Opinion
(Fall Riding, 1801.)
The natural boundary described in a deed for land is to be followed, if it can be ascertained; but if the jury doubt which is the natural boundary, and are satisfied from the evidence that the artificial boundary was considered by the proprietor as the true one, they may establish it by their verdict.
DEFENDANT claimed the lands described in a patent, to Smythwick, beginning at the mouth of Bear Creek on Little River, thence up the creek N. 5 W. 248 poles to a gum, then up the north prong of said creek, N. 45 E. 264 poles to a hickory, thence a certain course to the river, and down the river to the beginning. The artificial course described as the two first lines declined from the creek and north prong, and the second course struck the river before the number of poles called for was completed; and by that means the third line was excluded altogether. Some distance up the branch from the beginning was a branch running to the northeast, which was insisted to be the north prong; but that branch was only 140 poles from the beginning, neither was it long enough to answer the distance called for in the second course, and, taking that for the north prong, the distance would have carried us to the river, excluding also the third line; but it was proved that the former owner of this land admitted the artificial boundary as laid down in the plot to be the true boundary of the land.
The natural boundary, if it can be ascertained, is to be followed; but if the jury have doubts which is the natural boundary, and are satisfied from the evidence that the artificial boundary was considered by the proprietor as the true one, they may establish it by their verdict.
Quere de hoc.
NOTE. — See Person v. Roundtree, 1 N.C. 69, and the cases referred to in the note thereto.