Opinion
16-cv-03775-LB
01-28-2022
SHAUNAK SAYTA, Plaintiff, v. BENNY MARTIN, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING RECOVERY OF COSTS AND FEES IN PART AND DENYING MOTION TO QUASH WITHOUT PREJUDICE
RE: ECF NOS. 169, 170, 171, 173, 180
LAUREL BEELER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT
The court previously confirmed arbitration awards in favor of Shaunak Sayta's former lawyer, Benjamin Martin, and awarded him attorney's fees and costs. Mr. Sayta appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and entered judgment in Mr. Martin's favor against Mr. Sayta and his lawyer, John Cowan, awarding $47,372 attorney's fees and costs. Sayta v. Martin, No. 18-17090, Mem. Op. (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2020), ECF No. 37; id., Am. Mandate (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2021), ECF No. 47. The court issued a Writ of Execution in the amount of $47,372 on September 20, 2021. Mr. Martin served subpoenas on several third parties in an apparent effort to identify and levy Mr. Cowen's assets.Mr. Martin also filed a Memorandum of Costs on October 19, 2021 seeking costs and attorney's fees incurred to enforce the Ninth Circuit's judgment. Mr. Cowen moved to quash the subpoenas on October 26, 2021 and objected to the Memorandum of Costs on November 2, 2021.
Orders - ECF Nos. 50, 70; Judgments - ECF Nos. 51, 71. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.
Notice of Appeal - ECF No. 73.
Writ of Execution - ECF No. 165.
Martin Decl. - ECF No. 176-1 at 2 and 6-18.
Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 169.
Mot. to Quash - ECF Nos. 170, 171; Obj. to Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 173.
On January 18, 2022, Mr. Martin filed an Application for a Writ of Execution claiming $25,725.03 for an October 19, 2021 “judgment.” On the same day, Mr. Cowen objected on grounds that there is no judgment to support Mr. Martin's Writ. The purported “judgment” referenced in the Writ appears to be an erroneous reference to Mr. Martin's Memorandum of Costs, which is the subject of this order.
Writ of Execution - ECF No. 180 at 1.
Obj. Writ of Execution - ECF No. 181 at 2.
The court denies in part recovery of the costs claimed in the Memorandum of Costs. Most costs sought therein are not claimable as a matter of right without a noticed motion, and the majority of the claimed attorney's fees were not “reasonable and necessary.” The court denies Mr. Cowen's motion to quash without prejudice for failing to comply with the court's Standing Order concerning discovery disputes. All parties have consented to magistrate jurisdiction. The court can decide the case without oral argument under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).
Consents - ECF Nos. 5, 12.
ANALYSIS
1. Statutory Framework: Recovery of Costs Incurred to Enforce a Judgment
Absent an applicable federal statute, California law governs the enforcement of writs of execution when the district court proceedings were held in California. Fed.R.Civ.P. 69; Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 95 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1996). California's Enforcement of Judgments Law is codified as Title 9 of California's Code of Civil Procedure and provides a comprehensive scheme governing the enforcement of judgments. Hilao, 95 F.3d at 851. Courts should apply the Enforcement of Judgments Law “in a common sense manner.” Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). Enforcement costs fall into two categories, those authorized as a matter of right (claimable through a memorandum of costs or noticed motion) and other costs that may be granted on a discretionary basis (claimable by noticed motion). Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Elizabeth Arden, No. C 10-80058 SI, 2010 WL 5018386, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2010).
Costs that are available as a matter of right are identified in California Code of Civil Procedure § 685.070(a). Xcentric Ventures, 2010 WL 5018386, at *2. To obtain costs as a matter of right, the judgment creditor need only file a memorandum of costs with an attestation that the costs are correct, reasonable, necessary, and have not been satisfied. Id. To challenge the claimed costs, the judgment debtor has ten days after being served with the memorandum of costs to file either a noticed motion to have the costs taxed by the court or objections to the memorandum of costs. Id. (costs should be challenged through a noticed motion) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.070(c)); Schutza v. Walter E. Fielder, Inc., No. 18-CV-0257-BAS-LL, 2019 WL 5295075, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2019) (“The filing of objections to a memorandum of costs may be deemed a motion to tax costs where the motion was timely, and each item in the objections corresponds to each successive line in the other party's cost memorandum.”) (citing 16 William Lindsley, Cal. Juris., 16 Cal. Jur. 3d Costs § 96 (3d ed. 2019)).
While judgment creditors may seek additional “reasonable and necessary” costs that are not specifically identified in § 685.070, the judgment creditor must file a noticed motion to request those costs. Xcentric Ventures, 2010 WL 5018386, at *2; see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.080(a) (“The judgment creditor may claim costs authorized by Section 685.040 by noticed motion.”). Regardless of whether costs are claimed through a noticed motion or a memorandum of costs, the request must be made before the judgment is fully satisfied. Yeager v. Bowlin, No. Civ. 2:08-102 WBS, 2015 WL 3795585, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (“Under either method [i.e., a memorandum of costs or noticed motion], however, the judgement creditor must request postjudgment attorneys' fees before the underlying judgment is fully satisfied”) (citing §§ 685.070(b), 685.080(a)).
2. Recoverability of Attorney's Fees
California law provides that judgment creditors may obtain attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment as a matter of right “if allowed by Section 685.040” by filing a noticed motion or memorandum of costs. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.070(a)(6); Carnes, 488 F.3d at 1060 (“The judgment creditor may seek to recover attorney fees incurred in enforcing a judgment by either filing a memorandum of costs or by serving a noticed motion.”); see also Love v. Guerrero, No. ED CV 13-1655-DMG(SPx), 2016 WL 11672296, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016) (“Attorney's fees are also allowable as of right, on the judgment creditor's memorandum of costs, when those fees are authorized by statute or contract.”); but see Karnazes v. Hartford, No. A136400, 2014 WL 511089, at *1 (Cal.Ct.App. Feb. 10, 2014) (a noticed motion, rather than a memorandum of costs, is required in order to claim attorney's fees incurred while attempting to enforce a judgment under §§ 685.070 and 685.040), as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 3, 2014) (unpublished). In this regard, § 685.040 provides that:
[t]he judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law. Attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney's fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.
The “second sentence of section 685.040 applies to noncontract cases” and provides that attorney's fees may be recovered as costs if authorized by statute and expended to enforce a judgment. Rosen v. LegacyQuest, 225 Cal.App.4th 375, 382 (2014) (“When attorney fees are authorized by statute, they have been ‘otherwise provided by law' and thus may be recovered as costs if expended to enforce a judgment.”) (cleaned up). Regarding the reference to § 1033.5(a)(10)(A) in the last sentence of § 685.040, § 1033.5(a)(10)(A) provides that costs include, “[a]ttorney's fees, when authorized by. . . [c]ontract.” In sum, costs incurred to enforce a judgment include attorney's fees when the underlying judgment included an award of attorney's fees pursuant to a statute or contract.
For example, in Goldman v. Gagnard, the prevailing party in an arbitration asked the court to confirm the arbitration award and then sought post-judgment attorney's fees incurred to enforce the judgment pursuant to § 685.040. No. 11-CV-03028 LHK, 2013 WL 4064878, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013). The court found that post-judgment attorney's fees were recoverable under § 685.040 even though the total judgment was not itemized because attorney's fees were included in the underlying arbitration award. Id. at *3; Cf. Imperial Bank v. Pim Elec., Inc., 33 Cal.App.4th 540, 558 (1995) (“The absence of any fee award in the underlying judgment precludes the recovery of fees as costs in the trial court for enforcing the money judgment, and necessarily precludes the award of attorneys' fees on appeal.”). Similarly, when attorney's fees are awarded under California Civil Code § 1717 (providing for the recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party on contract actions where the contract provides for an award of attorney's fees), then the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees incurred to enforce the judgment under § 685.040. Logtale, Ltd. v. IKOR, Inc., No. 11-CV-05452-EDL, 2019 WL 12517082, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (finding that “[s]ection 1033.5 includes attorney's fees authorized by contract under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1717 as an allowable cost, ” and awarding plaintiff attorney's fees incurred to enforce judgment where the court “entered a judgment in Plaintiff's favor based on a contract that included an attorney's fees provision, awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees based on its success in that action, and those attorney's fees are part of the overall award that Plaintiff has been attempting to enforce.”).
Furthermore, if the statute on which a judgment was based provides a right to attorney's fees, then attorney's fees incurred to enforce that judgment are recoverable costs under § 685.040. York v. Strong, 234 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1477 (2015) (“[T]here was no need for the trial court to wrestle with the language of section 685.040 in this case, because our Supreme Court previously ruled in Ketchum that attorney fees incurred in an effort to enforce a fee judgment obtained under the anti-SLAPP law do qualify as recoverable costs under section 685.040 . . . .”) (citing Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 n.6 (2001)); Berti v. Santa Barbara Beach Props., 145 Cal.App.4th 70, 77 (2006) (affirming award of attorney's fees incurred to enforce statutory attorney's fee award under California Corporations Code § 15634 (repealed 2010)).
Attorney's fees incurred to enforce a judgment based on a federal statute are also recoverable under § 685.040. Erickson v. Sympathy for the Rec. Indus. ex rel. Mermis, No. C10-00636 HRL, 2011 WL 1211533, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011) (permitting the recovery of post-judgment attorney's fees under § 685.040 where the underlying judgment was based on violations of the Copyright Act, which provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party as part of the costs (17 U.S.C. § 505)). On the other hand, a judgment awarding attorney's fees under foreign law does not support a post-judgment fees award under § 685.040. China Branding Grp. Ltd. v. Tony Bobnlinski, No. 2:20-CV-06759-RGK-JC, 2021 WL 1678976, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2021) (“Though Plaintiff was awarded attorneys' fees in the Cayman action in accordance with Cayman law, the award of fees was not pursuant to section 1717 of the California Civil Code, nor any other statute that California courts have recognized as a basis to support an award of attorneys' fees under § 685.040.”).
Here, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Mr. Sayta's appeal in part, affirmed the court's confirmation of an arbitration award to Mr. Martin, and then awarded $46,980 in attorney's fees and $392 in double costs (totaling $47,372) to Mr. Martin against both Mr. Sayta and Mr. Cowan. Memorandum, Sayta v. Martin, No. 18-17090, (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2020), ECF No. 37-1; Am. Mandate, id., (9th Cir. Feb 3, 2021), ECF No. 47. Regarding the basis for the Ninth Circuit's fee award, Mr. Martin asserted that the appeal was frivolous and sought costs and attorney's fees on that basis under the following authorities: (1) Ninth Circuit Rules 46-2(a), 30-2(d); (2) Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 and 46(c); (3) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1927; and (4) California Civil Code § 1717. Id., Appellee's Mot. for Attorney's Fees (9th Cir. March 19, 2020), ECF No. 40-1 at 2. Regarding the claim for fees under § 1717 on appeal, Mr. Martin relied on the prevailing party attorney's fee provision in the underlying agreement and this court's prior award of fees under § 1717. Id., ECF No. 40-1 at 18.
While the Ninth Circuit's order does not identify a specific basis for the award of attorney's fees, the order explicitly awards attorney's fees and costs and - given the grounds on which Mr. Martin sought attorney's fees - there is no question that the Ninth Circuit awarded attorney's fees pursuant to a federal or California statute or the underlying contract. Id., Order (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2020), ECF No. 41. Thus, Mr. Martin is entitled to “reasonable and necessary” post-judgment attorney's fees incurred to enforce the judgment under § 685.040.
3. Mr. Cowen's Challenges to the Claimed Fees
Mr. Cowen challenged the costs claimed by filing objections to the Memorandum of Costs.Mr. Martin claims that the objections were untimely. After Mr. Martin filed the Memorandum of Costs on October 19, 2021, Mr. Cowen filed objections fourteen days later on November 2, 2021, which was the deadline for objections identified on the court's docket. Section 685.070(c) provides that the judgment debtor has ten days after service to object to a memorandum of costs, and § 685.070(f) provides that California Code of Civil Procedure § 1013 applies to § 685.070. In this regard, § 1013(g) permits electronic service under § 1010.6, and § 1010.6(a)(4)(B) provides for an extension of time to do any act by two court days after service by electronic means. Bryant Fam. Vineyard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 16-CV-00125-JST, 2016 WL 1410127, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2016) (noting that the two-court-day extension under § 1010.6(a) applies only where the document served was filed with the court). October 29, 2021 fell ten days after Mr. Martin filed the Memorandum of Costs with the court, and November 2, 2021 was two court days after October 29, 2021. Accordingly, Mr. Cowen's objections were timely, and the court construes the objections as a motion to tax costs. Schutza, 2019 WL 5295075, at *2 (construing an objection to a memorandum of costs as a motion to tax costs).
Obj. to Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 173.
Opp'n to Objs. to Post-Judgment Cost Bill - ECF No. 176 at 7-8.
Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 169 (“Objections due by 11/2/2021.”) (Docket Entry); Objs. to Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 173.
Regarding the substance of Mr. Cowen's objections, Mr. Cowen - citing Jaffe v. Pacelli, 165 Cal.App.4th 927, 934-38 (2008) - argues that attorney's fees are collectible as costs only “if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney's fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.” Mr. Cowen further argues that Mr. Martin was required to file a noticed motion to claim attorney's fees under §§ 685.070 and 685.040. Neither contention is correct. Carnes, 488 F.3d at 1060 (“attorney fees incurred in enforcing a judgment” may be obtained either through a memorandum of costs or noticed motion); Berti, 145 Cal.App.4th at 77 (“[Defendant's] argument [that statutory attorney's fees incurred to enforce a judgment are not recoverable under § 685.040] ignores that the penultimate sentence of Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 authorizes postjudgment fees provided by law.”).
Reply in Supp. of Obj. to Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 177 at 5.
Id.; Obj. to Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 173 at 3.
Mr. Cowen also faults Mr. Martin's failure to complete Section 10 of the Memorandum of Costs (Worksheet) MC-011 by including a statement concerning “whether the attorney fees are contractual or statutory.” Mr. Cowen has not, however, identified any authority precluding the award of attorney's fees based on clerical errors in a memorandum of costs. Denying attorney's fees due to a clerical error in the Memorandum of Costs Worksheet would contradict the Ninth Circuit's instruction to apply California's Enforcement of Judgments Law “in a common sense manner.” Carnes, 488 F.3d at 1060.
Reply in Supp. of Objs. to Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 177 at 4.
Concerning the requirement to file the memorandum before the judgment is fully satisfied, Wells Fargo levied Mr. Cowen's account on October 8, 2021 in the sum of $47,372. According to Mr. Martin's declaration and Wells Fargo's Memorandum of Garnishee, the levied funds have not, however, been delivered to the U.S. Marshals Service or to Mr. Martin. Therefore, the judgment was not fully satisfied before Mr. Martin filed the Memorandum of Costs. Gray1 CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc., 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 895 (2015) (finding that judgment was fully satisfied when judgment creditor accepted cashier's check for amount of judgment plus accrued interest and awarded costs); Anderson v. Kellogg, No. H030311, 2007 WL 1244348, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App. Apr. 30, 2007) (finding that judgment was fully satisfied when “appellant paid the Sheriff the full amount on the writ of execution”) (unpublished). In short, the Memorandum of Costs was a procedurally proper method of requesting costs and fees available as a matter of right under § 685.070, including attorney's fees, because Mr. Martin timely filed the Memorandum of Costs within two years of the costs incurred, and before the judgment was fully satisfied, and included the statutorily required affidavit. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.080(a).
Martin Decl. in Supp. of Opp'n to Objs. to Post-Judgment Cost Bill - ECF No. 176-1 at (¶ 6); Ex. 4 to Martin Decl. in Supp. of Opp'n to Objs. to Post-Judgment Cost Bill - ECF No. 176-1 at 26-28.
4. Reasonableness and Necessity of the Attorney's Fees
In order to recover attorney's fees as costs under § 685.040, the fees must have been reasonably and necessarily incurred to enforce the judgment. Howard Johnson Int'l, Inc. v. Ebuehi, No. LA CV 17-09104-VAP, 2020 WL 2121426, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2020) (“while the Court agrees. . . that the attorneys' fees and costs it has incurred to enforce the Judgment were reasonable and necessary, as discussed below, the Court will not award it those fees and costs [under § 685.040] already awarded by the United States Bankruptcy Court in a separate enforceable judgment” and evaluating the reasonableness of fees incurred to enforce a judgment not related to the bankruptcy proceeding); Abselet v. All. Lending Grp., Inc., No. CV 11-815-JFW (JEMX), 2016 WL 9665251, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016) (“Although the Court has concluded that [plaintiff] is entitled to post-judgment attorneys' fees and costs [under § 685.040], it must undertake an analysis of whether the award sought is reasonable.”); see Karnazes, 2014 WL 511089, at *1 (rejecting proposition that enforcement fees can be recovered based on memorandum of costs rather than noticed motion because it would “create the unique anomaly of a judgment debtor being liable, at least in theory, for unlimited amounts of attorney fees that are never required to undergo judicial inspection to determine if the fees are both reasonable and necessarily incurred in enforcing the judgment”).
According to the Memorandum of Costs and later filed Writ of Execution, Mr. Martin seeks a total award of $25,725.03 in post-judgment costs. Of these costs, Mr. Martin seeks post-judgment attorney's fees in the sum of $23,520 for work by counsel, Ali Ari Aalaei. Mr. Aalaei billed 40.2 hours including 39.2 hours at $600 per hour and, according to the Memorandum of Costs, one hour at $200 per hour. The bulk (38.4 hours) of the post-judgment attorney's fees were incurred between May 4, 2021, and July 15, 2021, for preparing three motions to enforce the Ninth Circuit's judgment (37.4 hours for drafting the moving papers and preparing for the hearing and one hour, billed at $200 per hour, for attending the hearing on these motions). The court denied these motions without prejudice, holding that the motions were premature in part because Mr. Cowen had not tried to enforce a writ of execution or noticed any judgment-debtor exams and because Mr. Cowen had attempted to negotiate a payment plan and had not disobeyed court orders. For the same reasons, the attorney's fees incurred for preparing these motions were not “reasonable and necessary.” The court, therefore, reduces the claimed 40.2 hours of attorney's fees by 38.4 hours.
Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 169 at 1; Writ of Execution - ECF No. 180 at 1.
Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 169 at 6; Aalaei Decl. - ECF No. 176-2. There is a discrepancy between the Memorandum of Costs and the “billing records” attached to the Aalaei Declaration. The “billing records” attached to the Aalaei Declaration do not reflect a reduced rate of $200 per hour for attending the July 15, 2021 hearing as noted in the Memorandum of Costs. Accordingly, while the sum of the hours and rates in the Memorandum of Costs is correct ((39.2 hours x $600/hour) + (1 hour x $200/hour) = $23,720), the sum of the hours and rates in the Aalaei Declaration is not correct because the sum of the hours (40.2) at the quoted rate of $600 per hour does not equal $23,520 as stated in the “billing records” attached to the Aalaei Declaration, but would in fact total $24,120 (40.2 hours x $600/hour = $24,120). The discrepancy is not material, however, because the court does not award attorney's fees associated with attendance at the July 15, 2021 hearing.
Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 169 at 6; Aalaei Decl. - ECF No. 176-2.
Order - ECF No. 153 at 3-4.
The remaining attorney's fees (1.8 hours at $600 per hour) relate, primarily, to Mr. Aalaei's review of: (1) filings by Mr. Martin and Mr. Cowen and (2) the court's order setting a judgment debtor examination. Reasonable attorney's fees for these activities, which were necessary to enforce the judgment, are recoverable under § 685.040.
Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 169 at 6; Aalaei Decl. - ECF No. 176-2.
California state and federal courts use the lodestar method to determine a reasonable fee award. Heifetz v. Mona's Burgers Clayton LLC., No. 19-CV-02392-LB, 2021 WL 292034, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2021), recons. denied, 2021 WL 1176533 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2021). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up), op. am. on den. of reh'g, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997). A prior award of attorney's fees to an attorney at a particular hourly rate may be persuasive in establishing the reasonableness of a claimed hourly rate. Heifetz, 2021 WL 292034, at *5 (following cases as persuasive that awarded attorney's fees to an attorney at a particular hourly rate).
While Mr. Martin has not supplied any information concerning Mr. Aalaei's experience and qualifications sufficient to evaluate the reasonableness of his hourly rate in the Memorandum of Costs or Opposition, Mr. Cowen does not challenge the hourly rate charged by Mr. Aalaei. Moreover, Mr. Martin did include information - including a Laffey Matrix and a declaration regarding his background - supporting his hourly rate in the underlying appeal, and the Ninth Circuit awarded attorney's fees based on a rate of $600 per hour for Mr. Aalaei. Sayta v. Martin, No. 18-17090, Appellee's Mot. for Attorneys' Fees (9th Cir. March 19, 2020), ECF No. 40-1 at 18-19 and 33; id., Order (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2020), ECF No. 41. The court finds that the $600 per hour rate changed by Mr. Aalaei is reasonable based on the Ninth Circuit's prior award of attorney's fees at that rate.
The court therefore grants Mr. Martin's request for post-judgment attorney's fees in the sum of $1,080 (1.8 hours at $600 per hour) and denies with prejudice the remaining claimed attorney's fees.
5. Other Claimed Costs
Mr. Martin also seeks $2,005.03 in the following additional costs: (1) $226.53 in “courtesy copy delivery” costs, (2) $434.50 in “[a]ttachment expenses, ” including $119.50 in subpoena service costs, $250.00 for serving a bank levy on Wells Fargo, and a $65 “US Marshal Fee, ” (3) $695.00 in court reporter fees, and (4) $649 in fees for a process server to locate Mr. Cowen's financial institutions. Section 685.070(a)(1) to (4) provides for the recovery of statutory costs for (1) preparing an abstract of judgment, (2) filing a notice of judgment lien, (3) issuing a writ for the enforcement of judgment, and (4) the levying officer for performing the duties under a writ. Except for the $65 “US Marshal Fee, ” the additional costs Mr. Martin claims are not identified in § 685.070(a) and are, therefore, not claimable as a matter of right. Mr. Martin was required to file a noticed motion to seek these additional costs. The court denies Mr. Martin's request for all non-attorney's fee costs, except for the $65 U.S. Marshal Fee, without prejudice.
Mem. of Costs - ECF No. 169 at 4-5.
6. Motion to Quash
Mr. Cowen asks the court to quash subpoenas served on Wells Fargo, Intelligent Office, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America. The court denies Mr. Cowen's Motion to Quash without prejudice. This court's Standing Order requires, among other things, that if a meet-and-confer by other means does not resolve the parties' dispute, lead counsel for the parties must meet and confer in person (if counsel are local) and then submit a joint letter brief with information about any unresolved disputes. The letter brief must be filed under the Civil Events category of “Motions and Related Filings > Motions - General > Discovery Letter Brief.” After reviewing the joint letter brief, the court will evaluate whether further proceedings are necessary, including any further briefing or argument. The court thus denies without prejudice the motion to quash in favor of this process.
Mot. to Quash - ECF No. 171 at 3.
CONCLUSION
The court taxes the $65 fee paid to the U.S. Marshals Service and $1,080 in attorney's fees to Mr. Cowen. The court denies without prejudice Mr. Martin's request for additional costs. The court also denies without prejudice Mr. Cowen's motion to quash.
This disposes of ECF Nos. 169, 170, 171, 173, and 180.
IT IS SO ORDERED.