Santana v. Unknown

Full title: JOSE LUIS SANTANA, Petitioner, v. UNKNOWN, Respondent.

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Dec 17, 2013

Case No. 1:13-cv-02034 MJS (HC) (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2013)

Opinion

Case No. 1:13-cv-02034 MJS (HC)

12-17-2013

JOSE LUIS SANTANA, Petitioner, v. UNKNOWN, Respondent.

Michael J. Seng

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

FOR PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO

EXHAUST STATE REMEDIES

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a February 12, 2010 conviction for various drug charges. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner presents four claims for relief in the present petition. He asserts that he exhausted the first three claims by way of direct appeal. However, Petitioner admits that the fourth claim of the present petition has not been presented to the state courts and is not exhausted. (Pet. at 10.)

I. DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.1990). Otherwise, the Court will order Respondent to respond to the petition. Rule 5 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988).

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly present" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .
In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000).

Upon review of the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, it appears that Petitioner has not presented the fourth claim of the petition to the highest state court, the California Supreme Court.

Petitioner must inform the Court if, in fact, claim four has been presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the Court with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court along with a copy of any ruling made by the California Supreme Court.

The Court shall provide Petitioner the opportunity to amend the petition to remove the unexhausted claim or to move to stay the petition while he attempts to exhaust state remedies. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22; Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005) (Courts must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the claim if he can do so.).

II. ORDER

Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the petition should not be dismissed for Petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies. Petitioner is ORDERED to inform the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order if claim four has been presented to the California Supreme Court and how he desires to proceed with the present petition.

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule 110. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Michael J. Seng

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE