Opinion
No. 51678/2016.
09-29-2017
S.B.H. REALTY, Petitioner–Landlord, v. Ivelisse SANTANA, Respondent–Tenant, "John Doe" and/or "Jane Doe," Respondents–Undertenants.
Jason Fuhrman, Esq., Novick, Edelstein, Lubell, Reisman, Wasserman & Leventhal, P.C., Yonkers, Petitioner's Attorneys. Emilio Paesano, Esq., BOOM!Health Legal Services, Bronx, Respondent's Attorneys.
Jason Fuhrman, Esq., Novick, Edelstein, Lubell, Reisman, Wasserman & Leventhal, P.C., Yonkers, Petitioner's Attorneys.
Emilio Paesano, Esq., BOOM!Health Legal Services, Bronx, Respondent's Attorneys.
DIANE E. LUTWAK, J.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a holdover proceeding based upon the tenant's alleged breach of a substantial obligation of her tenancy and lease in that she chronically paid her rent late. Petitioner alleged that it had to bring five nonpayment proceedings against respondent in five years. In the "Wherefore Clause" of its Holdover Petition, petitioner sought a judgment of possession, a warrant of eviction, past due rent, use and occupancy and attorneys' fees. The case was initially calendared for September 15, 2016 and was adjourned for settlement or trial first to October 27, 2016, then to December 8, 2016 and then to December 15, 2016. Respondent made a motion for summary judgment returnable December 15, 2016 which was adjourned to February 3, 2017 with a briefing schedule for opposition and reply papers. Respondent also requested an award of attorneys' fees in that motion; paragraph 18 of her original lease which commenced April 1, 2003 , a complete copy of which is annexed as Exhibit E to her motion, is entitled "Legal Expense", and includes an agreement for the tenant to pay all legal fees incurred by the landlord in the event it brings a legal proceeding for nonpayment of rent, breach of lease or another reason to terminate the lease or tenancy. The Hon. Brenda Spears issued a Decision and Order dated April 5, 2017 finding that none of the five nonpayment proceedings could be relied on in support of the chronic rent delinquency claim and that the predicate notice was defective on several grounds. Accordingly, Judge Spears granted respondent's motion, dismissed the proceeding and set the case down for an attorneys' fees hearing on May 1, 2017.
The Petition at ¶ 2, and the predicate "Ten (10) Day Notice of Termination" which is incorporated by reference in the Petition at ¶ 10, also refer to the lease.
The Petition and predicate notice of termination describe the lease as being dated April 1, 2005.
THE ATTORNEYS' FEES HEARING
The attorneys' fees hearing took place over the course of three dates—June 8, 2017, July 6, 2017 and August 21, 2017. Three witnesses testified: Emilio Paesano, Esq. and Eva Horowitz, Esq., attorneys from BOOM!Health Legal Services, the non-profit legal services provider representing respondent; and Gregory Bougopolous, Esq. of Novick Edelstein, Lubell, Reisman, Wasserman & Leventhal, P.C., the law firm representing petitioner. All three testified in a straightforward manner and the court finds each witness's testimony to be credible.
Through a combination of his direct testimony and cross-examination, Mr. Paesano testified that BOOM!Health hired him in November 2014, and he was promoted to supervising attorney in December 2016. He has a Bachelor's Degree from the University of Toronto and a Master's Degree in legal philosophy from York University and is a 2014 graduate of Cardozo Law School, where he completed a guardianship clinic, held internships at GMHC and MFY Legal Services and was awarded a post-graduate "Bridge–to–Practice" fellowship. Mr. Paesano testified that he passed the New York State Bar in 2015, was admitted in 2016 , has an hourly billing rate of $275 and that BOOM!Health has protocols for maintaining contemporaneous time records in -hour increments in a computer-based timekeeping system. Mr. Paesano testified that he joined his colleague Eva Horowitz in working on this case as of December 8, 2016, and their time records were admitted into evidence over the objection of petitioner's attorney. Those time records reflect 6.75 hours of work done by Ms. Horowitz from September 29, 2016 through January 23, 2017 and 30 hours of work done by Mr. Paesano from December 8, 2016 through June 7, 2017. The Court sustained petitioner's objection to Mr. Paesano testifying about the work done by Ms. Horowitz .
The court has confirmed Mr. Paesano's date of admission to the Bar in December 2016 and law school by taking judicial notice of the information found on the "Attorney Registration" page of the New York State Unified Court System's ("NYSUCS") website.
However, see fn 9, supra.
In response to questions on cross-examination about certain entries in his time records Mr. Paesano explained:
He billed 75 minutes for the December 8, 2016 and February 3, 2017 court appearances because this was the amount of time he had to spend in the courtroom on those days, including waiting time.He billed 30 minutes on April 11, 2017 to prepare the Notice of Entry because he had to prepare, print, copy, assemble, affix postage to and mail the document himself. Ms. Horowitz testified that she graduated from law school in 2012 and has been working at BOOM!Health since 2015 representing tenants in Housing Court. She further testified that the time records which had previously been introduced into evidence accurately reflect the time she spent working on this case—going to court, reviewing the files from the underlying nonpayment proceedings, and trying to settle the case. On cross-examination she explained that while BOOM! Health does employ paralegals, retrieving, reviewing and copying the relevant documents in the court files for the five nonpayment proceedings—which she billed a total of one hour for—was work she needed to do herself because some of the files were quite large and a paralegal wouldn't know which documents to copy.
The court has confirmed Ms. Horowitz's date of admission to the Bar in August 2013 by taking judicial notice of the information found on the "Attorney Registration" page of the NYSUCS website, which also indicates that she is a graduate of Harvard Law School.
Mr. Bougopoulos testified that he was admitted to the New York State Bar in 2007 , and in 2008 joined Novick Edelstein, where he is now a Partner. He handles all types of real estate and landlord-tenant matters. His law firm's computer-based case notes and billing records—which he testified reflect time spent in .1–hour increments—were admitted into evidence (the latter over objection). Those records reflect a combination of flat-fee and time-worked billing; for example, $600 was charged for the initial court appearance on September 15, 2016, and then nothing was charged for subsequent court appearances except for a charge of $475 for the appearance on February 3, 2017, the day the summary judgment motion was argued. Mr. Bougopoulos testified that his hourly billing rate started at $200 when he was first hired in 2008 and increased over time to a current rate of $275. He testified that he appeared in court four times on this case prior to the motion for summary judgment, worked approximately 6.5 hours on this case during that time and then spent 5.2 hours preparing the papers in opposition to respondent's motion. His colleague Jason Fuhrman, Esq., who had not previously worked on this case and whose hourly billing rate is $300, argued the summary judgment motion. Petitioner's total bill for this case was $6099.91 through and including preparation of a motion to stay the attorneys' fees hearing pending appeal.
The court has confirmed Mr. Bougopoulos's date of admission to the Bar in April 2007 by taking judicial notice of the information found on the "Attorney Registration" page of the NYSUCS website, which also indicates that he is a graduate of St. John's University School of Law.
THE PARTIES' CLOSING ARGUMENTS
In his written closing argument, respondent's attorney argues that the amount of attorneys' fees requested is reasonable, and is amply supported by the testimony and time records. Respondent seeks attorneys' fees of $9262.50 for work performed up to the hearing, and, based on the attorneys' affirmations attached to the closing argument (as per the court's request), an additional $1062.50 for the fees hearing for a total of $10,325. The pre-hearing work is comprised of 6.75 hours of Ms. Horowitz's time, billed at the hourly rate of $150 for a total of $1012.50, and 30 hours of Mr. Paesano's time, billed at the hourly rate of $275, for a total of $8250. Respondent argues that a comparison of the BOOM!Health time records with those of petitioner's attorney indicates that, "if anything, Mr. Paesano was conservative with his billing." The $1062.50 requested for time spent on the attorneys' fees hearing (an hour and a half in court and fifteen minutes out of court) includes, in addition to time spent by Mr. Paesano and Ms. Horowitz, the time of Richard N. Kahn, Esq., who conducted the hearing and also worked on the post-hearing written submission and describes himself in his affirmation as Vice President of Legal Services at BOOM!Health, an attorney in good standing with the New York State Bar for the past twenty-one years who has litigated in Bronx Housing Court for seventeen years and currently bills at $375 per hour.
The court has confirmed Mr. Kahn's date of admission to the Bar in June 1996 by taking judicial notice of the information found on the "Attorney Registration" page of the NYSUCS website, which also indicates that he is a graduate of Boston College Law School.
Petitioner's attorney submitted a "Post–Legal Fee Hearing Memorandum of Law" in which he lays out the applicable legal standards and argues first that, while respondent is the prevailing party at this juncture (pending the outcome of an appeal), respondent failed to present evidence of a lease entitling her to legal fees. Second, petitioner argues that the amount sought is not reasonable. Petitioner's attorney argues that the billing records are impermissibly vague, that they are excessive compared with what his firm charged petitioner and that the practice of billing in quarter-hour increments, rather than .1 hour increments as billed by petitioner's attorneys, results in inflated bills.
Petitioner argues that Mr. Paesano's billing rate of $275 per hour is not reasonable, and points to the testimony of Mr. Bougopolous, who asserted that when he was an attorney with comparable experience to Mr. Paesano his billing rate was $250 per hour.
Regarding the time spent by Mr. Paesano, petitioner argues that his time records "are completely incredible and unreliable" and should be disregarded. Petitioner's attorney asserts that Mr. Paesano testified that he began working on this case on December 18, 2016, and that his time records for seven dates of work done prior to that date are therefore "an impossibility". Regarding Mr. Paesano's time record for January 20, 2017, petitioner argues that there is no justification for a quarter-hour of billing to review an email. Regarding Mr. Paesano's billing records for the time spent drafting his reply to petitioner's opposition to the motion for summary judgment, petitioner allows that the billing notes for January 25, 26 and 30, 2017 were sufficiently specific, but argues that the total of six hours was an unreasonable amount of time for a reply that constitutes "overbilling"; further, the additional 2.25 hours spent on February 1, 2017 should be disregarded because the billing note "does not say what type of work was being performed". Petitioner also argues that respondent should not be allowed to bill for 1.25 hours on the date the motion was argued, as most of this was waiting time and it is not reasonable to bill for this, even if respondent's attorney had no other cases on the calendar that day.
Regarding time spent following the court's Decision and Order dated April 5, 2017 granting respondent's summary judgment motion, petitioner argues:
.5 hours for preparing, serving and filing a Notice of Entry on April 11, 2017 is excessive and primarily clerical/secretarial work which should not have been billed at an attorney's hourly rate 1. .5 hours to appear at the Appellate Term on May 31, 2017 on petitioner's motion for a stay pending appeal "is completely false and must be stricken" as such motions are submitted without argument and "there is no legitimate reason for EP to have been at the Appellate Term for this case on that day" 1. 1.0 hours of Mr. Paesano's time spent preparing for the attorneys' fees hearing on June 7, 2017 should be stricken as "improper block billing", given that this meeting does not appear in the time records of Ms. Horowitz and there was no testimony as to what conversations took place that day with either Mr. Paesano's colleagues or with "opa" (opposing party's attorney) Petitioner also objects to the testimony and time records of Ms. Horowitz. First, petitioner asserts that there was no testimony about her years of experience or billing rate. In addition, petitioner objects individually to almost every one of the fourteen items of work listed on Ms. Horowitz's billing records, which add up to 6.75 hours.
DISCUSSION
Having heard and reviewed the testimony and documents presented at the hearing, as well as the post-hearing submissions and the court file, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that respondent is entitled to attorneys' fees of $8961.25, payable to her attorneys BOOM!Health Legal Services.
RESPONDENT'S ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS' FEES
Respondent proved her entitlement to legal fees, as a copy of the original lease between the parties dated April 1, 2003 was attached as Exhibit E to respondent's motion for summary judgment. Under paragraph "18th" of that lease, "the Tenant agrees to pay all costs, expenses and legal fees incurred by the Landlord" in a proceeding brought, inter alia, "to terminate the Tenant's lease or tenancy." Section 234 of the New York State Real Property Law provides a reciprocal right to attorneys' fees for a tenant who substantially prevails in defending against a landlord's lawsuit based upon the tenant's failure to comply with a lease which includes a provision that permits the landlord to recover if successful in prosecuting that action. See, e.g., Troy v. Oberlander (146 A.D.2d 460, 536 N.Y.S.2d 73 [1st Dep't 1989]. The fact that the attorneys who provided the legal services work for a non-profit organization which does not charge its clients for services does not impact its ability to recover reasonable attorneys' fees under RPL § 234. Maplewood Management, Inc v. Best (143 A.D.2d 978, 533 N.Y.S.2d 612 [2nd Dep't 1988] ).
While the lease was not introduced into evidence at the attorneys' fees hearing, this is a proceeding based upon alleged breach of lease and there appears to be no dispute as to the lease's existence or to its attorneys' fees provision, which petitioner itself referenced in the "Wherefore Clause" of its Holdover Petition which requests attorneys' fees. Nestor v. Britt (270 A.D.2d 192, 707 N.Y.S.2d 11 [1st Dep't 2000] )(landlord estopped from arguing invalidity of attorneys' fees provision in lease where the relief requested in its own papers included attorneys' fees based on that lease). As the lease and the Petition are part of the Court's file in this proceeding, which was reviewed by Judge Spears prior to issuing her Decision and Order granting summary judgment to respondent and setting the case down for an attorneys' fees hearing, this Court finds that respondent's reciprocal entitlement to legal fees under the lease has been established.
See fn 1, supra.
The issue at stake in this proceeding was the landlord's right to evict the tenant from her home due to alleged chronic rent delinquency, and the outcome was dismissal of the proceeding on respondent's motion for summary judgment and reinstatement of her tenancy. In other words, respondent is the prevailing party as the outcome was 100% favorable to her. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to have her attorneys' fees paid for by petitioner and it is an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion to order that those fees be made payable directly to her attorneys. Diaz v. Audi of Am, Inc (57 AD3d 828, 873 N.Y.S.2d 308 [2nd Dep't 2008] ); Hing v. Abreu (2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4889, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op 32615[U][Sup Ct Qns Co 2016] ); 1097 Holding LLC v. Ballesteros (19 Misc.3d 1126[A], 862 N.Y.S.2d 816 [Civ Ct Bx Co 2008] ).
BILLING RECORDS
An attorney who worked on the case, and who has sufficient knowledge of the case and of the billing practices of the firm, is competent to testify in support of a party's claim for legal fees and to lay a foundation for the billing records of all attorneys at the firm who worked on the case. For example, in Nestor v. Britt (16 Misc.3d 368, 834 N.Y.S.2d 458 [Civ Ct N.Y. Co 2007), the court permitted the junior partner who worked on the case to introduce into evidence both his own billing records and those of the senior partner who also worked on the case. See also, e.g., 407 E 81 Realty LLC v. Creighton (36 Misc.3d 1220[A], 959 N.Y.S.2d 89 [Civ Ct N.Y. Co 2012] ).
The billing records, testimony and post-trial affirmations of respondent's counsel are sufficient to determine the hours reasonably expended in litigating this case. Mr. Paesano testified that his office's funders and protocols require maintenance of computer-based, contemporaneous time records on all cases and that his office's timekeeping system records time in quarter-hour segments. A timekeeping system based on time blocks of .25 hours is acceptable. 1097 Holding LLC v. Ballesteros (19 Misc.3d 1126[A], 862 N.Y.S.2d 816 [Civ Ct Bx Co 2008] )(awarding attorneys' fees after a hearing to respondent-tenant represented by LSNY, which used the "KEMP" timekeeping system which records 15–minute increments). The billing records which were admitted into evidence indicate the attorney who performed the work, the date, the hours expended and the nature of the work done.
While the Court sustained petitioner's objection to Mr. Paesano testifying about the work Ms. Horowitz did on the case, following which respondent called Ms. Horowitz as a second witness at the attorneys' fees hearing, case law does permit an attorney who worked on a case and is familiar with the firm's billing practices to introduce into evidence the firm's billing records for other attorneys who worked on the case. Finding meritless petitioner's argument that there was an insufficient basis to consider bills for work completed by attorneys other than the one testifying, the Hon. Gerald Lebovits explained, "In fact, petitioner's proposition would only serve to increase the amount of legal fees due if every person who worked on a case were required to testify in support of the claim for fees." 407 E 81 Realty LLC v. Creighton (36 Misc.3d 1220(A), 1220, 959 N.Y.S.2d 89 [Civ Ct N.Y. Co 2012] ).
The Court rejects petitioner's argument that Mr. Paesano's time records "are completely incredible and unreliable". First, petitioner misstates Mr. Paesano's testimony: he testified that he began working on the case on December 8, 2016, as indicated in his time records, not on December 18, 2016. Second, the Court rejects petitioner's argument that "there is no justification for a—hour of billing to simply read an e-mail" on January 20, 2017. Mr. Paesano included only this one time entry pertaining to any e-mails throughout his six months of time records for this case and did not separately itemize entries for digesting, analyzing and responding to the email; while it may be "common knowledge that many e-mails take seconds to a few minutes to read," as argued by petitioner's attorney, it is also common knowledge that many other e-mails take much longer than a few minutes to read, digest, analyze and respond to.
REASONABLE AND PROPER FEES
To determine the amount of an attorneys' fees award, as explained by the Appellate Division, First Department, "The relevant factors are the nature and extent of the services, the actual time spent, the necessity therefor, the nature of the issues involved, the professional standing of counsel, and the results achieved." Jordan v. Freeman (40 A.D.2d 656, 656–657, 336 N.Y.S.2d 671, 671–672 [1st Dep't 1972] ), quoted in 542 E 14th St LLC v. Lee (66 AD3d 18, 883 N.Y.S.2d 188 [1st Dep't 2009] ). Further, the court "may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and in the light of such knowledge and experience, the court may form an independent judgment from the facts and evidence before it as to the nature and extent of the services rendered, make an appraisal of such services, and determine the reasonable value thereof."Id.
Petitioner objects to the amount of time Mr. Paesano spent on the reply papers as unreasonable. Regarding the 2.25 hours Mr. Paesano billed on February 1, 2017, the Court agrees this is excessive when added to the prior six hours, especially given that the type of work performed was not specified. However, the Court rejects petitioner's argument that the initial six hours is "overbilling". While the arguments in the reply papers do look similar in many respects to the initial motion papers, before writing the reply it is evident that Mr. Paesano first had to read and analyze petitioner's somewhat voluminous (18 pages of petitioner's attorney's affirmation and managing agent's affidavit with accompanying Exhibits A through R) opposition papers and conduct legal research. While a more experienced and knowledgeable attorney might have been able to prepare the reply in less than six hours, the papers were well-written and the result achieved was the relief requested—the motion was granted and the petition dismissed. As set forth below, the Court has adjusted for Mr. Paesano's experience level by reducing the hourly billing rate he requested.
Further, the court strikes the .5 hours Mr. Paesano billed for his time pertaining to a court appearance on petitioner's motion for a stay of the attorneys' fees hearing at the Appellate Term. As petitioner correctly points out, motions are not heard in person at the Appellate Term. Whether Mr. Paesano intended this billing item to cover his work for some other aspect of petitioner's motion cannot be determined from either his testimony at the hearing or the billing records.
However, the court is not reducing the amount of time Mr. Paesano spent on appearances in Housing Court; an attorney who spends two hours in court even if only for the purpose of adjourning just one case is entitled to bill for that time. It is certainly reasonable for an attorney's time spent waiting for their adversary to appear and/or the court to call the case to be billed in full. See, e.g., Drapala v. Pasan (2017 N.Y. Slip Op 50738[U], 55 Misc.3d 1222[A] [Civ Ct Kings Co 2017] )(time records include numerous non-trial court appearances billed for 2– and 3–hour time slots). In fact, whereas Mr. Paesano billed 1.25 hours for his appearance on February 3, 2017 to argue his summary judgment motion, petitioner's attorney billed $475, which, when divided by the $300 per hour rate of the attorney who argued the motion (Mr. Fuhrman), results in 1.58 hours spent in court on that day on this case. Petitioner's argument that "Housing court is a volume practice, not a boutique practiced based upon hourly billing" is misguided and undercut by petitioner's attorneys' own billing records. While petitioner's attorneys may charge modest rates for its volume practice, sizable attorneys' fees awards based on hourly billings can be and are awarded in Housing Court proceedings where appropriate. See, e.g., 407 E 81 Realty LLC v. Creighton (36 Misc.3d 1220[A], 959 N.Y.S.2d 89 [Civ Ct N.Y. Co 2012] ); Ninth Avenue Realty LLC v. Mckay and Silver (2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6116 [Civ Ct N.Y. Co 2012] ); Ross v. Congregation B'Nai Abraham Mordechai (12 Misc.3d 559, 814 N.Y.S.2d 837 [Civ Ct N.Y. Co 2006] ).
Petitioner's objections to Mr. Paesano's June 7, 2017 entry for time spent preparing and meeting with his colleagues in advance of the attorneys' fees hearing are unavailing. That Mr. Paesano did not testify about this item is of no moment; there is no need for direct testimony regarding each item listed on billing records and he did answer all questions he was asked on cross-examination. That this item does not appear in Ms. Horowitz's time records reflects underbilling, not overbilling.
The court finds that the 6.5 hours Ms. Horowitz spent handling various aspects of the case from September 29, 2016 through December 9, 2016 was reasonable and appropriate, if not even a bit scant . The Court rejects petitioner's argument that spending an hour on September 29, 2016 to "review file" is excessive because the file at that point would have only contained the Notice of Petition and Petition. A client's file consists not only of the papers the opposing party filed with the court, but also includes the client's own documents which, for clients of nonprofit legal services providers, invariably includes documentation of the identity, income and government benefits of each member of the household. Further, in a case like this one based on alleged chronic rent delinquency and five prior nonpayment proceedings, the client's rent payment records and documents from prior court cases would likely be part of the client's file.
For example, presumably Ms. Horowitz or another BOOM!Health staff member would have conducted an initial intake meeting with respondent, which likely would have lasted anywhere from a half hour to two hours or more, which is not reflected in Ms. Horowitz's billing records.
Regarding two items billed at .5 hours each for copying and reviewing files, Ms. Horowitz explained in her testimony that part of the work she did on this case was to review the files from the five prior nonpayment proceedings upon which this chronic rent delinquency holdover proceeding was based. Petitioner's attorney argues that while file review is appropriate for an attorney, it is not appropriate for an attorney to bill for the work of retrieving and copying those files which should have been done by a paralegal. Ms. Horowitz's explanation that the retrieving and copying time was minimal and that the bulk of the work consisted of reviewing what were in some cases large files to determine which papers were relevant to respondent's case, work that a paralegal would not have been able to do is convincing. Putting aside the differences in staffing structures at for-profit and not-for-profit law offices, a total of one hour spent by an attorney to review five nonpayment proceeding files is well within the bounds of reasonableness. The other items billed add up, if anything, to less than what is reasonable to expect for the tasks of initial intake, case assessment, strategy development and settlement negotiations at two court appearances.
See fn 10, supra.
The only item Ms. Horowitz billed for which is stricken is for .25 hours on January 23, 2017, where the notation states "email to HRA", which the Court assumes to be a reference to the City's Human Resources Administration. This item of work does not appear on its face to pertain to the within proceeding, and there was no testimony which tied it in.
BILLING RATES
The court has applied hourly billing rates of $250 for Mr. Paesano, $150 for Ms. Horowitz and $375 for Mr. Kahn, which are appropriate and reasonable for attorneys with their respective years of legal experience who appear regularly in Bronx Housing Court. With regard to Mr. Paesano's hourly rate, the Court accepts the argument of petitioner's attorney and reduces it from the requested amount of $275 to $250 based on the totality of the evidence presented, including the testimony of Mr. Bougopoulos, who explained that he was admitted to practice law in New York State in 2006 and has worked at his firm specializing in real estate and landlord-tenant matters since 2008, with an initial hourly billing rate of $200 which increased by $25 increments over the years to his current rate of $275.
Mr. Paesano's hourly billing rate for the half hour he spent on April 11, 2017 preparing, serving and filing a Notice of Entry of Judge Spears' Decision and Order is reduced, as this is work that could have been done by a paralegal or intern. A reasonable hourly rate for work of paralegals and interns is $85, see, e.g., Hing v. Abreu (2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4889, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op 32615[U][Civ Ct Qns Co 2016] ), and, accordingly, the court allows a charge of $42.50 for the Notice of Entry.
While Ms. Horowitz did not testify to her billing rate, she did testify that she graduated from law school in 2012 and has worked at BOOM!Health since 2015 representing tenants in Housing Court. The rate of $150 per hour requested in Mr. Kahn's post-hearing submission is below the range of rates testified to by Mr. Bougopolous for junior associates and more than reasonable for a Harvard Law School graduate who was admitted to the New York State Bar four years ago .
See fn 5, supra.
The hourly rate of $375 is reasonable for Mr. Kahn in view of his experience, his education, the degree of complexity of the litigation, his responsibilities in this matter, the result achieved and the prevailing rates in this area.
ATTORNEYS' FEES DUE FOR PRE–HEARING WORK
Based on the allowable hours and billing rates discussed above, the legal fees petitioner is required to pay respondent's attorneys adds up to $7830, comprised of $975 for Ms. Horowitz's time (6.5 hours x $150/hour); $6,812.50 for Mr. Paesano's time on all tasks except for those related to the Notice of Entry (27.25 hours x $250/hour); and $42.50 for Mr. Paesano's time on the Notice of Entry (.5 hours x $85).
FEES ON FEES
Attorneys are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for services performed to recover a fee ("fees on fees"). See, e.g., Senfeld v. ISTA Holding Co (235 A.D.2d 345, 652 N.Y.S.2d 738 [1st Dep't 1997] ); Kumble v. Windsor Plaza Co (161 A.D.2d 259, 555 N.Y.S.2d 290 [1st Dep't 1990] ). The hearing lasted for approximately 1.5 hours and took place over the course of three different days . Mr. Kahn asserts that he spent 1.5 hours in court and .25 hours on the post-hearing written submission which results in a fee of $656.25 at the hourly rate of $375. Mr. Paesano asserts that he also spent 1.5 hours in court and .25 hours on the post-hearing written submission which results in a fee of $437.50 at the hourly rate of $250. Ms. Horowitz asserts that she spent .25 hours at the hearing which results in a fee of $37.50 at the hourly rate of $150. The total amount of the attorneys' fees for the services performed to recover the fee is $1131.25 ($656.25 + $437.50 + $37.50).
Certain of petitioner's objections to evidence offered by respondent resulted in the hearing lasting longer than it might otherwise have. For example, petitioner objected to Mr. Paesano's resumé going into evidence as an exhibit, the Court sustained the objection, and then Mr. Paesano needed additional time to testify about his educational and employment background. Also see fn 9, supra.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court grants respondent's motion and awards reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $8961.25. Accordingly, the clerk of the court shall enter a money judgment in favor of respondents' attorneys and against petitioner in the sum of $8961.25. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court, copies of which are being provided to the parties' respective counsel in the courthouse.
So Ordered: