Opinion
13-P-1645
12-16-2014
ROGER SAUVAGEAU & another v. DETROIT DIESEL CORPORATION & others.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiffs, Roger and Helen Sauvageau, appeal from an order of the Superior Court allowing a motion to alter or amend a judgment against the defendant, Johnson & Towers, Inc. We affirm.
Background. In November, 2002, the Sauvageaus purchased a forty-eight-foot pleasure boat named "Reel Estate" (boat). The boat was equipped with twin diesel engines that had been manufactured by the Detroit Diesel Corporation (Detroit Diesel) and distributed by Johnson & Towers (J&T). In January, 2003, Detroit Diesel issued a "Modification Bulletin," notifying its distributors of a potential defect in the type of engines installed in the Sauvageaus' boat. The bulletin required the distributors, including J&T, to repair the potentially defective engine part at no cost to the consumer by January 28, 2004. Although George Patton, a J&T employee in charge of servicing engines, contacted the Sauvageaus regarding the bulletin, no repairs were made before the deadline. The boat's engine malfunctioned the following summer and the Sauvageaus then spent $41,346 to repair it.
The plaintiffs were the boat's second owners; the original owners purchased it on July 12, 2001.
There was conflicting testimony about the conversation between Patton and Roger Sauvageau on the issue of the repairs.
The Sauvageaus filed suit and, on November 29, 2010, a jury returned a verdict in their favor on the claims against J&T only; judgment entered for $41,346, "together with statutory interest and costs.", That judgment was affirmed in this court in a memorandum and order pursuant to our rule 1:28.
Two of the seven counts in the complaint sought damages from J&T for breach of contract and violation of G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2, 9.
The trial judge subsequently found that the "conduct of Detroit Diesel and defendant, New England Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc. [did] not approach the level of being violative of G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2, 9," and dismissed the 93A count with prejudice.
Posttrial motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied.
See Sauvageau v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (2012).
On May 6, 2013, a judgment after rescript entered in the trial court, noting this court's decision affirming the judgment. On May 16, 2013, J&T served the Sauvageaus with a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that, under applicable Federal maritime law, the Sauvageaus were not entitled to prejudgment interest. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 59(e), 365 Mass. 827 (1974). The judge allowed the motion and ordered an award of postjudgment interest only, agreeing that the interest be calculated according to Federal law.
Discussion. Timeliness. The Sauvageaus first argue that J&T's motion to amend the judgment was untimely and, thus, erroneously allowed. In their view, the time for filing the motion expired ten days after the trial court judgment entered on November 29, 2010 - almost two and one-half years before the motion was filed. We disagree. "A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than [ten] days after entry of the judgment." Mass.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Here, the judgment after rescript was entered on the trial court docket on May 6, 2013. J&T served on the Sauvageaus its motion to alter or amend the judgment on count III of Sauvageaus' complaint on May 16, 2013.
Under the rules of appellate procedure, a rescript is issued to the trial court twenty-eight days after the date of the rescript, unless other factors, not present here, apply. See Mass.R.A.P. 23, as appearing in 367 Mass. 921 (1975). "[W]hen a rescript does issue to the lower court -- whether the rescript is issued by the Appeals Court or [the Supreme Judicial Court] -- that signals the end of the direct review process for the case." Foxworth v. St. Amand, 457 Mass. 200, 206 (2010). "Accordingly, the final judgment reflected in the entry of the rescript on the trial court's docket remains the final judgment." Id. at 207. Cf. Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami, 419 Mass. 220, 223 (1994) ("A motion to alter or amend a judgment under rule 59(e) applies to the 'erroneous computation of interest.' See J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 59.15, at 454 (1977). Within ten days of the entry of the judgment after rescript, Shawmut contested the clerk's calculation of interest by filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment under rule 59[e]. There was no error." [emphasis supplied]). In this case, J&T "reacted reasonably promptly" after the rescript and its motion was therefore timely. See Horvitz v. Wile, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 908 (2011).
Despite the plaintiffs' argument to the contrary, we are not persuaded that the judge speculatively based his decision regarding the motion's timeliness on Mass.R.Civ.P. 60, 365 Mass. 828 (1974).
Prejudgment interest. The Sauvageaus next contend that the judge erred when he determined that they are not entitled to prejudgment interest. The answer to that argument depends upon whether Massachusetts law or Federal maritime law controls. The Sauvageaus posit that their complaint arose from defects in the engines created during its construction and therefore existing prior to the boat's initial launching. As a result, they maintain, J&T's breach of contract is controlled solely by State law. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerican Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). Were that the case, under Massachusetts law, the Sauvageaus, in fact, would be entitled to statutory prejudgment interest.
It is true that issues relating to the construction of a new boat fall under State jurisdiction. See Moores's Case, 323 Mass. 162, 165-166 (1948). However, in this case, the trouble with the engines did not arise in a new boat before its launch. As J&T argues, J&T was not the boat's manufacturer. The jury found J&T liable only for breach of J&T's contract with the Sauvageaus for failing to repair the boat's engines aboard the "Reel Estate" well after its launch. "A repair job on a previously completed vessel . . . fall[s] within Federal [admiralty] jurisdiction." Id. at 165.
The plaintiffs waived their claim for breach of warranty against Detroit Diesel at the beginning of trial.
Sauvageau made a similar argument about the cause of action before this court in his prior appeal. "Sauvageau argue[d] that the judge erred because the warranty was not conditioned on 'failure of the engine' but rather on 'any malfunction occurring during the warranty period resulting from defects in material or workmanship.' . . . However, as the judge found, nothing in the summary judgment record suggested that Sauvageau's particular yacht was malfunctioning at the time that Detroit Diesel circulated the modification bulletin in early 2003. In fact, Sauvageau admitted that, as late as the spring of 2004, there was no direct evidence that the engine was malfunctioning. [This court therefore concurred] with the judge's grant of summary judgment [in favor of the manufacturer, Detroit Diesel.]" Sauvageau v. Detroit Diesel Corp., supra.
--------
It is well settled that, "to enforce a cause of action cognizable in admiralty, the substantive law to be applied is the same as would be applied in an admiralty court -- that is, the general maritime law." Militello v. Ann & Grace, Inc., 411 Mass. 22, 26 (1991). In particular, "[t]he questions whether to, and who may, award prejudgment interest are governed by the Federal maritime law and not State law." Ibid. In this case, the Sauvageaus do not dispute the proposition that maritime law requires the factfinder (in this case, the jury) to determine any award of prejudgment interest; their argument is only that State law controls instead.
The Sauvageaus did not request an award of prejudgment interest before the case was submitted to the jury - either by requesting special instructions or otherwise bringing the issue to the judge's attention. They are not permitted to do so after the trial. Id. at 28. We are satisfied that allowing their request for an automatic award of prejudgment interest under G. L. c. 231, § 6B, at this stage of the proceedings "would interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of the substantive Federal maritime law and would have a meaningful impact on the result." Id. at 27-28. In addition, because we agree that this action is governed by maritime law, the Federal postjudgment interest rate shall apply. Id. at 28-29. 28 U.S.C. 1961. See Curcuru v. Rose's Oil Service, Inc., 69 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 512 (2007).
We perceive no abuse of discretion in the judge's allowance of the defendant's rule 59(e) motion. See Gannett v. Shulman, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 606, 615 (2009).
Order allowing defendant's motion to alter or amend judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Berry, Kafker & Hanlon, JJ.),
Clerk Entered: December 16, 2014.