Opinion
Civil Action 21-cv-1416
05-12-2021
ROYLANDO SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al. Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LYNNE A. SITARSKI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Before the Court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Roylando Santiago (Petitioner), an individual currently incarcerated at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Center located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Honorable Paul S. Diamond referred the matter to me for a Report and Recommendation. (Order, ECF No. 5). For the following reasons, I respectfully recommend that the petition for habeas corpus be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Court's recitation of the procedural history relies upon information provided by Petitioner and the criminal docket sheet for Petitioner's underlying criminal case. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, No. CP-51-CR-0001319-2016 (Phila. Cty. Com. Pl.), Criminal Docket, available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-51 CR-0001319-2016&dnh=rVokz1KqnRIaOomL10W%2FNA%3D%3D (last visited May 11, 2021) [hereinafter “Crim. Docket”].
On August 17, 2015, Petitioner was arrested on charges of aggravated assault, attempted murder, rape, and terroristic threats, as well as other associated crimes. (Crim. Docket at 1, 5). On August 18, 2015, the trial court set bail at $1,000,000.00. Id. at 5. Petitioner was formally arraigned on February 25, 2016, and a pre-trial conference, scheduling conference, and motions hearing were subsequently held. Id. at 2. Petitioner filed a Notice of Insanity or Mental Infirmity Defense and an omnibus pre-trial motion including a Motion for Continuance. Id. at 8. On March 22, 2016, the court granted a continuance. Id.
On November 4, 2016, the court issued an order committing Petitioner under the Mental Health Act. (Crim. Docket at 8). The court ordered Petitioner's commitment under the Act thirteen more times over the course of the pre-trial proceedings. Id. at 8-16. The court also ordered multiple mental health evaluations of Petitioner. Id. at 10-11, 15. Several mental health competency determinations were conducted throughout 2019 and 2020. Id. at 3-4.
On July 14, 2020, the court continued the matter due to the closure of the courthouse as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. (Crim. Docket at 16). The court issued another continuance on August 14, 2020 for the same reason. Id. Petitioner then requested three more continuances for psychiatric evaluations. Id. On March 25, 2021, Petitioner filed a Motion for Release Pursuant to Rule 600, which is still pending before the court as of the date of this Report and Recommendation. Id. On May 6, 2021, Petitioner requested another continuance. Id. at 17.
On March 19, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2). Petitioner alleges that his current incarceration is in violation of his First Amendment right to religious liberty, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and a speedy trial, and unidentified “abatement” and “exculpatory” clauses. Id. at 3-6. He asserts that he has been held in pre-trial detention for six years, and that he was arrested without being picked out of a lineup. Id. at 3-4. The Honorable Judge Paul S. Diamond has referred this matter to me for a Report and Recommendation. (Order, ECF No. 5).
Pennsylvania and federal courts employ the prisoner mailbox rule, pursuant to which the pro se petition is deemed filed when it is given to prison officials for mailing. See Perry v. Diguglielmo, 169 Fed.Appx. 134, 136 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Little, 716 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Super. 1998)); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998); Commonwealth v. Castro, 766 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2001). In this case, Petitioner certified that he gave his habeas petition to prison officials on March 19, 2021, and it will be deemed filed as of that date. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2, at 8).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The instant petition was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A district court is authorized to summarily dismiss a habeas petition when it plainly appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. See Divner v. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania, No. 05-1197, 2005 WL 2106560, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2005) (explaining Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases has been applied to summarily dismiss § 2241 petitions; collecting cases); see also Ukawabutu v. Morton, 997 F.Supp. 605, 608 n.2 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 1998).
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be promptly screened and is subject to summary dismissal “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4. Rule 4 further states that a judge must order the respondent to file an answer only “[i]f the petition is not dismissed . . . .” Id. The language of the rule thus makes clear: where it is plainly apparent from the face of the petition that the petitioner will not prevail, the petition should be dismissed without ordering the respondent to answer. Pritchard v. Wetzel, No. 13-5406, 2014 WL 199907, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014); Smallwood v. Meisel, No. 13-3989, 2013 WL 6153238, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13-3989, 2013 WL 6145123 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2013). The Advisory Committee Notes to this rule confirm this interpretation, recognizing that “it is the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.” Advisory Committee Note to Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4. Under Rule 4, a federal habeas court may take judicial notice of state court records, dockets, and/or state court opinions, as well as its own court records. See Richardson v. Thompson, No. 13-1466, 2014 WL 65995, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
I find that substantive review of Petitioner's claims is inappropriate at this time. Petitioner has yet to stand trial, let alone invoke one complete round of state court review. Further, Petitioner has not presented any “special circumstances” that would demand habeas review prior to the completion of his state court trial.
The Supreme Court has stated that “federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances' to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973); see also Woods/Hall v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 07-3487, 2007 WL 4190693, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2007). “The rule barring pretrial intervention into pending state criminal proceedings by way of federal habeas corpus or otherwise is premised on the notion of comity, a principle of deference and ‘proper respect' for state governmental functions in our federal system.” Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, Del. County, Pennsylvania, 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
The need for federal restraint is heightened in cases involving pending state criminal proceedings. Id. Therefore, absent “extraordinary circumstances, ” the Court should “exercise its ‘pretrial' habeas jurisdiction only if petitioner makes a special showing of the need for such adjudication and has exhausted state remedies.” Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 443 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Woods/Hall, 2007 WL 4190693, at *2 n.4 (“exhaustion in state court of pre-trial claims in a § 2241 habeas petition is judicially mandated”).
The petitioner bears the burden of proving all facts entitling him to discharge from custody, including procedural requisites entitling him to relief. Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1982). The petitioner carries the burden of proving exhaustion of all available state remedies. Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). While the exhaustion rule is a matter of comity and not jurisdiction, it “should be strictly adhered to because it expresses respect for our dual judicial system.” Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Dickerson v. State of Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The exhaustion doctrine of section 2241(c)(3) was judicially crafted on federalism grounds in order to protect the state courts' opportunity to confront and resolve initially any constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions as well as to limit federal interference in the state adjudicatory process.”). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, “state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999).
Here, Petitioner has failed to establish that he has properly exhausted his claims. Petitioner filed a Rule 600 Motion for Release in the state court on March 25, 2021, which is still pending as of the date of this Report and Recommendation. (Crim. Docket at 16). Because the state court has not yet ruled on this motion, Petitioner has not submitted this claim to a complete round of the state's established review process. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45. Therefore, Petitioner's request for release is unexhausted.
Additionally, Petitioner does not show any extraordinary circumstance that warrants “pretrial, pre-exhaustion habeas corpus relief” during the pendency of his ongoing state court proceedings. See Lambert, 134 F.3d at 517. To justify pre-exhaustion habeas relief, Petitioner must present allegations revealing “that quality of delay, harassment, bad faith or other intentional activity which, in an appropriate situation, might constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance.'” Id.
Petitioner avers that he has been confined for six years in advance of trial. His criminal docket reflects that this is due to the trial court's multiple findings that he is incompetent to stand trial. (See generally Crim. Docket). Section 403 of Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act governs pretrial detention after a determination of incompetency. 50 P.S. § 7403. The Mental Health Act provides:
(d) Effect on Criminal Detention. - Whenever a person who has been charged with a crime has been determined to be incompetent to proceed, he shall not for that reason alone be denied pretrial release. Nor shall he in any event be detained on the criminal charge longer than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If the court determines there is no such probability, it shall discharge the person. Otherwise, he may continue to be criminally detained so long as such probability exists but in no event longer than the period of time specified in subsection (f).
(f) Stay of Proceedings. -- In no instance, except in cases of first and second degree murder, shall the proceedings be stayed for a period in excess of the maximum sentence of confinement that may be imposed for the crime or crimes charged or ten years, whichever is less. In cases of a charge of first or second degree murder, there shall be no limit on the period during which proceedings may be stayed.Id. Petitioner has been charged with attempted murder, which carries a maximum sentence of forty years' confinement. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(c). Therefore, under § 7403(f), proceedings in his case may be properly stayed for up to ten years while the court determines whether there is any probability that he may in the future attain the capacity to stand trial. Because of this, Petitioner has not shown any delay in his pretrial proceedings caused by harassment, bad faith, or other intentional activities of the trial court or Commonwealth. See Lambert, 134 F.3d at 517.
Accordingly, federal court intervention is premature and unwarranted. The Pennsylvania courts are the proper forum for addressing the issues raised in this petition in the first instance.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without prejudice. Therefore, I make the following:
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW this 12th day of May, 2021, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without prejudice.
Petitioner may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. See Local Civ. Rule 72.1. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.