Opinion
H044141
08-23-2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. DP003071NM)
I. INTRODUCTION
When appellant J.T. was 17 years old, the juvenile court declared her a dependent minor under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. After J.T. turned 18, the juvenile court continued its jurisdiction over her as a nonminor dependent. However, upon subsequently determining that J.T. was not meeting the eligibility criteria for nonminor dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction. (See § 391.)
All further unspecified section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
J.T. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her nonminor dependency jurisdiction, contending (1) the juvenile court erred by finding that section 391's requirements for termination had been met, and (2) there was insufficient evidence that termination was in J.T.'s best interests. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the juvenile court's order.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Section 300 Petition
On August 19, 2015, the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (the Department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) [failure to protect] and (g) [no provision for support], alleging that J.T., then 17 years old, came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
The petition alleged that the parents (who lived separately in Santa Cruz County) had placed J.T. in a Sacramento group home three years earlier and had been unwilling to participate in services that would facilitate J.T.'s return to their homes. J.T. had "identified her parents' lack of involvement in her life as a trigger for her emotional struggles," and the parents' failure to provide adequate emotional support placed J.T. at substantial risk of harm and neglect. The parents were unwilling to pick J.T. up from a psychiatric hospital, were unable to make other arrangements for J.T.'s care, and did not want her returned to their homes.
An investigation narrative attached to the petition provided additional information. J.T. had been adopted from Ukraine when she was seven years old. The parents later discovered that J.T. had fetal alcohol syndrome, institutional autism, speech and language delays, and oppositional defiant disorder. The parents had been paying for J.T. to stay in a group home, and they were going through a divorce. J.T. had recently been involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to section 5150, and the group home would not accept her back after that.
The social worker had spoken with J.T.'s mother, who indicated she did not feel safe when J.T. was in her home. The mother was interested in relinquishment of parental rights. However, after learning that she would continue to be financially responsible for J.T. and that she could be charged with abandonment, the mother had decided she would try to locate a new placement for J.T. The father similarly indicated that he was trying to find a new placement for J.T.
The social worker had also spoken with the owner/operator of the Sacramento group home. J.T. was receiving therapeutic interventions and had made progress, but was struggling to understand why her family did not want her to return to their care. J.T. had "fits of anger and aggression," and the incident leading to her hospitalization had included kicking a staff person and going after staff and peers with a knife.
At the time the petition was filed, J.T. was detained in a foster home, which was the personal home of C.D., who was the owner/operator of the Sacramento group home. At a detention hearing held on August 20, 2015, the juvenile court ordered J.T. detained.
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition
The Department filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on September 22, 2015, recommending the juvenile court sustain the section 300 petition and provide the parents with reunification services. J.T. was residing in a Sacramento treatment center. Her placement in C.D.'s personal home had not lasted because of another "behavioral outburst" that led to another section 5150 hold.
The Department filed an amended section 300 petition on October 6, 2015. The amended petition replaced the section 300, subdivision (b) allegation with an allegation under section 300, subdivision (c) [serious emotional damage].
At a hearing on October 6, 2015, the parents submitted on the Department's jurisdiction/disposition report, and the juvenile court sustained the amended section 300 petition. The juvenile court declared J.T. a dependent and ordered reunification services for the parents.
C. Six-Month Review
The Department filed a report in advance of the six-month review hearing, which was scheduled to be held in March 2016, just before J.T.'s 18th birthday. The Department recommended that J.T. continue as a dependent and remain in out-of-home placement.
J.T. had been moved to a group home in Santa Cruz County, where she would be able to stay if she was subsequently able to receive nonminor dependent benefits. Initially, the transition appeared to be positive: J.T. had been attending school and visiting with her parents. However, she had recently stopped attending school and had refused to participate in most of the group home activities. The group home had determined that J.T. would not be accepted into its transitional housing program.
The Department's report used the term "AB12 program," which refers to the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, under which nonminor dependents can qualify for assistance. (See In re Jesse S. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 611, 617; In re R.G. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1092-1093.)
J.T. did not have an independent education plan (IEP). She was receiving services from Santa Cruz County Children's Mental Health. J.T. had indicated she wanted to receive nonminor dependent benefits and understood that she would be required to complete high school (or obtain a GED) and be employed for at least 80 hours per month.
The parents had complied with their case plan but neither was interested in having J.T. live with them. The social worker did not believe J.T. would be safe if returned to their care.
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court adopted the Department's recommendations, continuing J.T.'s dependency and setting an initial nonminor dependent hearing following her 18th birthday.
D. Nonminor Dependency Hearing
The Department filed a report on April 14, 2016, recommending that J.T. be made a nonminor dependent "with a permanent plan of Supportive Transition and a goal of Permanent Connections for Independence." The Department recommended the parents no longer receive reunification services.
J.T. was living back in Sacramento, where she was staying with C.D. again. J.T. had enrolled in a new school and was "re-engaged with her academic work." She had indicated she wanted to enter the AB12 program (see fn. 2, ante) and had met with a social worker to complete a "SILP assessment" to facilitate her transition to a "SILP Placement." J.T. had been provided with her social security card, a certified copy of her birth certificate, a summary of her health and education, and a letter from the Department regarding the dependency proceedings. (See § 391, subd. (e).)
It appears that SILP refers to a "Supervised independent living placement." (See § 11400, subd. (w).)
J.T.'s transitional independent living plan (TILP), which was attached to the Department's report, identified four goals for J.T.: (1) graduate from high school; (2) obtain a fast food job; (3) obtain volunteer work at an animal shelter; and (4) move back to the Sacramento group home. With respect to the fast food job, the TILP specified that J.T.'s responsibilities included searching for openings and filling out job applications. With respect to housing, the TILP indicated that the social worker would be responsible for asking whether J.T. could move back to the Sacramento group home.
At a hearing on April 14, 2016, the juvenile court adopted the Department's recommendations, terminating the parents' reunification services and declaring J.T. a nonminor dependent. The juvenile court set a status review date of September 29, 2016.
E. Section 388 Petition/Request for Dismissal
On August 12, 2016, the Department filed a section 388 petition, requesting the juvenile court set a hearing to consider dismissing the dependency. The petition alleged that J.T. had left her SILP placement in May 2016 and was living in a homeless camp. J.T. was not working or attending school.
The Department also filed a memo requesting dismissal of the dependency. J.T. had been placed in the Sacramento group home but had moved out in May 2016. She been "checking in and visiting with" C.D., the group home's owner/operator, who—along with the social worker and a therapist—had been trying to encourage J.T. to return to the group home. However, J.T. was "very fond of a heroin using boyfriend that she live[d] with in the homeless camp."
The juvenile court set the matter for a contested hearing on September 29, 2016.
F. Termination Hearing Report
On September 9, 2016, the Department filed a termination hearing report. J.T. had met with the social worker on May 9, 2016, when she was still living in the Sacramento group home. However, she had left the group home about a week later. She was then allowed to move into C.D.'s home, but while at that home, J.T. had destroyed property and refused to do chores. She had referred to C.D.'s home as a "jail," and she had threatened to burn the house and stab the inhabitants as well as herself.
J.T. had spoken with the social worker on June 20, 2016 but had failed to show up for a meeting with the social worker on June 22, 2016.
J.T. had called the social worker on July 25, 2016 and had met with her on July 27, 2016. J.T. had told the social worker that she did not want to "live by rules 24/7." J.T. had been informed that the social worker would seek termination of her dependency if she continued to not comply with the terms of her case plan. The social worker offered J.T. the option of finding another SILP placement, which J.T. "thought she might try to do" as long as her friends and boyfriend could be "a part of [it]." The social worker noted that J.T. would probably not be successful in finding housing "due to her disheveled presentation."
The social worker had reached out to J.T. via email on August 19, 2016 and offered to come meet with her in Sacramento, but J.T. had not responded.
The social worker reported that J.T. was enrolled in Medi-Cal and had applied for Cal Fresh. The social worker had referred J.T. to Cal Works and had offered to help J.T. apply for Social Security benefits, but J.T. had asserted she did not have a disability and did not want to apply for such benefits. J.T. had previously been accessing education and independent living classes at the group home.
The social worker had informed J.T., via email, that she had "the right to continue to receive extended foster care benefits up until age 21" and that she could request a return to foster care and juvenile court jurisdiction until her 21st birthday. J.T. was specifically informed "that for re-entry, she may contact her last social worker or may call Family & Children's Services Hotline Reporting telephone number at [a specific toll free number] or [at a specific local number] directly and receive assistance and guidance to complete the re-entry process."
The Department's report indicated that although the Department was required to provide J.T. with a copy of a "written 90-day transition plan prepared pursuant to Section 16501.1," J.T. had not been "available for discussion and creation of a 90 day transition plan." The report also indicated that Judicial Council form JV-365 was attached, but that form does not appear in the record.
G. Termination Hearing
At a contested hearing held on September 29, 2016, J.T. testified telephonically. J.T. asserted she had been planning to attend community college, but that she "didn't complete what [she] needed to." She needed to take three more classes to "finish up" high school. She had tried to enroll at a "special ed school," but she did not have an IEP. She understood that she had to find "the closest" school to her and enroll there.
J.T. acknowledged she had not looked for employment since April 2016, when she was in the group home. She initially claimed she had found a job the night before the hearing, but then she clarified that she had identified potential job openings. She was willing to participate in counseling.
J.T. initially testified that she had met with the social worker in August 2016, but she later acknowledged that she had never responded to the social worker's attempts to contact her at that time.
J.T.'s attorney argued that J.T. was "in desperate need of the County's assistance." Specifically, J.T. needed guidance in obtaining services and enrolling in school. The attorney requested a one-month continuance to allow the social worker more time to help J.T., who "now understands the seriousness of her behavior and the fact that she really is on the brink of losing these AB 12 services."
Before ruling, the juvenile court reminded J.T. that if she wanted to "reapply for services," she could "reach out to" the social worker. County Counsel reiterated that if J.T. reached out to the social worker or to "CPS or Family & Children's Services," she could get help with "the paperwork for getting back into AB 12." J.T.'s attorney noted that J.T. could get the reentry forms and assistance from the social worker's supervisor, and that the attorney would help as well.
The juvenile court found that J.T. had received information about what she needed to do to comply with the requirements for maintaining nonminor dependency services. The juvenile court found that J.T. was no longer eligible for nonminor dependency services, granted the section 388 petition, and terminated its jurisdiction over J.T.
On November 17, 2016, J.T. filed a notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Nonminor Dependency Jurisdiction
A nonminor dependent is defined as "a foster child, as described in [42 U.S.C. § 675(8)(B)] who is a current dependent child or ward of the juvenile court . . . and who satisfies all of the following criteria: [¶] (1) He or she has attained 18 years of age while under an order of foster care placement by the juvenile court . . . . [¶] (2) He or she is in foster care under the placement and care responsibility of the county welfare department . . . . [¶] (3) He or she has a transitional independent living case plan . . . ." (§ 11400, subd. (v).)
A nonminor dependent is eligible for aid as long as he or she meets one or more of the following criteria: "(1) The nonminor is completing secondary education or a program leading to an equivalent credential. [¶] (2) The nonminor is enrolled in an institution which provides postsecondary or vocational education. [¶] (3) The nonminor is participating in a program or activity designed to promote, or remove barriers to employment. [¶] (4) The nonminor is employed for at least 80 hours per month. [¶] (5) The nonminor is incapable of doing any of the [preceding] activities . . . due to a medical condition . . . ." (§ 11403, subd. (b).)
Section 391 sets forth the requirements for terminating dependency jurisdiction over a nonminor. The juvenile court may not terminate dependency jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent unless it holds a hearing. (Id., subd. (a).) The juvenile court "must continue dependency jurisdiction over a nonminor who meets the definition of a nonminor dependent as described in subdivision (v) of Section 11400 unless the court finds either" that the nonminor "does not wish to remain subject to dependency jurisdiction" or that the nonminor is "not participating in a reasonable and appropriate transitional independent living case plan." (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
In addition, the juvenile court may not terminate dependency jurisdiction unless the county welfare department has submitted a report verifying that certain "information, documents, and services have been provided to the nonminor." (§ 391, subd. (e); see In re Nadia G. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1121.) The county welfare department must have provided documents including the nonminor's social security card, a certified copy of the nonminor's birth certificate, and "[t]he written 90-day transition plan prepared pursuant to Section 16501.1." (§ 391, subd. (e)(2)(J).) The county welfare department must also have provided the nonminor with, among other things, referrals to transitional housing or assistance in securing other housing and assistance in obtaining employment or other financial support. (Id., subd. (e)(4) & (5).)
"We review the decision to terminate jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (In re Aaron S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 507, 517 (Aaron S.).)
B. Compliance With Section 391
J.T. contends the juvenile court erred by finding that the Department met section 391's requirements for termination of dependency jurisdiction. J.T. points out that the Department did not provide her with the required "written 90-day transition plan prepared pursuant to Section 16501.1." (§ 391, subd. (e)(2)(J).) She also points out that the Department failed to provide her with Judicial Council form JV-365 (which provides a nonminor dependent with an opportunity to indicate whether or not the required assistance and services were provided) or Judicial Council form JV-464-INFO (which provides a nonminor dependent with information about how to request a return to juvenile court jurisdiction). J.T. additionally asserts that the Department's report did not include "confirmation that [she] was provided with help in obtaining employment or other financial support" and that the record does not support the social worker's claim that J.T. did not qualify for Social Security Disability benefits.
The Department contends section 391 did not apply to J.T. because she did not meet the federal definition of a nonminor dependent—in other words, that she was not "a foster child, as described in [42 U.S.C. § 675(8)(B)]" as required by section 11400, subdivision (v). The Department points out that the federal statute requires a nonminor to be completing a secondary education or the equivalent, be enrolled in a post-secondary education or vocation educational program, be participating in a program designed to promote or remove barriers to employment, be employed for at least 80 hours per month, or be incapable of doing the above due to a medical condition. (See 42 U.S.C. § 675(8)(B)(iv).)
The Department's position does not appear to be consistent with section 391's mandate that the juvenile court "not terminate dependency jurisdiction over a nonminor who has attained 18 years of age until a hearing is conducted pursuant to this section and the department has submitted a report verifying that [the required] information, documents, and services have been provided to the nonminor . . . ." (§ 391, subd. (e).) In other words, once she was declared a nonminor dependent, J.T. continued to be a nonminor dependent until the juvenile court held a hearing to terminate its jurisdiction, and the Department was not excused from complying with its statutory duties despite the apparent fact that J.T. was not going to school or working. (Cf. In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 [finding K.L. "was not a nonminor dependent" under section 11400, subdivision (v) where juvenile court had not yet declared her to be a nonminor dependent and she was not yet participating in a transitional independent living plan].)
The Department next claims that J.T. forfeited the issue of non-compliance with section 391 by failing to raise the issue in the juvenile court. We agree that the forfeiture rule appears to be appropriate in this case, because had these claims been brought to the juvenile court's attention, any errors could have been corrected. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 521; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501 (Dakota S.) [mother's claim that agency failed to prepare a "statutorily required preliminary assessment" was forfeited because she failed to object in the juvenile court].) Moreover, with respect to J.T.'s claim that she was not provided with a 90-day transition plan, the record strongly indicates that it was J.T.'s "own failure to meet with the social worker [that] led to the plan never being created," making the forfeiture doctrine particularly "appropriate." (See Aaron S., supra, at p. 521.)
Even if the issue of compliance with section 391 was not forfeited, we would find the error harmless under the circumstances here. (See Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 521; Dakota S., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 503.) As the Department argues and as discussed below, the record shows substantial compliance with section 391.
1. 90-Day Transition Plan
As noted above, J.T. points out that the Department did not provide her with the required "written 90-day transition plan prepared pursuant to Section 16501.1." (§ 391, subd. (e)(2)(J).) The Department does not argue that it provided J.T. with a written 90-day transition plan. Instead, the Department argues that (1) J.T. is estopped from making this argument because she did not make herself available to formulate a 90-day transition plan in August of 2016; (2) the 90-day transition plan is not required for a nonminor dependent; and (3) the TILP prepared for J.T.'s case was "viable as a transitional plan."
"The 90-day transition plan is intended to provide minors and nonminors who are exiting dependency jurisdiction with resources to assist in transitioning to independence." (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.) Section 16501.1, subdivision (g)(16)(B) provides that "[d]uring the 90-day period prior to the participant attaining 18 years of age or older . . . , a caseworker or other appropriate agency staff . . . shall provide the youth or nonminor dependent with assistance and support in developing the written 90-day transition plan, that is personalized at the direction of the child." The statute requires the 90-day transition plan to include "options regarding housing, health insurance, education, local opportunities for mentors and continuing support services, and workforce supports and employment services, a power of attorney for health care, and information regarding the advance health care directive form." (Ibid.)
This court has previously found an agency's failure to provide a 90-day transition plan harmless where the agency had provided the required information to the nonminor dependent in another manner. (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.) In Aaron S., the agency had sent the nonminor dependent an emancipation letter prior to the termination hearing; the letter "referred him to his independent living program case manager and provided contact information for transitional housing program providers," which satisfied the requirement of providing him with housing, employment, educational and continuing support services information. (Ibid.) The nonminor in that case had been informed he was eligible for health benefits through Medi-Cal, he had previously been sent a copy of the advanced health care directive form. (Ibid.)
As in Aaron S., "termination without proof of a 90-day transition plan was harmless here because the Department separately provided information to [J.T.] regarding each of the categories that would have been included in the plan. [Citation.]" (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.) The social worker provided J.T. with information about housing options, by setting her up with the group home SILP placement and by informing her that she had the option of finding another SILP placement. The social worker also provided J.T. with information about health insurance, education, and employment: at the time of the termination report, J.T. was enrolled in Medi-Cal, had applied for Cal Fresh, had been referred to Cal Works, and had been offered help in applying for Social Security benefits. J.T. had previously been accessing education and independent living classes at the group home and understood that she could enroll in a regular high school to complete her final three classes.
Although the record does not establish that J.T. was provided with two items required to be part of the 90-day transition plan—a power of attorney for health care, and information regarding the advance health care directive form (see § 16501.1, subd. (g)(16)(B))—J.T. does not argue that these two items were necessary to assist her "in transitioning to independence" (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 521).
In sum, J.T. has failed to show that she was prejudiced by the juvenile court's failure to require such a plan prior to terminating dependency jurisdiction. (See Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.)
2. Judicial Council Forms
J.T. points out that the Department failed to provide her with two Judicial Council forms: (1) form JV-365, which provides a nonminor dependent with an opportunity to indicate whether or not the required assistance and services were provided, and (2) form JV-464-INFO, which provides the nonminor dependent with information about how to request a return to juvenile court jurisdiction.
With respect to form JV-365, any error was harmless. At the termination hearing J.T. testified about the assistance and services she had received, and she was represented by counsel who advocated for her to receive additional services. J.T. was not deprived of the opportunity to inform the juvenile court of whether she had received the required assistance and services.
With respect to form JV-464-INFO, any error was likewise harmless. The social worker had previously provided J.T. with written information about her "right to continue to receive extended foster care benefits up until age 21" and informed her that she could request a return to foster care and juvenile court jurisdiction until her 21st birthday. The social worker had specifically informed J.T. "that for re-entry, she may contact her last social worker or may call Family & Children's Services Hotline Reporting telephone number at [a specific toll free number] or [at a specific local number] directly and receive assistance and guidance to complete the re-entry process." In addition, at the termination hearing, the juvenile court, County Counsel, and J.T.'s attorney all reminded J.T. about the process for reentering the dependency system. Thus, J.T. was not prejudiced by the Department's failure to provide her with the information form.
3. Employment Assistance
J.T. asserts that the Department's termination report did not include "confirmation that [she] was provided with help in obtaining employment or other financial support."
The record does not support J.T.'s claim. As noted above, the Department's termination report included confirmation that J.T. was enrolled in Medi-Cal, that she had applied for Cal Fresh, that she had been referred to Cal Works, that she had been offered help in applying for Social Security benefits. In addition, the TILP—which identified a fast-food job as a goal for J.T. and identified the steps J.T. would need to take to get such a job—showed that J.T. had been provided with assistance in obtaining employment.
4. Eligibility for Social Security Disability Benefits
J.T. next claims the record does not support the social worker's claim that J.T. did not qualify for Social Security Disability benefits. J.T.'s argument references a portion of the Department's six-month report, prepared before the juvenile court declared J.T. a nonminor dependent. It is unclear how this relates to J.T.'s arguments regarding termination of her dependency. In any event, the record shows that the social worker subsequently did offer to help J.T. apply for Social Security benefits, and that J.T. had declined such assistance.
The report states: "There is not an SSI [Supplemental Security Income] application pending. Based on the SSI screening guide (FC1633A) from the California Department of Social Services, [J.T.] does not warrant a referral for an SSI assessment."
C. Best Interests
J.T. contends there was insufficient evidence that termination of dependency jurisdiction was in her best interests.
As this court observed in Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at page 519, "[a]ll dependency cases involve consideration of the best interests of the dependent." Further, section 391 requires the county welfare department's report to describe—and the juvenile court to consider—"whether it is in the nonminor's best interests to remain under the court's dependency jurisdiction." (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Nevertheless, the juvenile court is "authorized to terminate jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent if he or she is not participating in his or her case plan. [Citations.]" (Aaron S., supra, at p. 519.) "As it is axiomatic that it would be detrimental for any nonminor dependent to stop receiving services, the mere assertion of such detriment without any proof of reasonable participation by the nonminor in his or her case plan does not demonstrate that the court abused its discretion." (Id. at pp. 519-520.)
As in Aaron S., here J.T. relies on cases that "do not interpret the current version of section 391 and are thus distinguishable." (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 520.) J.T. asserts that In re Robert L. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 789 stands for the proposition that a best interests finding is required, but that case "predated section 391 and found that under the dependency scheme in place at that time the juvenile court could only retain jurisdiction over a nonminor on a showing of 'existing and reasonably foreseeable future harm to the welfare of the child.' " (Aaron S., supra, at p. 520.) Likewise, another case cited by J.T.—In re Holly H. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1324—"applied a previous version of section 391, subdivision (c), which expressly provided that the juvenile court may continue jurisdiction over a nonminor if it found 'that termination of jurisdiction would be harmful to the best interests of the child.' [Citations.]" (Aaron S., supra, at p. 520.)
As the record contains no "proof of reasonable participation by the nonminor in his or her case plan," it "does not demonstrate that the court abused its discretion." (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 520.)
We observe that the respondent's brief fails to comply with the requirement that "the font size, including footnotes, must not be smaller than 13-point." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(b)(4).) In this case, the respondent's brief has 114 footnotes, which contain citations to the record, statutes, and cases. Each footnote appears to be in eight-point or smaller font size. Although we have exercised our discretion to "[d]isregard the noncompliance" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C)) in this case, we respectfully request the Department comply with the font-size rule in its future briefs.
IV. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's September 29, 2016 order is affirmed.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.