Opinion
A20-0874
12-29-2020
In re the Marriage of: Linde Anne Sayen, petitioner, Respondent, v. Michael Stephen Sayen, Appellant.
ORDER OPINION
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-15-4776 Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Cleary, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In July 2017, appellant-father Michael Stephen Sayen and respondent-mother Linde Anne Sayen divorced. Their divorce decree awarded mother sole legal and sole physical custody of their minor child and awarded father weekly supervised parenting time.
2. On February 24, 2020, father filed a notice of motion and motion seeking the following relief: (1) "[t]hat the PTE [Parenting Time Expeditor] makes a decision & files with the court," and (2) "[s]tipulation - changed to allow supervised visitation according to PTE."
3. At mother's request, the district court continued the March 27, 2020 hearing on father's motion and rescheduled it for April 7, 2020.
4. On March 16, 2020, the district court issued an order requiring the parties to determine, prior to the April 7, 2020 hearing date, what options were available for supervised parenting time.
5. Mother filed a motion proposing that father communicate with child through remote technology one time per week and then once the COVID-19 pandemic, stay-at-home order, and social distancing restrictions end, father "have parenting at Perspectives up to one time per week."
6. On April 3, 2020, the district court issued an order that canceled the April 7, 2020 hearing and stated that it had reviewed father's motion and mother's proposal. The district court ordered father to respond to mother's proposal and explain why he did not agree with it.
7. On April 10, 2020, father, through counsel, filed a letter with the district court that objected to mother's proposal. That same day, father's counsel supplemented the letter with corrections and additions.
8. On April 30, 2020, the district court found it was in the best interest of child to move from therapeutic visits with father to supervised parenting time. Father appeals.
9. Father seems to argue that the district court violated his right to due process when it issued an order on his motion for parenting time without first holding a hearing. We reject this argument because it is beyond the scope of our review, because it is inadequately briefed, and because—even if we ignore these defects—it lacks merit.
10. Generally, appellate courts will not address issues not previously presented to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). This rule applies to constitutional questions. In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981). Nor will an appellate court address an issue presented to and considered by the district court if the appellant is presenting that issue to the appellate court on a theory not presented to the district court. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. Here, the due-process argument father makes to this court was neither presented to, nor considered by, the district court. As a result, that argument is beyond our scope of review.
11. Father's additions and corrections to his April 10, 2020 letter allude to a due-process argument, stating: "Given the fact that the parties the April 7th, was a phone hearing we ask that the court reserve [father's] right due process by allowing testimony at a hearing at such time as the court can allow in person or telephonic appearances again." But, generally, a party seeking relief has the burden of "adequately communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom." Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987). We have thoroughly reviewed this file. We are not convinced that, in the context of this case and the evolving pandemic-related limits on the district court's ability to act, what father wanted and the authority requiring the district court to grant him that relief were presented to the district court in a manner that was clear enough to give that court an opportunity to respond coherently to father's request. Additionally, and more importantly, if the theory of father's due-process argument to the district court was that he should be permitted the opportunity to present testimony at an unspecified later date, that theory is different from the one he presents to this court, which is that "[t]he complexity of this Fundamental Liberty Right to see Appellant's young child needs more than just a few documentation or affidavits." In district court, father did not argue that his fundamental liberty rights were being violated. Because father changed the theory on which he argues that his due process rights were violated, he is improperly presenting that argument to this court. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
12. Additionally, appellate courts need not address an inadequately briefed question. State, Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); see Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-law appeal). Here, father's due-process argument to this court is significantly less than adequately developed in his brief.
13. Apart from the defects mentioned above, father's due-process argument lacks merit for two reasons. First, "it is presumed that a motion in family law, other than a motion for contempt, will be decided without an evidentiary hearing, unless the district court determines that there is good cause for a hearing." Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)). "Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion [in a family matter] generally is a discretionary decision of the district court." Id. Father does not argue that the district court abused its discretion in denying him a hearing, and our review of this record shows that any denial of an evidentiary hearing would not have been an abuse of the district court's discretion.
14. Second, generally, when an appellate court addresses a question of procedural due process of law, it engages in a de novo two-step process that asks whether the contested procedure deprived an individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest, and, if so, whether those procedures were constitutionally sufficient. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). Here, father does have a liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his minor child. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212 (1972). The district court, however, did not deprive father of that interest when it issued its April 2020 order. To the contrary, the district court granted father's request for supervised parenting time. Because the district court did not deprive father of a liberty interest, his claim does not survive the first step of the two-step analysis. Thus, the district court did not violate father's procedural-due-process rights when it decided his motion for parenting time on the parties' written submissions.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: December 29, 2020
BY THE COURT
/s/_________
Judge Denise D. Reilly