.C. 319, 112 S.E. 55; Section 25-57 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina; 239 S.C. 1, 121 S.E.2d 236; Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 3, page 150; 327 F.2d 630; 40 U.S.C. § 258a; 119 F. Supp. 161; 27 Am. Jur.2d, pages 109 to 122; 29A C.J.S., pages 762-780; 37 F. Supp. 28; 261 U.S. 299, at 306, 43 S.Ct. 354, at 356, 67 L.Ed. 664; 210 F. 832; 78 F.2d 460; 91 F.2d 884 at 893; 255 U.S. 163, 41 S.Ct.; 281, 65 L.Ed. 566; 274 U.S. 341, 47 S.Ct. 611, 71 L.Ed. 1083; 299 U.S. 476 at 496, 57 S.Ct. 244, 81 L.Ed. 360. As to proof on which the jurycould base a finding that it was reasonably probable thatthe land involved herein would be put to use as residentialsubdivision property within the immediate future, or withina reasonable time: 253 S.C. 400, 171 S.E.2d 349. Asto the Trial Judge's properly permitting witnesses for landownerto testify as to their opinion of the value of the tractof land involved and in overruling condemnor's objectionsto and motions to strike the testimony of landowner's witnessesgiving their opinion of the value of the tract ofland involved based on theory of supposed subdivision andthe prospective sale of lots therefrom: 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain, Sec. 160, page 676; Nichols on Eminent Domain, 4-12; 3142(1); 1 Cal. Rep. 250; 364 S.W.2d 724; 115 S.E.2d 585; 364 S.W.2d 309. As to the landownerbeing entitled to enter judgment on the verdict of the juryin this proceeding, and recover interest on the verdict fromthe date thereof to the date of payment: 242 S.C. 357, 131 S.E.2d 44; 239 S.C. 1, 121 S.E.2d 236; Code Section 10-1458 (1962). Messrs. James P. Mozingo, III, Baker Ethridge, and Paulling James, of Darlington, for Appellant-Respondent,in Reply, cite: As to whether condemnee is entitled to interestfrom the date of ta
Messrs. Thomas E. McCutchen and R. Davis Howser, of Whaley, McCutchen, Blanton Dent, Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to the Court's erring in using conflictingstandards in refusing testimony on behalf of the landownerand permitting similar testimony for the Highway Department: 253 S.C. 400, 171 S.E.2d 349; 251 S.C. 368, 162 S.E.2d 532; 234 S.C. 254, 107 S.E.2d 643; 151 S.C. 542, 149 S.E.2d 236; 113 S.C. 303, 102 S.E. 331; 200 F.2d 659; 12 A.L.R. 3d 1064. Asto the Court's erring in submitting the Notice of Appeal tothe jury and in refusing thereafter to instruct the jury thatno payment had been made to the landowner: 113 S.C. 303, 102 S.C. 331. As to the Trial Judge's erring in restrictingcross examination of the condemning authority'sexpert witness: 35 S.C. 197, 14 S.E. 481; McCormick, Law of Evidence, Sec. 22 (1954); 27 Am. Jur.2d "Eminent Domain", Sec. 429 (p. 334); 150 Mont. 322, 435 P.2d 224. As to the Trial Judge's erring in his commentsconcerning a proposed exhibit: 235 S.C. 395, 111 S.E.2d 669; Limitations on Trial Judges Commentary on The Evidence in South Carolina Jury Trials, 5 S.C.L. Quarterly 214; 237 S.C. 248, 116 S.E.2d 854; 181 S.C. 101, 186 S.E. 286. As to the Trial Judge's erring inallowing the foreman to take notes during the trial andparticularly during the charge: 2
Messrs. Moore, Flowers Doar, of Georgetown, for Appellant, cite: As to the testimony of the Landowners as tothe possible use of their tract being indefinite and uncertain,founded upon hearsay; and, their testimony should havebeen excluded from consideration by the jury: Sec. 58-779, Code of Laws of South Carolina; 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391; 32 C.J.S. Evidence Sections 546 (116) p. 434, 447; 32 C.J.S. Evidence Sections 546 (117); 244 S.C. 516, 173 S.E.2d 776; 253 S.C. 400, 171 S.E.2d 349: Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 4, Section 12-3142 (1). As to the Trial Judge's erring by not directing theentry of judgment in conformity with the testimony of Appellant'sexpert witness, or by granting a new trial: 258 S.C. 1, 186 S.E.2d 813. J. Reuben Long, Esq., of Conway, for Respondents, cites: As to the Court's properly allowing the landowners to givean opinion as to value: 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391.
As to the Trial Judge's erring in refusing to grant a newtrial upon the ground that the jury disregarded the chargeand based its verdict upon a method of valuation which wasprohibited under that charge, the law of this case, and ofthis state and which verdict was against the weight of theevidence: 16 S.C. 14; 68 S.C. 523, 47 S.C. 523, 47 S.E. 978, 979. Messrs. Gasque Seals, of Marion, for Respondents, cite: As to the Trial Judge's properly refusing to grant anew trial: 253 S.C. 400, 171 S.E.2d 349; 191 Va. 344, 61 S.E.2d 33; 61 S.E.2d p. 40. As to the TrialJudge's properly refusing to grant a new trial upon theground that the jury disregarded the charge: 98 S.C. 400, 82 S.E. 620; 233 S.C. 210, 104 S.E.2d 384; 221 S.C. 14, 68 S.E.2d 874; 229 S.C. 376, 90 2d 107; 166 S.C. 445, 165 S.E. 182. February 14, 1972.
fenses: 253 S.C. 328, 170 S.E.2d 657. As to the Court's erringin allowing the State to put Appellant on trial for both conspiracyand accessory before the fact since both offensesstemmed from the same alleged facts: Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution of South Carolina; Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 19, of the Constitution of South Carolina; 7 F.2d 259, 263. Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., and Timothy G.Quinn, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Columbia, and Marion H.Kinon, Sol., of Dillon, for Respondent, cite: As to the TrialCourt's properly refusing Appellant's motion for a continuance: 251 S.C. 568, 164 S.E.2d 569; 248 S.C. 506, 151 S.E.2d 752; 180 S.E.2d 179. As to the TrialCourt's properly allowing Co-Defendant Steadman to introduceinto evidence a tape recording purported to be a conversationbetween Steadman and State Law EnforcementDivision Agent over the objections of the Appellant: 253 S.C. 400, 171 S.E.2d 349; 243 S.C. 1, 132 S.E.2d 18; 199 S.C. 316, 19 S.E.2d 473; 251 S.C. 456, 163 S.E.2d 217; 29 Am. Jur. 29 Evidence Section 539; 199 S.C. 156, 18 S.E.2d 719; 88 S.C. 229, 70 S.E. 811; 251 S.C. 568, 164 S.E.2d 569. As to the TrialCourt's properly denying the motion to require the Stateto elect between the charges of criminal conspiracy and accessorybefore the fact: 147 S.C. 480, 483, 145 S.E.2d 285; 210 S.C. 157, 415 S.E.2d 865; 232 S.C. 489, 503, 102 S.E.2d 873; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law Section 9 (1); 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168; 76 S.C. 72, 56 S.E. 674; 21 Am. Jur.2d Criminal Law Sec. 182 p. 239; 237 U.S. 632, 59 L.Ed. 1153, 35 S.Ct. 712; 284 U.S. 299, 76 L.Ed. 306, 52 S.Ct. 180; 357 U.S. 386; 2 L.Ed.2d 1405; 78 S.Ct. 1280; 435 F.2d 453; 437 F.2d 1033; Sec. 16-550 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina; 243 S.C. 265, 274, 133 S.E.2d 800; 221 S.C. 300, 70 S.E.2d 355, 356; 232 S.C. 223, 101 S.E.2d 289; 16 Am. Jur.2d Conspiracy Sec. 29; Sec. 16-1, 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina; 22 C.J.S. C