Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-2671-BHH-TER
08-28-2019
JAMES LEE SARRATT, JR., Plaintiff, v. KATHY WHITE, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
This action has been filed by the Plaintiff, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant violated his constitutional rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Presently before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 24). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to the motion could result in dismissal of his case. Plaintiff timely filed his response. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff, who at the times relevant to this action, was a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Facility, alleges that he was taken to Spartanburg Regional Medical Center on October 16, 2016, due to severe acid reflux and was given a special prescription, including a refill, due to the severity his condition, but "due to cuts by Defendant Kathy White" he has not received the medication, but only over-the-counter antacid pills. He also alleges that he has been denied treatment as a result of budget cuts. As a result, he has suffered trouble sleeping, problems keeping his food down, weight loss, and damage to the lining of his throat.
Plaintiff's medical records reveal that he was taken to the emergency department at the Spartanburg Regional Medical Center on October 8, 2016, rather than October 16, 2016. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, pp. 3, 7). On that day, Plaintiff complained to medical staff at the detention center of chest pain, shortness of breath, and vomiting, and was transported to the hosptial via EMS. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, p. 3). At the hospital, Plaintiff was diagnosed with gastroesophageal reflux disease without esophagitis and constipation. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, p. 7). He was prescribed aluminum-magnesium hydroxide 200-200 mg/5 ml suspension every six hours as needed for heartburn up to ten days, and famotidine 20 mg tablet (commonly known as Pepcid) twice a day, and was given no refills for either medication. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, pp. 3, 5-7). After noting the medications Plaintiff was prescribed at the hospital, Plaintiff's SCDC medical records state "NP to advise." Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, pp. 3).
Plaintiff's Medication Administration Records (MAR) reveal that he did not begin taking the prescribed medication as soon as he returned from the hospital. MAR (ECF No. 24-6, p. 18). Plaintiff returned to the medical staff on October 10, 2016, complaining of chest pain related to indigestion and acid reflux. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, p. 3). He was given two packs of antacid and returned to the pod. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, p. 3). Plaintiff was seen again on October 13, 2016, with complaints of acid reflux, and the Nurse Practitioner ordered that he be given two ranitidine 150 mg tablets then and scheduled him to receive one ranitidine 150 mg tablet twice daily. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, p. 3). Plaintiff's MAR shows that Plaintiff indeed began taking the ranitidine twice daily on October 13, 2016, and continued to take it as prescribed through February of 2018. MAR (ECF No. 24-6, pp. 6-18). In addition, Plaintiff began taking the aluminum-magnesium hydroxide that was prescribed by the hospital physician on October 17, 2016, and took it for seven days. MAR (ECF No. 24-6, p. 18). Plaintiff did not take the other medication, famotidine, that was prescribed by the hospital physician. However, once he began taking the ranitidine, his medical records reveal no complaints of acid reflux, heartburn, or any other related issues until February of 2018, approximately sixteen months later. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, pp. 2-3).
On February 28, 2018, Plaintiff complained that the ranitidine was no longer working, and the nurse indicated that she would check with the Nurse Practitioner to see if Plaintiff could be given something different. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, p. 2). Plaintiff was issued eight packs of antacids for discomfort. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-4, p. 2). On March 1, 2018, the Nurse Practitioner prescribed Plaintiff with famotidine (Pepcid) 20 mg to see if it would work better for him. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, p. 16). The ranitidine was discontinued and Plaintiff started taking the famotidine on March 4, 2018, and continued taking it until March 20, 2018. MAR (ECF No. 24-6, p. 4).
On March 20, 2018, Plaintiff complained of vomiting after breakfast and supper and stated that there were dots of blood in his vomit. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, p. 16). His medication was changed from the famotidine to omeprazole (Prilosec). Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, p. 16); MAR (ECF No. 24-6, p. 4). Plaintiff continued taking the omeprazole and had no complaints of acid reflux, heartburn, or any other related condition for approximately six months until September 16, 2018, when he asked to be seen about his stomach/acid reflux issues. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, p. 16); MAR (ECF No. 24-6, pp. 1-3; ECF No. 24-5, pp. 7-18). Plaintiff was seen on September 26, 2018, and his omeprazole was increased from 20 mg to 40 mg. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, p. 16); MAR (ECF No. 24-6, p. 10). Plaintiff complained of acid reflux again on October 18, 2018, and the Nurse Practitioner noted on October 23, 2018, that Plaintiff was taking the maximum dose of omeprazole and informed Plaintiff to stay up for one to two hours after eating meals and to cut back on commissary foods if he was eating those. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, pp. 12, 15). Plaintiff made complaints of worsening acid reflux again on October 29, 2018, and November 5, 2018, when he stated that he felt something else was going in with his stomach. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, pp. 12, 14-15). The omeprazole was discontinued on November 7, 2018, and Plaintiff began taking pantoprazole. MAR (ECF No. 24-5, p. 7). In addition, Plaintiff was tested for h. pylori. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, p. 10). The lab results came back positive for h. pylori, so Plaintiff was given additional medication to treat it on November 15, 2018. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, p. 10).
Plaintiff filed this action on September 28, 2018.
Plaintiff's medication was again changed on December 12, 2018, to an increased dosage of pantoprazole and the addition of metronidazole after Plaintiff complained of continuing symptoms. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, p. 10); MAR (ECF No. 24-5, p. 5). On February 12, 2019, Plaintiff complained of vomiting, and he was ordered to stay in medical for observation. Med. Records (ECF No. 24-3, pp. 8-9). His pantoprazole dosage was again increased at that time from two tablets once a day to two tablets twice a day. MAR (ECF No. 24-5, p. 3).
Defendant Kathy White is the Medical Administrator at the SCDF and is responsible for overseeing the administration of the medical department. White Aff. ¶¶ 1-2. She is not a nurse and does not render medical treatment. White Aff. ¶¶ 1-2. The SCDF has a Medical Director, Rob E. McDonald, M.D., who oversees the medical treatment of the inmates. White Aff. ¶ 3. White is also not involved in the decision making process as to the annual budget the SCDF receives and avers that budgetary considerations do not play a role in the medical care delivered to the inmates. White Aff. ¶ 4.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet "the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his constitutional rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A legal action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To be successful on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
The standard for reviewing medical claims of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially the same as that for a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment-deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir.1992); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir.1988) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). "The Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of convicted prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee." Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir.1988)). In order to state a claim, "[a] plaintiff must satisfy two elements ...: he must show a serious medical need and he must prove the defendant's purposeful indifference thereto." Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1987). Unless medical needs were serious or life threatening, and the defendants were deliberately and intentionally indifferent to those needs of which he was aware at the time, a plaintiff may not prevail. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); . Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179 (4th Cir.1986). A claim of deliberate medical indifference requires more than a showing of mere negligence, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, and "more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). The Fourth Circuit has noted that treatment "must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
Defendant White avers that she had no involvement in the medical care rendered to Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to show that the medical care he received at SCDF was unconstitutional. He was consistently seen and treated whenever he complained of acid reflux. He was placed on various medications to treat his condition and went long periods of time without making any complaints regarding his reflux. Whenever his reflux problems started again, he was seen by the medical staff and he was either given a higher dosage, a new medication, or an additional medication. He was also given advice regarding lifestyle changes, such as remaining upright for one to two hours after eating and refraining from eating food from the canteen, to help lessen his reflux problems. When Plaintiff complained that his problems were caused by something other than reflux, he was tested for h. pylori and subsequently treated when the results returned positive. Plaintiff complains that he was not given the medication that was prescribed to him at the hospital. However, he was given one of those medications for seven days, and after he started the ranitidine, he had no complaints for over a year and a half. Each time his reflux started to cause problems again, his medication was altered in an effort to determine what worked best. Nevertheless, "[a]lthough the Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice." Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir.1988). Prison officials implement the type and amount of medical treatment at their discretion. See Allah v. Hayman, 442 F. App'x 632, 635 (3d Cir.2011) (holding that deliberate indifference standard "requires much more" than taking issue with the "amount and kind of medical care" an inmate received); Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1014 (7th Cir.2006) (finding that a prison doctor who prescribed non-surgical means of treating an inmate's hernia was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical needs where the doctor formed a professional opinion, other doctors agreed, and the inmate continued to have associated abdominal pain); Faison v. Rosado, 129 F. App'x 490, 492 (11th Cir.2005) (noting that although a prisoner "might not agree with the method of treatment provided, matters of medical judgment do not give rise to a § 1983 claim").
It is not clear from the record why Plaintiff was not given medication for his reflux when he first returned from the hospital on October 8, 2016. Nevertheless, it is clear that he was given two packs of antacids on October 10, 2013, and when he returned to medical on October 13, 2016, Plaintiff was given prescription medication which continued to alleviate his symptoms for over a year. This slight delay in receiving medication does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it. Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). "An Eighth Amendment violation only occurs [ ] if the delay results in some substantial harm to the patient." Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 Fed. Appx. 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Center, 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994)("An inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of a delay in medical treatment to succeed."). Further, the fact that Plaintiff received antacids for two days prior to beginning his prescription medication does not give rise to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Jacobs v. McVea, No. 14-CV-552, 2014 WL 2894286, at *7 (E.D. La. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) ("While it is evident that plaintiff was unhappy with the over-the-counter pain medication, a prisoner has no right to be prescribed a particular medication for pain, and the fact that he disagrees with the prison medical staff concerning which pain medication is appropriate is not actionable under § 1983."); Starling v. United States, 664 F.Supp.2d 558, 570-71 (D.S.C. 2009) (concluding that allegations of "ignoring specialist's recommendations, dispensing inferior pain medication, and refusing prescribed treatment" on part of doctor did not establish deliberate indifference). For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to show that any medical personnel at SCDF violated his constitutional rights with respect to the medical treatment he received. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.
Plaintiff asserts in his response that he needs to conduct discovery. However, the motion for summary judgment was filed after the expiration of the discovery deadline, and Plaintiff never moved for an extension of that deadline or made any other motion regarding discovery.
Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 17) to add Dr. McDonald as a Defendant. However, allowing such an amendment would be futile since the record reflects that the medical treatment Plaintiff received was not unconstitutional. See Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that leave to amend should be denied "only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile"). Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. --------
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) be granted and this case dismissed in its entirety.
s/Thomas E. Rogers, III
Thomas E. Rogers, III
United States Magistrate Judge August 28, 2019
Florence, South Carolina