Opinion
No. S13F1749.
2014-01-21
Holle Weiss–Friedman, Brunswick, for Sapp. Crystal R. Ferrier, Ferrier & Ferrier P.C., Brunswick, for appellee.
Holle Weiss–Friedman, Brunswick, for Sapp. Crystal R. Ferrier, Ferrier & Ferrier P.C., Brunswick, for appellee.
BLACKWELL, Justice.
We granted the application of Mary Brown Sapp for a discretionary appeal from a divorce decree that required Sapp and her former husband to sell their marital home. But upon further review, it appears that the decree was not final. Although it directed the sale of the marital home, the decree also provided that, if Sapp and her former husband did not agree on a listing price—and there is no dispute that they never agreed—the court would set a price at a later date. When a divorce is granted by a decree that reserves an issue to be determined later, the decree is interlocutory, not final. See Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274, 282(4), 705 S.E.2d 839 (2010); see also Miller v. Miller, 282 Ga. 164, 165, 646 S.E.2d 469 (2007). Because the decree was interlocutory, Sapp was required to bring her appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5–6–34(b), which requires, among other things, a certificate of immediate review. Because Sapp failed to comply with OCGA § 5–6–34(b), we dismiss her appeal. See Stevens v. State, 292 Ga. 218, 734 S.E.2d 743 (2012); Gelfand v. Gelfand, 281 Ga. 40, 41, 635 S.E.2d 770 (2006).
When we granted the application, we directed the parties to brief whether the decree was final.
Appeal dismissed.
All the Justices concur.