Opinion
No. 05-08-01651-CR
Opinion Filed November 25, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court Number Six, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MA07-48123-G.
Before Justices MORRIS, BRIDGES, and MURPHY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Paul David Satterfield was charged by information with driving while intoxicated, second offense. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress, challenging the legality of the traffic stop and his arrest. After a hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant then pled guilty to the offense, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The trial court sentenced appellant to ninety days in the Dallas County Jail. In one issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Because the law to be applied is well-settled, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Background
The record of the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress consisted of the testimony of Dallas police officer Dean Overall. Overall is a patrol officer who is also certified to conduct field sobriety tests. Overall testified he was on duty on January 17, 2007, at approximately 2:20 a.m. when he observed appellant operating a vehicle in the 2800 block of West Davis Street in Dallas. Appellant was parked at the Tradewinds night club. Overall described West Davis Street as a "major thoroughfare," with two lanes in each direction. Overall also testified that he patrolled the area frequently; there were "several clubs in that thousand feet"; and the clubs under state law closed at 2:00 a.m. with "last drinking at 2:15."
Overall observed appellant back his vehicle across the two westbound lanes of Davis Street, then across the center line, then into the eastbound lane for about twenty feet before proceeding eastward. Overall testified appellant "just kind of darted out from the club." Overall was driving west approximately 1500 feet from appellant, following another westbound car that was approximately 100 to 150 feet away from appellant when appellant was backing his vehicle across the roadway. Overall testified he believed appellant committed a traffic violation by failing to back the vehicle safely. Overall also testified that based on his experience, he "believed there was a high probability" appellant was driving while intoxicated. Based on his observations that appellant "was leaving a bar at closing, backed across two lanes of traffic, backed across a center turn lane with a car coming," Overall conducted a traffic stop of appellant's vehicle.
Motion to Suppress
In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress. Appellant argues the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, because Overall made the stop without specific, articulable facts that appellant actually was, had been, or soon would be engaged in criminal activity. Appellant's challenge on appeal is limited to the initial stop; he does not challenge the actual arrest.
The State bore the burden to establish the reasonableness of the warrantless detention. See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (once defendant makes showing that search made without warrant, burden shifts to State to establish search or seizure was reasonable). As the court stated in Ford,
An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.
Id. (footnotes omitted). "This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists," considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 492-93.
In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, we use a bifurcated standard of review. Id. at 493. We give "almost total deference" to the trial court's determination of historical facts and application of law to fact questions that turn on credibility and demeanor, but review de novo the application of law to fact questions that do not turn upon credibility and demeanor. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Because the trial court did not make explicit findings of fact in this case, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the record. Ford, 158 S.W.2d at 493.
Appellant contends there were no articulable facts to support Overall's conclusion that appellant was not backing his vehicle safely. Appellant argues the oncoming vehicle was at least 100 to 150 feet away; there was no evidence that vehicle took any evasive action or had to stop or turn to avoid appellant; and Overall admitted nothing went wrong. Appellant concludes, "it appears that the vehicle was stopped just because it was exiting from a bar early in the morning."
The State contends Overall reasonably believed appellant was violating Texas Transportation Code section 545.415(a), which provides, "[a]n operator may not back the vehicle unless the movement can be made safely and without interference with other traffic." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.415(a) (Vernon 1999). The State also contends Overall reasonably believed appellant was violating section 49.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code by driving while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003) ("A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.").
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the officer had specific, articulable facts which led him reasonably to conclude appellant was backing his vehicle in violation of Transportation Code section 545.415. The State was not required to show a traffic offense was actually committed, but only that the officer reasonably believed a violation was in progress. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) (citing Valencia v. State, 820 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd)). Overall testified appellant "darted out" across two lanes of traffic, backing across the center line of a major thoroughfare, 100 or 150 feet from an oncoming car. These were specific, articulable facts that led the officer reasonably to believe a traffic offense was in progress. In addition, the traffic offense was occurring while appellant was pulling out of a bar at 2:20 a.m. Considering the totality of the circumstances, there was an objective basis for Overall's conclusions. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492-93. The trial judge did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress. We overrule appellant's sole issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.