Summary
holding that the court "lacks jurisdiction to hear FOIA claims against individuals, even where such individuals are agency heads or other agency officials named in their official capacity"
Summary of this case from Hines v. U.S.Opinion
Civil Action No. 06-1970 (GK).
May 27, 2008.
Maureen Santini, Bethesda, MD, pro se.
William Mark Nebeker, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Maureen Santini, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Jeffrey A. Taylor, United States Attorney, and Daniel J. Metcalf, Director of the Department of Justice's Office of Information and Privacy alleging violations of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701- 706. This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment [ Dkt. No. 12]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Both Defendants are sued only in their official capacity.
I. BACKGROUND
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. See In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation, 245 F. Supp. 117, 124-25 (D.D.C. 2003). Therefore, the facts set forth herein are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
12In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig. 880 F.2d 14391442-43Jones v. Exec. Office of the President 167 F. Supp. 2d 1013 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit 507 U.S. 163164113 S.Ct. 1160 122 L.Ed.2d 517Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft185 F. Supp. 2d 9 13-14Lipsman v. Sec'y of the Army 257 F. Supp. 2d 36
Following their initial receipt of Plaintiff's subpoena for documents in April 2006, Defendants removed to this Court. Judge Collyer, writing for this Court, quashed the subpoena on October 17, 2006, noting that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce a Superior Court subpoena against the federal government and lacked jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's allegations given her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
Courts in this jurisdiction must liberally construe pleadings submitted by a pro se party. See United States v. Palmer, 296 F.3d 1135, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) for the proposition that the allegations of a pro se litigant, "however inartfully pleaded," are subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
However, there are limits to the latitude a court must affordpro se parties. A court may not, for instance, permit pro se litigants to disregard the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.United States. v. Funds From Prudential Sec., 362 F. Supp. 2d 75, 82 (D.D.C. 2005). Nor may a court entertain "what[ever] claims a [pro se litigant] may or may not want to assert" without an adequate jurisdictional basis. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act Claim Is Moot.
On January 16, 2008, Defendants filed a Suggestion of Mootness with the Court, arguing that the recent dismissal of Plaintiff's Superior Court civil action rendered her APA claim in the instant case moot. Plaintiff's APA claim alleged that the U.S. Attorney's Office arbitrarily and capriciously refused to comply with the subpoena issued in Plaintiff's civil case, and therefore violated the APA. Because the dismissal of Plaintiff's Superior Court action extinguishes any right she may have had to issuance of a subpoena in that proceeding, and because the relief requested in her APA claim is no longer available, Plaintiff's APA claim must be dismissed as moot.
Plaintiff argues that notwithstanding the dismissal of her civil case, her subsequent appeal of the Superior Court ruling prevents her claim from becoming moot. However, it is well settled that an appeal of an adverse state court ruling is not sufficient to keep underlying collateral discovery disputes alive, as "there is no longer a trial proceeding in aid of which a subpoena . . . may issue." Lopez Contractors, Inc. v. F M Bank Allegiance, 90 Fed. Appx. 549, 550, 2004 WL 335203, *1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting City of El Paso v. S.E. Reynolds, 887 F.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Consequently, Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed as moot.
B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Enforce the Freedom of Information Act Against Individuals.
Plaintiff's FOIA claims also must be dismissed, because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Freedom of Information Act against individuals. Plaintiff has named only individuals, not agencies, in this case.
The Freedom of Information Act grants district courts "jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records improperly withheld from the complainant." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear FOIA claims against individuals, even where such individuals are agency heads or other agency officials named in their official capacity. Santos v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 357 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2004); Stone v. Defense Investigative Service, 816 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D.D.C. 1993). Because Plaintiff has named as defendants in this case government employees in their official capacity (i.e., Defendants Jeffrey Taylor and Daniel J. Metcalf), rather than the agency being sued, Plaintiff's case must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [ Dkt. No. 12] is granted and this case is dismissed with prejudice.
An Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.