No. 01-06-01002-CR
Opinion issued January 24, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 262nd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1057071.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, HANKS, and HIGLEY.
GEORGE C. HANKS, Jr. Justice.
After his motion to suppress was denied, appellant, Lee Andrew Sauseda, pleaded guilty to the offense of possession, with intent to deliver, more than four grams and less than 200 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant was sentenced to eight years of deferred adjudication and a $500 fine. In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his illegal arrest. We affirm.
Facts
At about 8:30 p.m. on November 30, 2005, Harris County Sheriff's Deputy T.W. Bell saw what appeared to be a fight involving four men standing near a white Lincoln Continental in front of an apartment complex. When Deputy Bell turned his cruiser around and identified himself to the men, the men began to "disperse." As they were "separating," Deputy Bell saw one of the men, not appellant, walk around to the other side of the Continental and throw an object on the ground. Believing the discarded object to be cocaine, Deputy Bell drew his gun, ordered the men to stop and put their hands on the Continental, and radioed for backup. When the backup arrived, the officers handcuffed the four suspects, placed them in the backseats of the patrol cars, and began looking for the discarded object, which Deputy Bell found on the curb near the passenger-side door of the Continental. While he was leaning over to pick up the object, Deputy Bell smelled a strong odor of marihuana. Because the Continental was roughly two feet away and its passenger-side window was rolled down, Deputy Bell believed that the smell was coming from inside the car. A field test revealed that the discarded item was indeed crack cocaine, and a search of the car uncovered plastic bags containing marihuana, cocaine, and cash. Appellant admitted to the officers that the car and the narcotics found in the car belonged to him. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered by the search of his car on the basis that he was detained by the deputies in violation of his rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions. After a hearing during which appellant and Deputy Bell testified, the trial court denied appellant's motion, and appellant then pleaded guilty to possession, with intent to deliver, more than four grams and less than 200 grams of cocaine. This appeal followed. Motion to Suppress
In two points of error, appellant contends that (1) his arrest was illegal and without probable cause and (2), alternatively, any investigative detention was unreasonable and unlawful. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized. He further argues that, because "the drugs in the nearby vehicle were not discovered until Appellant had been in custody for over an hour, they could not have served as the basis for his arrest." Appellant does not complain of the warrantless search of his car. Standard of Review
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts while reviewing de novo the trial court's application of the law to those facts. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); State v. Stone, 137 S.W.3d 167, 174 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). If the trial court's decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, it will be sustained, even if that theory is not given as the reason for the trial court's decision. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Rauscher v. State, 129 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). Independent Source
In the instant cause, the investigating officers obtained the challenged evidence by conducting a search of the appellant's car, a means wholly independent of the deputies' detention of the appellant. As the record shows and the trial court found, Deputy Bell saw one of the suspects throw a suspicious object on the ground near the appellant's car, which led to a search by the officers of the surrounding pavement, which led Deputy Bell to move closer to appellant's car and smell the marihuana odor coming from its open passenger-side window, which led to a search of the car, which produced the evidence appellant sought to suppress. Once Deputy Bell detected the odor of marihuana emanating from the open window of appellant's car, he had probable cause to conduct a search of the car without a warrant, regardless of whether appellant was present or under arrest. Appellant's detention, even if it was unconstitutional, was not a link in that causal chain and was certainly not its source. In fact, Deputy Bell's observation of the discarding of cocaine by one of the suspects occurred before anyone, including appellant, had been taken into custody. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.