Opinion
Case No. 19-cv-07994-DMR
05-18-2020
COLETTE SAVAGE, Plaintiff, v. MARK SAVAGE, Defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 16, 18
Pro se Plaintiff Colette Savage, a resident of Idaho, filed this lawsuit against her brother Mark Savage, a Texas resident. She subsequently filed two motions for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order ("TRO"). [Docket Nos. 14, 18.] Defendant opposes both motions. [Docket No. 19.] He also moves pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(1)-(6) to dismiss the complaint. [Docket No. 16.] This matter is suitable for resolution without a hearing. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is granted in part. Plaintiff's motions are denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff's complaint, which is 93 pages long and has over 140 pages of attachments, is confusing and difficult to understand. Plaintiff challenges Defendant's actions with respect to a promissory note and family trust. The complaint contains numerous references to state court proceedings in Texas and California. As best as the court can tell, the heart of Plaintiff's complaint is that a court order issued by a state court in Texas regarding the promissory note conflicts with orders by a California state probate court. Compl. 15. Plaintiff alleges that she was "prevented from suing" Defendant in Texas for fraud-related behavior, and that he was therefore able to "garnish" her inheritance by obtaining an "erroneous" monetary judgment in Texas and then enforcing it against her in California. Id. at 10, 14. According to Plaintiff, "[t]he entire litigation in Texas was a premeditated hoax on a fake debt," and the "[c]onflicting orders" by the Texas and California courts "must be resolved." Id. at 16, 17 (emphasis in original). Id. at 16.
Plaintiff attached three court orders to the complaint:
• October 25, 2016 order by the Honorable George A. Miram, Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo, in In re The William B. & Beatrice S. Savage Family Trust, dated 4 October 1993 (and Restatement Thereto), Case No. PRO124417, ordering that two promissory notes called the "California Notes" are "cancelled and extinguished and there is no further action to collect on the California Notes that can or will be taken." Compl. Ex. 3.
• January 31, 2017 order by the Honorable A. Lee Harris, 66th Judicial District Court of Hill County Texas, in Colette Clara Savage v. Mark Savage, Cause No. 52, 939, granting Defendant Mark Savage's second motion for summary judgment, ordering that he "is entitled to recover a judgment against the Plaintiff on the Promissory Note dated August 22, 2014 in the original principal amount of $240,000 . . . executed by Plaintiff and payable to the order of Defendant," and entering judgment for Mark Savage in the amounts of $290,497.27 as the total principal and interest and $77,546.93 as attorneys' fees. Compl. Ex. 4.
• February 1, 2017 Clerk's Judgment by Superior Court of the State of California, County of Marin, in Mark Savage v. Colette Clara Savage, Case No. CIV 1700381, entering the January 31, 2017 judgment by the Hill County, Texas court in Mark Savage's favor against Colette Savage for the principal amount of $368,479.42. Compl. Ex. 4.
The legal claims asserted by Plaintiff in this lawsuit are voluminous and unclear. The complaint begins by listing over 50 separate "causes of action," although some are not actually claims for relief, such as "collateral estoppel," "res judicata," and "illegal bifurcation." See Compl. 2-5. Elsewhere, Plaintiff alleges claims for theft, fraudulent inducement, perjury, filing a false claim in court, "fiduciary misapplication/misappropriation," "elder fraud," violation of the Unfair Debt Collection Practices Act, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, "Texas Statutory Fraud," misrepresentation of securities, "1st 5th 7th 14th Constitutional Violations," suppression of evidence, conversion under Texas law, evidence tampering, violation of California Civil Code section 1624, violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, malicious prosecution, breach of contract, "duress and emotional distress," pro se discrimination, racketeering, slander of title, and tortious interference with expectation of inheritance, among others. Compl. 31-91.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 5, 2019. On February 27, 2020, the court issued an order noting that Defendant had not been served with the summons and complaint and that the deadline for service was March 4, 2020 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The court ordered Plaintiff to file either timely proof of service of the summons and complaint or a status report regarding service of those documents. [Docket No. 8.]
In response, Plaintiff filed a proof of service purporting to show that Defendant had been personally served on January 28, 2020. [Docket No. 11.] She also filed a letter to the Clerk in which she stated that "[i]t appears that [Defendant] has defaulted on this claim." [Docket No. 12.] Accordingly, on March 20, 2020, the court ordered Plaintiff to file a request for entry of Defendant's default by no later than April 10, 2020. [Docket No. 13.]
On March 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Temporary or Permanent Injunction Immediate Irreperable [sic] Harm From Trust Proceeds by Unlawful Means." [Docket No. 14 (1st Mot. for Prelim. Injunction/TRO).] In her motion, Plaintiff asks the court to stay the transfer to Defendant of $368,000 from her Bank of Marin bank account and to "injunct" her properties in Texas. Id. at 6. Plaintiff did not cite any authority for the relief she requested, nor did she notice the motion for a hearing or submit proof of service of the motion on Defendant. On March 31, 2020, Plaintiff filed a second request for an "Injunction on Bank of Marin account." [Docket No. 18 (2d Mot. for Prelim. Injunction/TRO.] Plaintiff again did not cite authority for the relief requested, notice the motion for a hearing, or provide proof of service of the motion on Defendant.
On April 4, 2020, Defendant appeared in this action through an attorney and filed the present motion to dismiss the complaint along with a request for judicial notice ("RJN"). [Docket No. 16.] He subsequently filed an opposition to Plaintiff's two motions for preliminary injunction or TRO. [Docket No. 19.] Plaintiff timely filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss in which she asks the court to enter Defendant's default. [Docket No. 21.] The court referred Plaintiff's request for default to the Clerk of the Court, and on May 8, 2020, the Clerk denied the request for entry of default. [Docket Nos. 25, 26.]
Plaintiff's opposition, which is 43 pages long and single-spaced, does not comply with Civil Local Rules 3-4(c) and 7-3(a), which provide that text must be double-spaced with no more than 28 lines per page and that opposition briefs may not exceed 25 pages. Plaintiff also filed a document on May 12, 2020 that purports to be a "reply" to Defendant's motion to dismiss. [Docket No. 29.] However, Defendant filed a brief replying to Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss on April 27, 2020. [Docket No. 24.] Under Civil Local Rule 7-3(d), "[o]nce a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, papers or letters may be filed without prior Court approval," except "[i]f new evidence has been submitted in the reply, the opposing party may file and serve an Objection to Reply Evidence . . . not more than 7 days after the reply was filed." Here, Defendant did not submit any evidence with his reply, and Plaintiff did not seek leave to file her "reply." It will therefore not be considered.
II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
In support of his motion to dismiss, Defendant asks the court to take judicial notice of 12 decisions, pleadings, and orders of the First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals, Marin County Superior Court, the 66th Judicial District Court of Hill County, Texas, the Texas Tenth Court of Appeals, and the Texas Supreme Court. He asserts that they are relevant to his motion. [DocketNo. 16-3 (RJN).] Plaintiff does not object to the court taking judicial notice of these documents.
Federal courts may "take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue." U.S. ex rel Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). The exhibits to Defendant's RJN are briefly summarized as follows:
• Exhibit A: October 15, 2018 decision by the First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals affirming an order denying cross-motions for attorneys' fees and
denying a motion to tax costs in Colette Savage v. Mark Savage, Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo Case No. PRO-124417, discussing court proceedings regarding two promissory notes executed by Colette Savage in Mark Savage's favor in connection with a $240,000 loan that contained California choice of law provisions, referred to by the court and the parties as the "California notes," and a third promissory note Colette Savage executed in Mark Savage's favor in Texas (referred to by the court as the "Texas note") in connection with the $240,000 loan.
• Exhibit B: August 26, 2016 order by the Honorable Alan Mayfield, Hill County Court, in Colette Clara Savage v. Mark Savage, Cause No. 52,939, granting Defendant Mark Savage's motion for summary judgment and determining "that the Defendant is entitled to recover a judgment against the Plaintiff on the Promissory Note dated August 22, 2014 in the original principal amount of $240,000 (the 'Note') executed by Plaintiff and payable to the order of Defendant" and denying all defenses by Plaintiff "to her obligation to pay the Note[.]"
• Exhibit C: January 31, 2017 order by the Honorable A. Lee Harris, Hill County Court, in Colette Clara Savage v. Mark Savage, Cause No. 52,939, granting Defendant Mark Savage's second motion for summary judgment, ordering that he "is entitled to recover a judgment against the Plaintiff on the Promissory Note dated August 22, 2014 in the original principal amount of $240,000 . . . executed by Plaintiff and payable to the order of Defendant," and entering judgment for Mark Savage in the amounts of $290,497.27 as the total principal and interest and $77,546.93 as attorneys' fees.
• Exhibit D: July 6, 2018 Order of Dismissal by Judge Harris, Hill County Court, in Colette Clara Savage v. Mark Savage, Cause No. CV219-18DC, dismissing the case, denying all claims by Colette Savage with prejudice, awarding Mark Savage attorneys' fees, and taxing costs against Colette Savage.
• Exhibit E: October 24, 2018 decision by the Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirming
two summary judgments entered in favor of Mark Savage in Colette Savage v. Mark Savage, Hill County Court Cause No. 52,939.
• Exhibit F: April 12, 2019 dismissal of Petitioner Colette Savage's petition for review by the Texas Supreme Court, Case No. 18-1126.
• Exhibit G: April 26, 2019 denial of Petitioner Colette Savage's petition for review and June 7, 2019 denial of Petitioner Colette Savage's petition for rehearing by the Texas Supreme Court, Case No. 18-0437.
• Exhibit H: June 13, 2019 mandate by the Texas Tenth Court of Appeals dismissing appeal by Colette Savage of the judgment of the Hill County Court in Colette Clara Savage v. Mark Savage, Cause No. CV219-18DC.
• Exhibit I: June 24, 2019 mandate by the Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirming the judgments of the Hill County Court in Colette Savage v. Mark Savage, Cause No. 52,939.
• Exhibit J: November 22, 2019 denial of petition for writ of mandamus by the Texas Supreme Court in Case No. 19-0086.
• Exhibit K: December 2, 2019 filing by Mark Savage in Mark Savage, Judgment Creditor v. Colette Clara Savage, Judgment Debtor, Marin County Superior Court Case No. CIV 1700381.
• Exhibit L: December 17, 2019 order by the Honorable Andrew E. Sweet, Marin County Superior Court, in Mark Savage, Judgment Creditor v. Colette Clara Savage, Judgment Debtor, Case No. CIV 1700381, denying Colette Savage's motion for reconsideration of an order denying her motion to vacate a sister-state judgment; granting Mark Savage's motion for an order amending the sister-state judgment and increasing the amount of judgment due to post-judgment costs and attorneys' fees; granting Mark Savage's motion to release to him all funds held in a blocked Bank of Marin account, number 0003-513876, as the amount due on the judgment "exceeds the amount held in the subject account"; and applying the total amount of funds in the Bank of Marin account "as a partial satisfaction of the Sister-State Judgment herein
against" Colette Savage.
This order is also part of Attachment 3 to Plaintiff's complaint.
Having reviewed Exhibits A though L to Defendant's RJN, the court concludes that the proceedings before the California and Texas courts are "directly related" to Plaintiff's allegations in this action. Accordingly, the court takes judicial notice of Exhibits A through B and Exhibits D through L. The court denies as moot the request for judicial notice of Exhibit C as it is already attached to Plaintiff's complaint as part of Exhibit 4.
III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because she seeks review of previous state court decisions adjudicating the same claims.
1. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A court will dismiss a party's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of th[e Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The challenging party may make a facial or factual attack challenging subject matter jurisdiction. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A facial challenge asserts that "the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In contrast, a factual attack disputes "the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction." Id. at 1039. A factual challenge permits the court to look beyond the complaint, without "presum[ing] the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations." White, 227 F.3d at 1242 (citation omitted). Even the presence of disputed material facts "will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). "Ordinarily, a case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be dismissed without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent court." Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
2. Discussion
"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal courts from exercising appellate review over final state court judgments." Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 858-9 (9th Cir. 2008). The "doctrine forbids a losing party in state court from filing suit in federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court judgment, and seeking federal court review and rejection of that judgment." Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). "The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from collateral federal attack. Because district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court decisions, they must decline jurisdiction whenever they are 'in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.'" Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983)). The doctrine applies to both final judgments and "interlocutory state court decisions." Doe & Assocs., 252 F.3d at 1030.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two cases, Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
In order to determine whether the doctrine applies, "a district court first must determine whether the action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision." Bell, 709 F.3d at 897 (citing Noel v. Hall, 342 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003)). "A de facto appeal exists when 'a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.' In contrast, if 'a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting Noel, 342 F.3d at 1164).
If a plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden de facto appeal, the plaintiff "may not seek to litigate an issue that is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is brought." Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that the "inextricably intertwined" language "is not a test to determine whether a claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis. Should the action not contain a forbidden de facto appeal, the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends." Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they are identical to allegations and claims for relief that she has already litigated and lost in multiple prior state court actions. According to Defendant, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff is seeking review of previous state court decisions that have rejected her allegations.
The court concludes that Plaintiff's lawsuit amounts to a forbidden de facto appeal of state court decisions that entered judgment against her in Defendant's favor regarding a promissory note she executed in Texas. The judicially-noticeable proceedings document the following sequence of events. In 2016, the San Mateo County Superior Court held "cancelled and extinguished" two promissory notes which it referred to as the "California Notes." Compl. Ex. 3. In a 2018 decision affirming an order issued by the San Mateo County Superior Court, the California Court of Appeals discussed the California Notes and the existence of a "third note [Plaintiff] had apparently executed in Texas" in connection with a $240,000 loan. RJN Ex. A.
The parties also engaged in litigation in Texas state court. In 2016 and 2017, the Hill County Court granted Defendant's motions for summary judgment and held that he was entitled to recover a judgment against Plaintiff regarding an August 22, 2014 promissory note in the original principal amount of $240,000 executed by Plaintiff and payable to Defendant, as well as interest and attorneys' fees. RJN Ex. B, Compl. Ex. 4. A Texas appeals court affirmed the orders on summary judgment, RJN Exs. E, I, and the Texas Supreme Court dismissed or denied Plaintiff's requests for review. RJN Exs. F, G. On February 1, 2017, the Marin County Superior Court entered the January 31, 2017 Hill County Court judgment in Defendant's favor against Plaintiff for the principal amount of $368,479.42. Compl. Ex. 4. Plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment, which the Marin County Superior Court denied, and on December 17, 2019, that court denied her motion for reconsideration of the order denying her motion to vacate, and increased the amount of the judgment owed by Plaintiff. It also ordered the release of funds from a blocked Bank of Marin account in order to partially satisfy the judgment against Plaintiff. RJN Ex. L.
In this action, Plaintiff's complaint and current motions for injunctive relief make clear that she asserts legal claims that challenge the propriety of various state court orders and seeks relief from those orders. Thus, Plaintiff challenges the decisions by the Hill County Court entering judgment against her in Defendant's favor, as well as the Marin County Superior Court's entry of the same. She contends that those decisions are in conflict with the San Mateo County Superior Court's decision holding the two California Notes "cancelled and extinguished":
We have conflicting orders by two State COURTS denying evidentiary hearings and trial by both Texas and California and are requesting this case be viewed in EQUITY. . . . We assert in both Texas and Marin Court and can prove this petitioner was never heard nor granted jurisdiction, nor due process and deprived of all the rules of civil procedure, equity, and affirmative defenses . . . Texas appealed and re-probated the last two California orders in a Texas court . . . This is an ongoing case in three different jurisdictions including now Marin County where Mark Savage and conspirators filed a SISTER STATE JUDGMENT APPLICATION to avoid San Mateo. PROBATE ORDERS from San Mateo have the authority to hold the Texas ORDER unenforceable . . . The state of Texas involved themselves in a settled and satisfied California state matter and re-opened PROBATE case #124417 and 125167 in Hillsboro, rural Texas, using counterfeit notes as a vehicle . . .Compl. 10-11 (emphases in original). A significant portion of the complaint is devoted to explaining why the Hill County Court erred in finding in Defendant's favor regarding the promissory note at issue in Texas. Further, in her motions for injunctive relief, Plaintiff seeks a stay of the transfer of money from her Bank of Marin bank account to Defendant. This request for relief is a direct challenge to the Marin County Superior Court's order directing the release of funds from that account to Defendant. See 1st Mot. for Prelim. Injunction/TRO 6; RJN Ex. L. Therefore, because Plaintiff's lawsuit complains "of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court," this court lacks jurisdiction to consider her claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges throughout her complaint that the promissory note at issue in Texas is "counterfeit" and "fraudulent," was rescinded by Plaintiff, was part of a "debt loan scheme," was "re-laundered and re-trafficked," and violated Texas law. She asks the court to "uphold LEGAL RESCISSION under FDCPA, under HOBBS ACT, DTPA, and extinguish the notes under various CALIFORNIA PROBATE CODES 17211 AND 3-305." Compl. 11-15. This request for relief also amounts to a "forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision," see Bell, 709 F.3d at 897, because at least some of Plaintiff's defenses to her obligation to pay the note have already been adjudicated in Defendant's favor. Specifically, in its August 26, 2016 order entering judgment in Defendant's favor, the Hill County Court held that unspecified defenses "to [Plaintiff's] obligation to pay the Promissory Note which is the subject of [the order] . . . are hereby denied." RJN Ex. B.
Plaintiff does not respond to Defendant's argument that her claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and does not explain how any of her claims escape the jurisdictional bar. The court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. As discussed above, Plaintiff challenges the judgments by the Texas state court and Marin County Superior Court and asks the court to "extinguish" the promissory note at issue in Texas; in other words, she asks this court to "review and reject[] those [state court] judgments." See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). As a result, the court must refuse to hear what is a "de facto appeal from" those decisions, and "must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is 'inextricably intertwined' with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision." Noel, 341 F.3d at 1154. Accordingly, the court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint. Her complaint is therefore dismissed. This dismissal is without prejudice, as the Ninth Circuit has held that "[o]rdinarily, a case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be dismissed without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent court." Frigard, 862 F.2d at 204.
B. Defendant's Other Arguments in Favor of Dismissal
Defendant raises several additional arguments in favor of dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. Def.'s Mot. 7-16. As the court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action, it does not reach the merits of those arguments.
IV. MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION/TRO
Plaintiff filed two motions for injunctive relief. In her first motion, Plaintiff appears to ask the court to stay the transfer of $368,000 from her Bank of Marin bank account to Defendant and "injunct" her properties in Texas. 1st Mot. for Prelim. Injunction/TRO 6. She seeks the same relief in her second motion. 2d Mot. for Prelim. Injunction/TRO 3. As discussed above, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint. Therefore, the motions for injunctive relief are denied without prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted and Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief are denied. The Clerk of the Court shall close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 18, 2020
/s/_________
Donna M. Ryu
United States Magistrate Judge