Opinion
Civil Action No. 96-4305 (NHP).
February 23, 1999
Stephen M. Latimer, Esq., LOUGHLIN LATIMER, Hackensack, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Josh Swager, Esq., David J. Bishop, Esq., PAARZ, MASTER, KOERING, CRAMMER O'BRIEN, BISHOP HORN, Pleasantville, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants, Drs. Ostrum, Rovillos and Bauer, and Mary Lombardo.
Jayne E. Turner, Esq., REISEMAN, SHARP, KELSEY BROWN, Parsippany, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant, Kathryn MacFarland.
Stephen D. Holtzman, Esq., Vanessa P. Patrizi, Esq., LALLY, HOLTZMAN, GILLIGAN, DUFFIN QUASTI, P.C., Linwood, N.J., Attorneys for Correctional Medical Services, Inc.
LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on three separate motions, namely: (1) defendant Kathryn MacFarland's motion for summary judgment; (2) defendant Gordon Ostrum, M.D.'s motion for summary judgment; and (3) defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. This Court heard oral argument on January 26, 1999. For the reasons stated more particularly herein, defendant Kathryn MacFarland's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, defendant Gordon Ostrum, M.D.'s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Finally, plaintiff Marcos Santiago's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
STATEMENT OF FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Marcos Santiago ("plaintiff") was an inmate in the New Jersey Prison System until he was released on July 12, 1997. Prior to his release and on January 15, 1995, plaintiff injured his right knee while he was playing basketball in the gymnasium of the Bergen County Detention Center in Hackensack, New Jersey.
On September 13, 1996, plaintiff filed the within action against numerous defendants alleging violations of his constitutional and civil rights. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. The gravamen of plaintiff's Complaint is that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs following the slip and fall incident. The remaining defendants in this action, namely, Kathryn MacFarland, Gordon Ostrum, M.D., and Correctional Medical Services, Inc., have filed the subject motions for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment
The standard governing a summary judgment motion is set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which provides, in pertinent part, that:
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Procedurally, the movant has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of genuine issues of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). When the movant will bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden can be discharged by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. Id. at 325. If the movant establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to do more than "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
In this matter, there are no genuine issues of material fact and therefore, summary judgment is appropriate in these circumstances.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant has deprived him of a right secured under the constitution, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
In this matter, plaintiff alleges that the remaining defendants, who collectively comprise a medical/health servicing company, an executive assistant to the Administrator of Bayside State Prison, and a physician employed by the Department of Corrections, violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.
To prove a violation of one's Eighth Amendment rights, the plaintiff "must satisfy both the objective and subjective elements of a cruel and unusual punishment allegation." Diaz v. Edgar, 831 F. Supp. 621, 623-24 (N.D.Ill. 1993). The objective prong of an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis requires that the deprivation be "sufficiently serious." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Notably, the objective component of an Eighth Amendment analysis is "contextual and responsive to `contemporary standards of decency.'"Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). The courts have indicated that a condition will be deemed "sufficiently serious" if the "`conditions . . ., alone or in combination, deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 999 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981),cert. denied, sub. nom., Union County Jail Inmates v. Fauver, 465 U.S. 1101, sub. nom., Di Buono v. Fauver, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984)).
The subjective element of an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis requires that the plaintiff show that the resulting injury was caused by the prison official's "deliberate indifference."Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 820 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd dub nom,Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). To establish that a state actor was deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's conditions of confinement, it must be shown that the prison official acted with "subjective recklessness." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In other words,
a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.Id. at 837. Thus, an analysis of the prison official's state of mind is entirely mandatory in the determination of whether the complainant has suffered cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 838.
Notably, "[w]here a person is suffering injury as an incidental and unintended consequence of official actions, the abuse of power contemplated in the Due Process and Eighth Amendment cases does not arise." Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1979). Accordingly, mere negligence on the part of a state official does not implicate the Due Process Clause. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986). See also Office of Inmate Advocacy v. Fauver, 222 N.J. Super. 357, 360 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 111 N.J. 637 (1988).
In the present matter, plaintiff alleges that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs following the slip and fall incident at the Bergen County Detention Center.
A state clearly has the obligation to provide medical care for inmates at a penal institution since the inmates are unable to provide medical care for themselves. In the Matter of the Commitment of F.H., 258 N.J. Super. 532, 536-537 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1992). A medical need meets the objective prong and is, therefore, "sufficiently serious" if the condition is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987),cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988) (citing Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a condition is "sufficiently serious" if "a failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury or death.").
In this matter, plaintiff sustained an injury to his right knee on January 15, 1995 which ultimately required plaintiff to undergo a surgical procedure. This Court will assume for purposes of this analysis that plaintiff's injury to his right knee is sufficiently serious and, therefore, will address only the subjective prong of the analysis in detail. As aforementioned, the subjective prong of the analysis requires an inquiry into whether defendants were "deliberately indifferent" to plaintiff's serious medical needs.
To establish the subjective prong of the analysis, a plaintiff must produce evidence that the prison guards and/or prison doctors intentionally delayed or denied access to the inmate's treatment once such treatment was prescribed by a physician. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). A showing of deliberate indifference requires "facts which indicate not only the conduct but also the attitude of prison authorities." Smith v. Fielder, 867 F. Supp. 832, 834 (E.D.Wis. 1994).
Notably, not every "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care," however, can be deemed violative of the Eighth Amendment. For example, "[n]eglect, carelessness, or malpractice [are] more properly the subject of a tort action in the state courts." Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that "the law is clear that simple medical malpractice is insufficient to present a constitutional violation"); Lewandowski v. Fauver, 531 F. Supp. 53, 54 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding no claim exists under § 1981 for negligent or incorrect medical treatment). In other words, in order to succeed in an action claiming inadequate medical treatment, a prisoner must show more than mere negligence; he must show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67. It is only such "deliberate indifference" that can affront "evolving standards of decency" in direct contradiction to the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
In this matter, plaintiff alleges that the remaining defendants, Kathryn MacFarland, Gordon Ostrum, M.D. and Correctional Medical Services, Inc., violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
A. Kathryn MacFarland
Defendant Kathryn MacFarland (hereinafter "MacFarland") was employed as an Executive Assistant at Bayside State Prison. Plaintiff alleges that MacFarland was "deliberately indifferent" to plaintiff's medical needs because she "had knowledge of and acquiesced in the course of action taken by the medical department and Dr. Ostrum." See Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, page 23. At oral argument, however, counsel for plaintiff conceded that MacFarland did not have control over whether or not plaintiff would receive surgery and, if so, when that surgery would be scheduled. See also Deposition of Kathryn MacFarland, page 40 at lines 11-13. It is also clear from the record that MacFarland's job is essentially administrative in nature and that she is, most respectfully, not a "decision maker" with regard to the ultimate care of the inmates. Moreover, plaintiff's expert witness, Richard Sacks, M.D., (hereinafter "Dr. Sacks") testified via deposition that he did not have any opinion with regard to the allegations of deliberate indifference on the part of Kathryn MacFarland.
The record indicates that plaintiff was transferred from the Bergen County Detention Center to Bayside State Prison on February 7, 1995 where he remained incarcerated until his transfer to Southern State Correctional Facility in December, 1996. See Certification of plaintiff Marcos Santiago in Opposition to defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, ¶ 4.
Q. An is it also fair to say that you have no opinion as to any allegations of deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants MacFarland [sic] and Ashton? A. Yes, that's correct.
See Deposition of Dr. Richard Sacks, page 138 at lines 13-17.
It is clear that plaintiff has simply failed to establish with any competent evidence that the actions of MacFarland manifested a deliberate or intentional indifference to a serious medical need. Moreover, assuming that there is a cause of action for negligence against MacFarland, plaintiff cannot recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for claims sounding in mere negligence. Thus, because plaintiff has failed to allege that MacFarland manifested "intentional" or "deliberate" indifference to his medical conditions, summary judgment is clearly appropriate.
B. Dr. Ostrum
Dr. Ostrum was the medical director at Bayside State Prison from 1995 through April 1996. In April 1996, Dr. Ostrum became an "independent contract physician" for CMS. See Certification of Stephen M. Latimer in opposition to defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 5. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Ostrum was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because he "exhibited a lack of concern for plaintiff's condition . . ." and was responsible for the delay in surgery. See Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, pages 13-14. Plaintiff's own expert witness, Dr. Sacks, however, testified that he was of the medical opinion that no medical doctor involved in the care of plaintiff exhibited deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs. Again, assuming that there is a cause of action for negligence against Dr. Ostrum, plaintiff cannot recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for negligence.
Q. Can I assume, Doctor, that you are not of the opinion [that] Dr. Ostrum, or for that matter, any medical doctor involved in the care of Mr. Santiago exhibited deliberate indifference to Mr. Santiago's medical needs? A. I would agree with that statement.
See Deposition of Dr. Richard Sacks, page 89, lines 16-21.
The Court is also compelled to note that the record is replete with evidence that plaintiff continually visited the infirmary, was regularly examined by staff physicians, was prescribed medications, and was rendered medical treatment even after the surgery was complete. This paper trail of appointments and treatments indicates to this Court that plaintiff's claim for deliberate indifference is simply without any merit and, therefore, summary judgment is appropriate.
This Court is also compelled to note that there is evidence in the record that plaintiff failed to keep his scheduled appointments and follow different treatments prescribed by various physicians.
C. Correctional Medical Services
Correctional Medical Services, Inc. ("CMS") is a corporate entity which began providing medical care and health services to inmates under the custody of the Department of Corrections on April 27, 1996. See Complaint and Jury Demand, ¶ 16. Plaintiff blanketly asserts that CMS violated his rights guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when it acted with "deliberate indifference" to his legitimate medical needs.See id., ¶ 50. At oral argument, counsel for plaintiff conceded that the sole theory upon which plaintiff is connecting CMS to this case is the theory of respondeat superior.
First, plaintiff's Complaint and Answers to Interrogatories fail to establish how he was injured as a result of any actions taken by CMS. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it is clear that all of the events surrounding the alleged inadequate care took placeprior to CMS contracting with the Department of Corrections and prior to Dr. Ostrum becoming affiliated with CMS. In fact, it is undisputed that CMS did not begin to provide medical and health services to all state correctional facilities until April 27, 1996; over one year after the injury occurred and approximately seven months after plaintiff underwent reconstructive surgery.
Second, even assuming that plaintiff's Complaint and Answers to Interrogatories do allege that CMS's employees, i.e., Dr. Ostrum, were treating plaintiff within the relevant period of time, plaintiff's claim must fail. There are simply no factual allegations in plaintiff's Complaint or in the record to support the contention that CMS acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. In fact, plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Sacks testified that he did not have an opinion with respect to any deviation of care on behalf of CMS. Plaintiff merely contends that CMS' employees failed to properly treat his injuries in connection with the slip and fall incident which took place on January 15, 1995. Plaintiff's allegations sound, at most, in "negligence" and, as aforementioned, a claim for negligent treatment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Correctional Medical Services, Inc.'s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, ¶ 7.
Q. So, just so I'm clear and the record is clear, you have no opinion with respect to any deviation of care on behalf of Correctional Medical Services, inc.; is that correct? A. I would say that's correct.
See Deposition of Dr. Richard Sacks, page 137, lines 11-15.
Finally, assuming arguendo that CMS's employees were negligent or "deliberately indifferent" to plaintiff's medical needs, CMS cannot be held vicariously liable based upon a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of any individual person. See Bernstein v. Aivazis, 584 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd 740 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that a claim which is grounded solely on a theory of respondeat superior against a public entity could not remain viable). Simply stated, since plaintiff has not alleged that CMS has deliberately violated an articulated policy, CMS cannot be held liable in a civil rights case for the actions of any individual persons pursuant to Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Plaintiff argues that the policy reasons underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v. McKnight , ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2100 (1997) imply that Monell does not apply to private corporations that contract to provide governmental services. This Court disagrees with plaintiff's interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson and considers it inapposite to the facts presented in the matter at bar. In Richardson , the analysis was limited solely to the applicability of § 1983 qualified immunity. The Supreme Court did not address whether the private firm was liable under § 1983 based upon a theory of respondeat superior . It is clear after a careful reading of the Richardson case that the Supreme Court left the Monell decision intact and did not limit or modify the Monell decision.