Santoro v. Town of Hamden

Full title: FRANK SANTORO, SR., PPA ET AL. v. TOWN OF HAMDEN

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

Date published: Aug 18, 2006

2006 Ct. Sup. 14538 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)

41 CLR 850

Opinion

No. CV 040488583

August 18, 2006

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

ANGELA C. ROBINSON, JUDGE.

This case arises out of the unfortunate scenario in which a student of the Hamden Public School system claims that he was bullied by other student(s) and the school system failed to adequately respond.

The plaintiffs, Frank Santoro, Sr., PPA, and Audrey Santoro, PPA, brought an action against the defendants, Town of Hamden, Hamden Board of Education, Alicia Begina, Mary Marradino, and Gilbert Rebhurn, alleging that the minor, Santoro, was subjected to severe bullying behavior within the Hamden Public School system and that the school officials refused to take meaningful action to redress the problem. The defendants move to strike the First and Second Counts of the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. For reasons more fully set forth below this court grants the defendants' motions to strike the two remaining counts in the Amended Complaint.

The plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that the defendants' actions denied the Santoro minor child equal educational opportunities. The defendants challenge the sufficiency of this statement, arguing that it merely posits a legal conclusion. Further, the defendants argue that the Hamden Board of Education is entitled to sovereign immunity because it was acting as an agency of the state.

The plaintiffs counter that this court must consider their allegations as pled; and the defendants are not entitled to immunity because the instant case seeks prospective equitable relief in the form of an injunction.

The defendants next move to strike the Second Count in the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which alleges that the defendants violated section 10-222d of Connecticut General Statutes. Section CT Page 14539 10-222d of C.G.S. requires each regional board of education to develop a policy to address the existence of bullying in its schools. The defendants first claim that there is no private cause of action under this statute. And, second, the defendants argue that even if there is a private cause of action, the plaintiffs may not pursue it in this action because they failed to exhaust the administrative remedies.

The plaintiffs counter that there is no legal support for the defendant's assertion that no private cause of action exists for section 10-222d. The plaintiffs do not address the defendants' administrative remedies argument.

The law governing the court's consideration of a motion to strike is well established. "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). It tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted. Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 260 Conn. 59, 65, 793 A.2d 1048 (2002); Practice Book § 10-39. The trial court's role is to examine the complaint and construe it in favor of the pleader. Suffield Development Associates, Ltd. Partnership v. National Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 772, 802 A.2d 44 (2002). Specifically, the court must "assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder" and "read the allegations broadly, rather than narrowly." Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 321, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). The requirement of favorable construction does not extend, however, to legal opinions or conclusions stated in the complaint, but only to factual allegations and the facts "necessarily implied and fairly provable under the allegations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Forbes v. Ballaro, 31 Conn.App. 235, 239, 624 A.2d 389 (1993). The motion is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading, which allegations cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any facts not therein alleged. Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 549-50, 427 A.2d 822 (1980). The motion is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law unsupported by the facts alleged. Fidelity Bank v. Krenisky, 72 Conn.App. 700, 720, 807 A.2d 968, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 915, 811 A.2d 1291 (2002); Donar v. King Associates, Inc., 67 Conn.App. 346, 349, 786 A.2d 1256 (2001). "If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991).

First Count — Allegation that Defendants' Actions Denied Santoro Minor Child Equal Educational Opportunities

Considering the plaintiffs' allegations broadly, this court concludes that there is a sufficient factual basis in the First Count, which incorporates facts referenced in other portions of the Amended Complaint, to deny the defendants' motion to strike. Therefore, this court must turn to the defendants' second argument that the Hamden Board of Education is immune from suit pursuant to the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine.

Connecticut law has created a dichotomy in which local boards of education are agents of the state for some purposes and agents of the municipality for others. Heigl v. Board of Education of New Canaan, 218 Conn. 1, 34, 587 A.2d 423 (1991). "A town board of education thus potentially enjoys immunity under two different theories of immunity for acts carried out within its governmental capacity. For example, we have long recognized the common-law principle [of sovereign immunity] that the state cannot be sued without its consent . . . Alternatively, at common law, Connecticut municipalities enjoy governmental immunity, in certain circumstances, from liability for their tortious acts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

To determine whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to a local school board, the court must determine whether the board is acting in accordance with state-required activities or for the benefit of a municipality. Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 112, 708 A.2d 937 (1998); Cahill v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. 94, 102, 444 A.2d 907 (1982). According to the plaintiffs' complaint, the defendants are being sued for their alleged failure to fulfill the state constitutional requirement of the provision of equal educational opportunities in public schools. Thus, the defendants are being sued in their capacity as agents of the State. See, Couture v. Board of Education, 6 Conn.App. 309, 312-13, 505 A.2d 432 (1986). Therefore, the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity applies to bar the claim alleged in the plaintiffs' First Count. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike the First Count is granted.

Second Count — Allegation that the Defendants Failed to Follow Their Own Bullying Policies

Turning to the defendants' second motion to strike, the court considers whether section 10-222d is a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 10-222d mandates that each regional district develop a policy to address the existence of bullying in its schools. The section further requires that the policy incorporate certain things. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants failed to comply with the requirements of this section because they failed to follow their own bullying policy. The defendants counter that, even if they did fail to comply with the statute, it does not create a private cause of action whereby local boards may be sued.

There are no cases directly on point addressing this precise issue of whether or not there is a private cause of action under section 10-222d. In the absence of any applicable precedence directing a contrary outcome, this court finds insufficient indicia that the legislature intended to create a private cause of action pursuant to section 10-222d. Therefore this court concludes that section 10-222d does not provide a basis for circumventing the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the defendants' motion to strike the Second Count must be granted.

Plaintiff's Argument regarding Injunctive Relief

The court has granted both of the defendants' motions to strike because it found that the defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. There are two ways to circumvent that doctrine: "(1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity . . .; or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute . . ." (Citations omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 314, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).

The rationale for the exceptions is that declaratory or injunctive relief of the type referenced above results in less interference with the functioning of government and the control required of government officials over their respective instrumentalities. "Because a court may tailor declaratory and injunctive relief so as to minimize any such interference . . . actions that seek injunctive or declaratory relief against a state officer acting in excess of statutory authority . . . do not conflict with the policies underlying the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id.

In the claims for relief in the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs are seeking "an order providing them with vouchers for the plaintiff to attend school outside the district; an order of mandamus compelling the defendants to comply with section 10-222d of C.G.S.; damages; and any additional relief to which equity may pertain." Notwithstanding plaintiffs' counsel's oral arguments that this is only an action for "prospective injunctive" relief, these claims for relief seek more.

Further, even looking exclusively to the one possible claim for injunctive relief "any additional relief to which equity may pertain," this request is too vague and imprecise. The manner within which a school district establishes its educational system; and the manner in which it implements its bullying policy are discretionary and contingent upon a multitude of variables, too numerous to permit any court to fashion a simple enjoinder which would not unduly interfere with governmental function.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants' motions to strike the First and Second Count of the Amended Complaint.