Opinion
CV134005683S
12-23-2016
Edison Santiago (Inmate #302587) v. Warden
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Vernon D. Oliver, J.
The petitioner, Edison Santiago, initiated this petition for a writ of habeas corpus and challenged General Statutes § 54-125a, as amended by Public Act 13-3. The pro se petition was amended by assigned counsel and now encompasses twelve counts. The crux of the petitioner's allegations concern § 54-125a, its interrelationship with the Risk Reduction Earned Credits (RRE credits) he may receive pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98e, and how the RRE credits affect his parole eligibility date.
The petitioner's twelve counts are captioned as follows: (1) ex post facto violation re: P.A. 13-247; (2) ex post facto violation re: P.A. 13-3; (3) retroactive application of P.A. 13-247: statutory construction; (4) retroactive application of P.A. 13-3: statutory construction; (5) due process re: P.A. 13-247; (6) due process re: P.A. 13-3; (7) separation of powers; (8) right of personal liberty re: 13-247; (9) right of personal liberty re: P.A. 13-3; (10) denial of equal protection re: P.A. 13-3; (11) denial of substantive due process; (12) due process: enforcement of governmental representations.
On May 17, 2016, the respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the habeas court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's parole eligibility pursuant to the Appellate Court's decision in Petaway v. Commissioner of Correction, 160 Conn.App. 727, 125 A.3d 1053 (2015). On July 13, 2016, the petitioner filed two memoranda captioned as a memorandum in support of petitioner's opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss in the guise of a motion for summary judgment, and a memorandum in support of the petitioner's opposition to respondent's motion for summary judgment. The court heard oral argument on the motion and objection thereto on August 30, 2016. For the reasons articulated more fully below, the respondent's motion is granted and judgment shall enter dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
I
STANDARD
The court must first determine the appropriate standard to apply to the respondent's motion. " [S]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any state [of] the proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.P. Alexandre, LLC v. Egbuna, 137 Conn.App. 340, 49 A.3d 222, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 913, 53 A.3d 1000 (2012). " A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of this court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). " Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).
" Although the proper way to challenge subject matter jurisdiction is by a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion for summary judgment . . . it is not improper to treat a motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) J.P. Alexandre, LLC v. Egbuna, supra, 137 Conn.App. 345 n.5.
Although the respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, in the memorandum of law in support of the motion, the respondent repeatedly urges the court to dismiss the petitioner's claims and cites to Practice Book § 23-29, a section authorizing the court to dismiss the habeas action on certain grounds. The petitioner also requests the court to apply the legal principles associated with a motion to dismiss to the jurisdictional arguments in the respondent's motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to the foregoing, although the respondent moved for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss standard will be applied to the petitioner's claims.
II
DISCUSSION
The petitioner was the defendant in a criminal case in which he was convicted of one count of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56b, and one count of evading responsibility of death or serious injury, in violation of General Statutes § 14-224(a). The offense date for the offenses was April 16, 2006. The petitioner was sentenced on May 4, 2007, to a total effective sentence of twelve years incarceration. As a result of his manslaughter conviction, the respondent designated the petitioner as a violent criminal offender, thereby making him parole ineligible until he has served at least eighty-five percent of his sentence pursuant to General Statutes § 54-125a.
In 2011, the General Assembly enacted legislation allowing certain prisoners convicted of crimes committed after October 1, 1994, to be eligible for RRE credits to be earned and applied to reduce their sentence. Public Acts 2011, No. 11-51, codified in General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § § 18-98e and 54-125a. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted Public Acts 2013, No. 13-3, § 59, which amended § 54-125a to require that an inmate classified as a violent criminal offender, like the petitioner, must serve eighty-five percent of the definite sentence imposed before becoming eligible for parole. See General Statutes § 54-125a(b). As a result of this amendment, RRE credits earned by a violent criminal offender no longer advance that inmate's earliest parole eligibility date.
" To establish a cognizable claim under the ex post facto clause . . . a habeas petitioner need only make a colorable showing that the new law creates a genuine risk that he or she will be incarcerated longer under that new law than under the old law." Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 818, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002). The Johnson court found that the petitioner established a cognizable claim of an ex post facto violation through a colorable showing that he would likely serve more prison time as a result of the extension of his parole eligibility date from fifty percent to eighty-five percent of his sentence resulting from an amendment to General Statutes § 54-125a. Id., 818-19. Critical to the outcome of Johnson had been the fact that the petitioner in that case had committed offenses prior to the effective date of the change in legislation. Id., 809-10. Additionally, by operation of the amendment to § 54-125a at issue in Johnson, violent criminal offenders were now required to serve a higher percentage of their sentences prior to their consideration for discretionary parole release.
In 2015, the Appellate Court in Petaway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 160 Conn.App. 734, determined that a habeas court properly declined to issue a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's RRE credit claims. The Petaway court distinguished that case from Johnson because " the petitioner [in Petaway made] no claim that a change in the law after [the date of the petitioner's offenses] extended the length of his incarceration or delayed the date of his first eligibility for parole consideration beyond the time periods in existence at the time of his criminal conduct. In sum, he [made] no claim rooted in ex post facto jurisprudence. Thus, unlike the petitioner in Johnson, the petitioner in [ Petaway had] not made a colorable ex post facto claim." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 733-34.
The Petaway court further concluded that " [s]horn of its ex post facto designation, the petitioner's claim was no more than a complaint that long after he committed robbery and was sentenced, favorable legislation was enacted that gave him, at the respondent's discretion, an opportunity for earlier parole consideration but that legislation was later repealed, putting him back into the same position he had been in 2003 and 2005. The petitioner, however, has no liberty interest in parole eligibility, and, therefore, such a claim does implicate the jurisdiction of the habeas court. See, Baker v. Commissioner, 281 Conn. 241, 914 A.2d 1034 (2007) (parole eligibility under § 54-125a does not constitute cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke habeas court's jurisdiction)." Petaway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 160 Conn.App. 734.
Moreover, the changes in the law created by the implementation of the RRE credit statute, § 18-98e, are fundamentally different from the changes in the law created by the amendments to § 54-125a that were at issue in Johnson, by which violent criminal offenders are not eligible for parole consideration until they have served eighty-five percent of their sentences. General Statutes § 18-98e created a means by which the respondent can manage the inmate population through the discretionary awarding of credits " for adherence to the inmate's offender accountability plan, for participation in eligible programs and activities, and for good conduct and obedience to institutional rules as designated by the commissioner . . ." General Statutes § 18-98e(b). The discretionary nature of these credits is further emphasized by the provision that " good conduct and obedience to institutional rules alone shall not entitle an inmate to such credit . . ." General Statutes § 18-98e(b)(1). The commissioner or a designee also " may, in his or her discretion, cause the loss of all or any portion of such earned risk reduction credit for any act of misconduct or insubordination or refusal to conform to recommended programs or activities or institutional rules occurring at any time during the service of the sentence or for other good cause." General Statutes § 18-98e (b)(2).
In the present case, as in Petaway, the crimes committed by the petitioner occurred prior to the 2011 implementation of the RRE credit legislation, and thus the application of the 2013 amendment does not support a claim rooted in ex post facto jurisprudence. The changes in the law implemented by § 18-98e are merely means by which the respondent can better administer the inmate population. The statute is infused and teeming with discretion and is not, as was the change in the law at issue in Johnson, a change in the law that supports a colorable ex post facto claim because the statute in no way increases an inmate's term of confinement. See, Petaway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 160 Conn.App. 734 n.3 (suggesting that the changes wrought by General Statutes § § 54-125a and 18-98e benefitted the petitioner and shortened, as opposed to lengthened, his term of incarceration). The petitioner's punishment is no more onerous, and in no way greater, than when he committed the offenses. Thus, the petition fails to set forth cognizable and colorable ex post facto claims.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims, and the petition is dismissed pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29(1).
Additionally, the court concludes that there is no relief that it could grant to the petitioner. Overseeing the administration of the prison population by the respondent through tools such as RRE credits is not a habeas court's function. See, e.g., State v. Fernandez, 254 Conn. 637, 656, 758 A.2d 842 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 913, 121 S.Ct. 1247, 149 L.Ed.2d 153 (2001) (noting that it is " not within the province of the judiciary to micromanage prisons"). " Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Meachum, 238 Conn. 692, 733-34, 680 A.2d 262 (1996).
General Statutes § 18-98e gives the respondent and the respondent's designee the discretionary authority to use RRE credits to administer the inmate population. Any credits such as those awarded by § 18-98e and other statutes are, of course, solely a matter of legislative grace. See, e.g., Magee v. Commissioner of Correction, 105 Conn.App. 210, 218-19, 937 A.2d 72, cert. denied, 286 Conn. 901, 943 A.2d 1102 (2008); Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, 94 Conn.App. 210, 213, 893 A.2d 445, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 917, 899 A.2d 622 (2006); Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 878, 792 A.2d 774 (2002); Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 321 n.12, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787 (1986). Habeas courts in particular must be circumspect in enmeshing themselves in prison administration matters that courts are ill equipped to deal with. The amended petition and its myriad of claims are no more than an invitation for a habeas court to enmesh itself in prison matters that the highest courts of this state and country have warned courts to not resolve by decree.
Consequently, the court also concludes that the petition must be dismissed on the ground that there is no habeas corpus relief that can be granted. Practice Book § 23-29(2).
III
CONCLUSION
Judgment shall enter dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the court lacks jurisdiction over the claims and there is no relief that the court can grant. Practice Book § 23-29(1) and (2).
It is so ordered.