Opinion
CV166015953S
02-27-2018
Saybrook Manor Cove Association, Inc. v. Saybrook Manor Beach, Inc. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Domnarski, Edward S., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Domnarski, J.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, Saybrook Manor Cove Association, Inc., to quiet title to portions of two paper streets that lie within a subdivision laid out in 1922 known as Saybrook Manor Beach (subdivision), located in Old Saybrook, Connecticut. These paper streets, which are depicted on a 1922 subdivision map (1922 map) submitted by the plaintiff; see Pl.’s Ex. 4; are made up of portions of Vincent Avenue and Bayside Avenue (avenues). The plaintiff alleges, in its amended complaint, that it has acquired title to the disputed property through adverse possession (count one) or, in the alternative, has an easement by either prescription (count two) or implication (count three). The first named defendant, Saybrook Manor Beach, Inc. (developer), is the entity that originally owned the lots and streets in the subdivision. As to the remaining defendants (adjoining defendants), the plaintiff alleges that they each own an interest in various pieces of real property adjoining the avenues and therefore have an interest in the outcome of this action. None of the adjoining defendants, however, have claimed an ownership interest in the disputed property, nor do any of them claim to have adversely possessed any portion of such properties.
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) defines paper street or road as " [a] thoroughfare that appears on plats, subdivision maps, and other publicly filed documents, but that has not been completed or opened for public use."
FINDINGS OF FACT
The subdivision is generally bounded on the east by the Oyster River, on the south by Long Island Sound, on the west by Middletown Avenue, and on the north by Schenker Avenue. The streets in the developed portions of the subdivision were conveyed to the town of Old Saybrook (town) for highway purposes by a deed from the developer dated May 20, 1942. Pl.’s Ex. 7, p. 4. The 1922 map depicts a north-south street known as Vincent Avenue and an east-west street known as Bayside Avenue located within the southeastern section of the subdivision. The portions of these avenues that lie within this southeastern section of the subdivision were never constructed- presumably because, due to soil conditions and the proximity of Long Island Sound and the Oyster River, this section of the subdivision was not suitable for the construction of houses; indeed, the general southeastern section of the original subdivision is now designated as tidal wetlands and remains undeveloped.
At trial, the plaintiff presented a survey map of the southeastern section of the subdivision (survey map) that was prepared by Alan Bongiovanni, a licensed surveyor; the survey map depicts the location of the avenues as originally laid out. See Pl.’s Ex. 6. The avenues shown on this map are thirty feet wide. The survey map delineates the portions of the avenues in dispute and also shows the existing features that are located on and within the avenues. It also indicates that the northern portion of Vincent Avenue is paved and that the southern portion contains a sand path. The paved portion of Vincent Avenue that lies south of Neptune Avenue was not included in the 1942 conveyance to the town; this paved portion ends, and the sand path begins, approximately 260 feet south of Neptune Avenue. There is evidence that indicates that the paved portion of Vincent Avenue south of Neptune Avenue has been claimed by the town under the doctrine of public dedication. See Pl.’s Ex. 7.
In its amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges interests in all of Vincent Avenue that lies south of Neptune Avenue, including the paved portion. In its posttrial brief, however, the plaintiff expressly asserts that it is claiming only the unpaved portion of Vincent Avenue. In light of this statement in its brief and the evidence presented at trial, the court concludes that the plaintiff has abandoned its claim to the paved portion of Vincent Avenue south of Neptune Avenue. It is clear from the evidence that the plaintiff is claiming an interest in that portion of Vincent Avenue that runs from the southerly terminus of the paved portion of Vincent Avenue to its intersection with Bayside Avenue. Within this claimed portion of Vincent Avenue lies a sand path, which is shown on the survey map. The sand path is approximately seven feet wide and has historically been used as a path to the plaintiff’s beach located on the south side of Bayside Avenue.
The southern terminus of Vincent Avenue intersects with the northern boundary of Bayside Avenue. On the south side of Bayside Avenue is a bathing beach area that is owned and maintained by the plaintiff; this beach is shown on the survey map as lots 326 through 330. The plaintiff also owns lots 321 through 325, which are likewise located on the south side of Bayside Avenue; these lots remain in their natural state and are not used as a bathing beach. A satellite imagery photograph shows that most of the land within lots 321 through 325 has eroded and is now covered by water. Pl.’s Ex. 42. As shown on the survey map, the westerly terminus of the disputed portion of Bayside Avenue abuts the town’s right-of-way, and its easterly terminus is located at the southern end of another paper street known as Bayside Place. The total length of the portion of Bayside Avenue that the plaintiff claims is 185 feet.
Located within the boundaries of Bayside Avenue is a two- to three-foot high, five-foot wide stone retaining wall, which the plaintiff constructed around 1996. This wall was constructed to prevent further erosion of the land in the vicinity of the disputed property. The westerly portion of the retaining wall lies within the town’s right-of-way. From its intersection with the right-of-way, the retaining wall extends in an easterly direction into the portion of Bayside Avenue that the plaintiff claims- a scaled distance of thirty-eight feet. At its eastern end, the retaining wall jogs to the north approximately ten feet. When the retaining wall was originally constructed, this northerly jog was approximately twenty-five feet in length and extended onto Vincent Avenue. Approximately three years ago, the northerly most fifteen feet of this portion of the retaining wall was removed by the defendant Appleby Holdings, LLC (Appleby). The easterly boundary of the existing retaining wall is located in the vicinity of the southeastern corner of Vincent Avenue.
The plaintiff is a nonstock corporation that was established in 1956. The articles of incorporation state that a purpose of the corporation is " [t]o ... encourage the improvement of roads and passways" within the subdivision. Pl.’s Ex. 9. Property owners and residents of the subdivision are eligible, but not required, to be members of the plaintiff. It is undisputed that many property owners in the subdivision have deeded beach rights. The parties acknowledge that the property owners also have the right to use the streets laid out in the original subdivision, as established by our case law. See Peckheiser v. Tarone, 186 Conn. 53, 58-59, 438 A.2d 1192 (1982) (" each grantee of a conveyance of a lot in the subdivision would have acquired a right to use in common with all other lot owners any private road shown in the development plan of benefit to him even without any express grant of such a right" ).
Many of the witnesses called by the plaintiff and the defendants testified as to their use of the Vincent Avenue sand path for access to the beach. The sand path has been used for over fifty years. From the evidence presented, the court cannot determine whether these witnesses were using the path as members of the plaintiff, or pursuant to their individual rights as owners of property within the subdivision. For this reason, path usage cannot serve as proof to support the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim.
The court does find, however, that the plaintiff, in its corporate capacity, committed acts of possession over portions of Vincent Avenue and Bayside Avenue. The plaintiff’s current president, Charles Cobb, and Alan Horton, a member of the plaintiff since 1984, both testified at the trial. Cobb, a member of the plaintiff since 1997, testified that, at least since 1997, the plaintiff has performed maintenance tasks related to the Vincent Avenue sand path. Some of these maintenance tasks were performed by volunteers on behalf of the plaintiff, and some were performed by contractors hired by the plaintiff. These tasks included mowing the grass on the sides of the path, replacing sand that had eroded from portions of the path, and grooming the path. Horton testified that the plaintiff installed and maintained the " Saybrook Manor Cove" signs located at the end of the paved portion of Vincent Avenue and on Bayside Avenue at the entrance to the plaintiff’s beach, which, according to Horton, had been in existence for at least fifteen years prior to 2013. Horton also testified that the plaintiff placed large boulders at the north and south ends of the sand path in order to prevent motor vehicles from traveling over it. These signs and boulders are shown in photographs submitted by the plaintiff as a part of exhibit numbers one and two. The court finds Cobb and Horton’s testimony to be credible and notes that these activities of the plaintiff are compatible with the purposes of the plaintiff as stated in its articles of incorporation.
In February 1996, the plaintiff received a permit from the Department of Environmental Protection (department) to construct the aforementioned retaining wall. See Pl.’s Ex. 26. The permit allowed the plaintiff to " construct a 2-3’ high by approximately 5’ wide stone retaining wall from the foot of Vincent Avenue to the east jetty." Id., p. 3. This wall is presently located within the boundaries of Bayside Avenue, as the court described earlier. At trial, Horton testified that the retaining wall was constructed in the mid-1990s to prevent further erosion of the land in the vicinity of the disputed property. In the absence of contrary evidence, it is reasonable to infer that the permitted wall was constructed during 1996 and was completed by the beginning of 1997.
In 2011, the Department of Environmental Protection became the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection. See Public Acts 2011, No. 11-80, § 1, codified at General Statutes § 22a-2d.
In attempting to establish the open and visible possession element of its adverse possession claim, the plaintiff points to the numerous other applications that it, as owner, submitted to the department seeking permission to construct structures in, or on the shore of, the Long Island Sound. The court does not find these applications to be probative, as they pertain to the plaintiff’s beach and not to the property presently in dispute. Another application, submitted in 1992, proposed construction of a timber-pile walkway from Vincent Avenue to Bayside Avenue. It appears that this project was not approved or constructed, and there was no evidence presented at trial to establish how this application could have provided open and visible possession or dominion over the claimed property. Hence, the 1992 application is likewise no help to the plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
I
Title by Adverse Possession
In count one of its amended complaint, the plaintiff claims to have acquired title to the disputed property by adverse possession and thus seeks to quiet title thereto pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31. " When a party seeks to quiet title pursuant to § 47-31 [on the basis of adverse possession], the court should first determine in which party record title lies, and [only] then determine whether adverse possession has divested the record owner of title ... The initial question is whether record title is in one party or the other and, if so, the question becomes whether the record owner was divested of title by clear and positive proof of adverse possession of the other." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Har v. Boreiko, 118 Conn.App. 787, 794, 986 A.2d 1072 (2010). Thus, before turning to the question of whether the plaintiff in the present case has established its adverse possession claim, the court will first determine in whom record title to the disputed property lies.
General Statutes § 47-31 provides in relevant part: " (a) An action may be brought by any person claiming title to, or any interest in, real or personal property, or both, against any person who may claim to own the property, or any part of it, or to have any estate in it, either in fee, for years, for life or in reversion or remainder, or to have any interest in the property, or any lien or encumbrance on it, adverse to the plaintiff, or against any person in whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim or title conflicting with the plaintiff’s claim, title or interest, for the purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the property. Such action may be brought whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the immediate or exclusive possession of the property."
At trial, Bongiovanni, a licensed surveyor, testified that it was his opinion, based upon the research performed in connection with the survey he prepared, that the developer was the record title holder of the disputed property. None of the defendants have contested this opinion. The court therefore finds that the developer, Saybrook Manor Beach, Inc., is still the record owner of the disputed property. The question now becomes whether the plaintiff has proven its claim of adverse possession, thus divesting the developer of title.
The plaintiff contends in its post-trial brief that, because a default judgment has been entered against the developer, it is therefore relieved of its burden to prove the allegations of its amended complaint. In its post-trial brief, Appleby disagrees, suggesting that service upon the developer may have been inadequate and that the default judgment may not have been effective. Although the court rejects this suggestion, it agrees that the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove its claims.
" [T]o establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fifteen years [see General Statutes § 52-575(a)] by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his own and without the consent of the owner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caminis v. Troy, 300 Conn. 297, 311, 12 A.3d 984 (2011). " [T]he open and visible element requires a fact finder to examine the extent and visibility of the claimant’s use of the record owner’s property so as to determine whether a reasonable owner would believe that the claimant was using that property as his or her own." Schlichting v. Cotter, 109 Conn.App. 361, 368, 952 A.2d 73, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 944, 959 A.2d 1009 (2008). As to the exclusive possession element, such possession " can [generally] be established by acts, which at the time, considering the state of the land, comport with ownership; viz., such acts as would ordinarily be exercised by an owner in appropriating land to his own use and the exclusion of others ... Thus, the claimant’s possession need not be absolutely exclusive; it need only be a type of possession which would characterize an owner’s use." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 502, 442 A.2d 911 (opting that defendant in that case " was possessing the disputed beach area in a manner that an owner of a public beach would ordinarily follow" ). As to the " claim of right" element, such claim " does not necessarily mean that the adverse possessor claims that it is the proper titleholder, but [rather] that it has the intent to disregard the true owner’s right to possession." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eberhardt v. Imperial Construction Services, LLC, 101 Conn.App. 762, 768, 923 A.2d 785, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 904, 931 A.2d 263 (2007).
" [A]dverse possession claims are highly fact and context specific. In evaluating such claims, ‘[t]he location and condition of the land [at issue] must be taken into consideration and the alleged acts of ownership must be understood as directed to those circumstances and conditions.’ ... Roche v. Fairfield, [supra, 186 Conn. 501 n.11 see also 16 R. Powell, Real Property (1999) § 91.01[2] (’character of disputed property is crucial in determining what degree of control and what character of possession are required to establish adverse possession’). Additionally, in assessing whether hostility exists, the relation that the [alleged] adverse possessor occupies with reference to the owner is important ... In sum, when determining whether the necessary elements of adverse possession exist, each claim must be decided on its own particular facts. The requirements vary according to, and it is necessary to consider, the nature and situation of the property. To determine whether particular acts constitute adverse possession, it is sometimes necessary to consider the character of the property and the purposes for which it is suitable, the circumstances attending the possession, the acts and declarations of [the] claimant while in possession, and the relation of the holder of the legal title to the claimant." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rudder v Mamanasco Lake Park Ass’n, Inc., 93 Conn.App. 759, 775, 890 A.2d 645 (2006).
It is the burden of the party claiming adverse possession to make out its claim by " clear and positive proof." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caminis v. Troy, supra, 300 Conn. 311. " [C]lear and convincing proof ... denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution ... [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v. Green, 91 Conn.App. 296, 305-06, 880 A.2d 889 (2005).
Turning to the adverse possession claim in the present case, the court acknowledges at the outset that this action is not a case where the claimant asserts absolutely exclusive possession of the property it claims. As noted, many individuals have used the disputed property over the years to go to the beach. The plaintiff’s claim is similar to the adverse possession claim alleged as a special defense by the defendant town of Fairfield in Roche v. Fairfield, supra, 186 Conn. 490. In that case, which involved beach property, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s possession was not exclusive because the beach was used by the plaintiffs and the general public. Id., 502-03. The Roche court rejected this argument, noting that the defendant had been " possessing the disputed beach area in a manner that an owner of a public beach would ordinarily follow." Id., 502. In the present case, the plaintiff maintained portions of the avenues for purposes of access, just as the defendant in Roche had maintained a public beach. Thus, the fact that members of the public used this access point does not destroy the plaintiff’s exclusive possession.
The plaintiff claims ownership of land that was designated as streets in the original subdivision. The plaintiff’s actions in replacing eroded sand and cutting back grass on the sides of the path served to maintain the path on Vincent Avenue in order to provide access to the plaintiff’s beach. Such actions by the plaintiff were similar to the road maintenance functions that the town performed on the roads that it owned in the subdivision. On the basis of the testimony of Cobb and Horton, the court concludes that, at least since 1997, the plaintiff’s possession of that length of Vincent Avenue where the sand path is located was consistent with that of an owner of a street and is sufficient to satisfy the exclusive possession element of adverse possession. Beginning in 1997, the plaintiff also performed an act of possession over the southern portion of Vincent Avenue when it constructed that portion of the retaining wall that was later removed.
As previously noted, the southerly terminus of Vincent Avenue intersects with the north side of Bayside Avenue. The Vincent Avenue sand path extends to Bayside Avenue and then turns to the west, towards the bathing beach. Approximately twenty-five feet of the sand path lie within the boundaries of Bayside Avenue, in the area that the plaintiff claims. The remaining portion of the sand path traverses Bayside Avenue in the area of the town right-of-way, which the plaintiff does not claim. Also located within the boundaries of Bayside Avenue is a portion of the aforementioned retaining wall. The findings regarding the plaintiff’s acts of possession over the Vincent Avenue sand path apply to the Bayside Avenue portion of the sand path. In addition, the construction of the wall in 1997, and its continued existence in its present location, are evidence of the plaintiff’s possession of the portion of Bayside Avenue within which the wall is located.
There was a lack of evidence, however, to establish the plaintiff’s dominion or possession of that portion of Bayside Avenue that lies east of the eastern edge of the retaining wall. There is no sand path within the boundaries of Bayside Avenue in this area, and there was no evidence to establish that the plaintiff performed maintenance tasks in this area. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not proven its claim of adverse possession as to the portion of Bayside Avenue that lies to the east of the retaining wall.
Although it is more likely than not that, since it was established in 1956, the plaintiff has exercised some form of dominion over the avenues, the evidence presented at trial provides clear and convincing proof that since 1997, and for a period of fifteen years thereafter, the plaintiff’s possession of portions of the avenues has satisfied the elements of adverse possession. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of Cobb and Horton, and the construction and continued existence of the retaining wall.
When determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied the elements of adverse possession, the court has considered the location and condition of the property at issue and the character of the plaintiff’s claimed possession. There was no evidence to establish that the record owner, the developer, has exercised any control over the avenues since the plaintiff was formed in 1958.
The court finds that the plaintiff’s use of the aforedescribed portions of the avenues would have been sufficient to demonstrate to a reasonable owner that the plaintiff was using the property as if the plaintiff owned it. The plaintiff’s signs at the ends of the path, its maintenance of the path, its placement of boulders at the entrances to the path, and its construction of the retaining wall on the avenues, considered together, constitute an ouster of the record owner.
The court further finds that the plaintiff’s possession of the property was open and visible. The plaintiff’s acts pertaining to the avenues comport with the ownership and maintenance of streets that provide access to a beach. The boulders and signs at the ends of the path were certainly visible. The plaintiff’s acts of maintenance would also have been visible. Significantly, the original construction of a large stone retaining wall within the boundaries of the avenues, and its continued existence, would have certainly been open and visible. These open and visible acts of possession satisfy the exclusive possession element, as defined by Roche . These acts were done with disregard for the rights of the record owner and equate to a claim of right. Finally, the plaintiff has established a continuous, fifteen-year period of adverse possession beginning in 1997; no evidence was presented to indicate that the developer had at any time interrupted the plaintiff’s possession after 1997.
In sum, the plaintiff has established the essential elements of its adverse possession claim. The court notes, however, that, although none of the abutting defendants have claimed any ownership interest in the avenues nor made a claim of adverse possession, Appleby and the intervenors, Donald J. Moore and Samantha J. Moore, held the plaintiff to its burden of proof at trial. Indeed, in its post-trial brief, Appleby directs the court’s attention to a decision in a quiet title action involving plaintiffs who claimed title by adverse possession over a portion of another paper street located in the subdivision, Elliott Avenue. See Boutilier v. Saybrook Manor Beach, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-01-0094366-S (October 9, 2003, Aurigemma, J.). In that case, Judge Aurigemma entered judgment for the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs " failed to prove the identity of the record owner of the disputed parcel, [did] not [provide] notice to all persons, known or unknown, that may claim a right, title, estate or interest in the property and [did] not [prove] through clear and convincing evidence that it [was] highly probable that they obtained title to Elliott Avenue via adverse possession for the requisite 15-year period." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Appleby’s reliance on Boutilier is misplaced. Unlike the plaintiffs in that case, the plaintiff in the present case has identified the record owner of the disputed property- the developer- and has given sufficient notice to it, has served the adjoining defendants who may claim an interest in the disputed property, and has satisfied the elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing proof. Judgment for the plaintiff on count one may therefore enter. All that remains for the court to determine is the geographic scope of the plaintiff’s title.
In view of the nature and character of the plaintiff’s possession- maintaining access to the beach- the court finds that additional notice is not necessary.
The portion of the avenues to which the plaintiff claims title in its amended complaint are shown on the survey map. Sec Pl.’s Ex. 6. As previously noted, however, the plaintiff has effectively withdrawn its claim to the paved portion of Vincent Avenue south of Neptune Avenue. Also, as previously determined, the plaintiff has not met its burden of proving adverse possession of the easterly portion of Bayside Avenue. Thus, the portion of the avenues to which the plaintiff has actually acquired title is more limited, as the court describes in detail in the succeeding paragraphs, which descriptions are based on the survey map.
The court finds that the plaintiff has acquired title to the following described parcels of land.
Vincent Avenue
That portion of Vincent Avenue that lies south of the southerly end of the paved portion of Vincent Avenue. Commencing at a point on the westerly line of Vincent Avenue, which point is 260 feet south of the intersection of the southerly line of Neptune Avenue and the westerly line of Vincent Avenue, thence running in a southerly direction along the westerly line of Vincent Avenue, an approximate distance of 335 feet, to the intersection of the northerly line of Bayside Avenue and the westerly line of Vincent Avenue, thence, turning and running in an easterly direction, along the northerly line of Bayside Avenue and the southerly line of Vincent Avenue, a distance of thirty feet, to the easterly line of Vincent Avenue, thence turning and running in a northerly direction along the easterly line of Vincent Avenue, a distance of 335 feet, thence turning and running in a westerly direction, thirty feet, to the point and place of beginning.
Bayside Avenue
That portion of Bayside Avenue that lies easterly of the easterly line of the " limit of town R.O.W. [right-of-way]" shown on the survey map and westerly of the eastern edge of the stone retaining wall designated as " rocks" on said map. Pl.’s Ex. 6. Commencing at the point on the northerly line of Bayside Avenue that marks the northeasterly corner of the limit of the town’s right-of-way, thence running in an easterly direction along the northerly line of Bayside Avenue a distance of approximately thirty-eight feet, to the eastern edge of said retaining wall, thence turning and running in a southerly direction thirty feet to the southerly line of Bayside Avenue, thence turning and running in a westerly direction approximately thirty-eight feet to the southeasterly corner of the limit of the right-of-way, thence turning and running in a northerly direction, along the limit of the right-of-way, a distance of thirty feet to the point and place of beginning.
II
Easement by Prescription
Because the plaintiff has established title by adverse possession, it is not necessary for the court to address the plaintiff’s prescriptive easement claim in count two. In any event, as noted previously, the court cannot determine from the evidence whether the individuals who used the avenues did so in their capacity as members of the plaintiff, which might give rise to a prescriptive easement in the plaintiff. Judgment may therefore enter for the defendants on this count.
III
Easement by Implication
Similarly, in view of the findings regarding the adverse possession count, it is not necessary for the court to address the plaintiff’s claim for an implied easement in count three. In any event, any claim to an implied easement that the plaintiff may have had would have been superceded by the easement rights it acquired as a grantee of land within the subdivision. See Peckheiser v. Throne, supra, 186 Conn. 58-59.
CONCLUSION
As to count one, judgment may enter quieting title to the aforedescribed portions of Vincent and Bayside Avenues in Old Saybrook, Connecticut, in favor of the plaintiff. Judgment may enter in favor of the defendants as to counts two and three.
In an earlier proceeding, Judge Aurigemma ordered the plaintiff to pay $1,500 in fees and costs to the defendants. See Docket Entry No. 159.20. This sum is to be paid within thirty days.
The developer was defaulted for failure to appear on June 6, 2017. Pursuant to a motion for first order of notice filed by the plaintiff on August 1, 2017, notice of the action was published in the Hartford Courant, the New Haven Register, and the Middletown Press . On the basis of these publications, the court finds that the developer has actual notice of this action. At trial, Bongiovanni testified that the last deed transaction involving the developer occurred in 1958. The Secretary of the State of Connecticut’s commercial recording division contains no records for the developer. Pl.’s Ex. 34. On the basis of this evidence, the court further finds that it is not likely that the developer is still in corporate existence. The court therefore affirms the default for failure to appear previously entered against the developer. Nevertheless, such default does not relieve the plaintiff of its burden of proving its case. Although a default against a defendant ordinarily operates as an admission of the plaintiff’s claims in a legal action, the law is different with respect to claims for equitable relief. " An action brought by a plaintiff which requests equitable instead of legal relief poses a situation in which a determination of monetary damages in a hearing in damages is not appropriate. The plaintiff, however, is still required to establish his right to receive equitable relief after the entry of default ... This necessarily entails a hearing in which the plaintiff must prove the matters he has alleged in his complaint." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Ratner v. Willametz, 9 Conn.App. 565, 575, 520 A.2d 621 (1987). Because the statutory action to quiet title " is equitable in its essence" ; Loewenberg v. Wallace, 147 Conn. 689, 692, 166 A.2d 150 (1960); the burden of proving title by adverse possession thus remains on the plaintiff, despite the default entered against the developer.