Opinion
H037024
01-18-2012
In re I.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.S., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD20502)
R.S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court's judgment (jurisdictional order and dispositional order) concerning his daughter I.A. (daughter) (born 2005). The juvenile court had declared daughter a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious emotional damage) after finding true 11 subdivision (b) allegations (b-1 through b-10 and b-12) and five subdivision (c) allegations (c-1 through c-5). Thereafter it removed daughter from father's and the mother's custody and ordered reunification services for father and the mother. Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support two of the subdivision (b) findings that pertain to him (b-10--had only intermittent contact with daughter, did not provide necessities to daughter, was not seen as a father by daughter, did not protect daughter from exposure to drug use and criminal activity, causes anxiety to daughter; b-12--has history of using drugs and alcohol, has criminal history, has been affiliated with the Norteno criminal street gang). He does not challenge the judgment based on the true findings as to allegations b-1 through b-9 and c-1 through c-5, which are based on the mother's neglect and abuse. "Because Father's contentions, even if accepted, would not justify a reversal of the court's jurisdictional ruling or the grant of any other effective relief, we decline to address them and dismiss the appeal." (In re I.A. (2011) _ Cal.App.4th __ [2011 Cal.App. LEXIS 1583, 1-2] (I.A.).)
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
Daughter came to the attention of the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children's Services (Department) in February 2011 because her mother had endangered her during a domestic violence incident with the mother's boyfriend. The mother was arrested after the incident.
At the contested jurisdictional hearing, the social worker testified that father had never lived with daughter, had not seen daughter for at least a year before daughter was taken into protective custody, and "prior to that he had only seen her a handful of times." She added that daughter "does not know [father] as her father."
DISCUSSION
Father "challenges the lower court's adoption of portions of the [Department's] section 300 petition naming him as an offending parent. Specifically [he] challenges the b-10 and b-12 allegations. Essentially, these counts alleged that [daughter] came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b) because [father] had a history of substance abuse and failed to protect [daughter] from exposure to drug use and criminal activity while she was in mother's care. Insufficient evidence supported these allegations. Accordingly, the court's adoption of the portion of the section 300 petition relating to [father] was error."
Daughter, however, was also found to be a dependent of the juvenile court as a result of other findings under subdivision (b) and findings under subdivision (c) of section 300. Father does not challenge those findings on appeal. Because the juvenile court's uncontested findings offer an independent basis for affirming the exercise of jurisdiction over daughter, Department argues, and we agree, that father's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are moot. (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [a minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring her within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent]; In re Dirk S. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1045 [single basis for jurisdiction is sufficient to uphold juvenile court's order]; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 [where one jurisdictional finding is supported by substantial evidence, appellate court need not consider sufficiency of evidence to support other findings].)
" 'We uphold judgments if they are correct for any reason, "regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the court reached its conclusion." [Citation.] "It is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which is the subject of review. . . ." ' [Citation.] We will not reverse for error unless it appears reasonably probable that, absent the error, the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result." (In re Jonathan B., supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 876.)
This concept has recently been examined in detail.
"The many aspects of the justiciability doctrine in California were summarized in Wilson v. L.A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450: ' "A judicial tribunal ordinarily may consider and determine only an existing controversy, and not a moot question or abstract proposition. . . . [As] a general rule it is not within the function of the court to act upon or decide a moot question or speculative, theoretical or abstract question or proposition, or a purely academic question, or to give an advisory opinion on such a question or proposition. . . ." ' [Citation.] An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of 'effective' relief--that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties' conduct or legal status. ' " ' "It is this court's duty ' "to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it." ' " ' " ' (Costa Serena [Owners Coalition v. Costa Serena Architectural Com. (2009)] 175 Cal.App.4th [1175,] 1205-1206; see also In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498 [a case is moot when it is ' "impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief" ']; Simi Corp. v. Garamendi (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503 ['A case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical impact or cannot provide the parties with effective relief'].) When the court cannot grant effective relief to the parties to an appeal, the appeal must be dismissed." (I.A., supra, _Cal.App.4th at pp. _ [at pp. 6-8].)
"It is commonly said that the juvenile court takes jurisdiction over children, not parents. [Citations.] While this is not strictly correct, since the court exercises personal jurisdiction over the parents once proper notice has been given [citation], it captures the essence of dependency law. The law's primary concern is the protection of children. [Citation.] The court asserts jurisdiction with respect to a child when one of the statutory prerequisites listed in section 300 has been demonstrated. [Citation.] The acquisition of personal jurisdiction over the parents through proper notice follows as a consequence of the court's assertion of dependency jurisdiction over their child. [Citations.] Parental personal jurisdiction allows the court to enter binding orders adjudicating the parent's relationship to the child [citation], but it is not a prerequisite for the court to proceed, so long as jurisdiction over the child has been established. [Citation.] Further, every parent has the option not to participate in the proceeding, even if properly noticed. [Citation.]
"As a result of this focus on the child, it is necessary only for the court to find that one parent's conduct has created circumstances triggering section 300 for the court to assert jurisdiction over the child. [Citations.] Once the child is found to be endangered in the manner described by one of the subdivisions of section 300--e.g., a risk of serious physical harm (subds. (a) & (b)), serious emotional damage (subd. (c)), sexual or other abuse (subds. (d) & (e)), or abandonment (subd. (g)), among others--the child comes within the court's jurisdiction, even if the child was not in the physical custody of one or both parents at the time the jurisdictional events occurred. [Citation.] For jurisdictional purposes, it is irrelevant which parent created those circumstances. A jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been established. [Citation.] As a result, it is commonly said that a jurisdictional finding involving one parent is ' "good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [him] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent." ' [Citation.] For this reason, an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence." (I.A., supra, _ Cal.App.4th at pp. _ [at pp. 8-11], fn. omitted.)
Because father does not challenge the jurisdictional findings involving the mother, "any decision we might render on the allegations involving Father will not result in a reversal of the court's order asserting jurisdiction. The juvenile court will still be entitled to assert jurisdiction over [daughter] on the basis of the unchallenged [findings]. Further, the court will still be permitted to exercise personal jurisdiction over Father and adjudicate his parental rights, if any, since that jurisdiction is derivative of the court's jurisdiction over the minor and is unrelated to Father's role in creating the conditions justifying the court's assertion of dependency jurisdiction." (I.A., supra, _ Cal.App.4th at p. __ [at p. 12].)
"Under these circumstances, the issues Father's appeal raises are ' "abstract or academic questions of law" ' [citation], since we cannot render any relief to Father that would have a practical, tangible impact on his position in the dependency proceeding. Even if we found no adequate evidentiary support for the juvenile court's findings with respect to his conduct, we would not reverse the court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders nor vacate the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over his parental rights." (I.A., supra, _ Cal.App.4th at pp. _ [at pp. 12-13].)
Father nevertheless argues that we should decide his issues because he was prejudiced. According to father, "the juvenile court's erroneous adoption of the b-10 and b-12 allegations against [him] unfairly prejudiced him at the dispositional hearing. In other words, because the jurisdictional findings became the basis for the reunification and custody orders, an error in the former undermined the foundation for the latter. [Citation.] In addition to the prejudice already suffered by [father], the court's erroneous jurisdictional finding has the potential to continue to infect these dependency proceedings by suggesting, without support, that [father] failed to adequately protect [daughter] from mother. [Citation.] The court's erroneous jurisdictional findings influenced the case plan and will certainly influence the course of the dependency. [Citation.] Moreover, even after this case is resolved, the erroneous jurisdictional finding has the potential to prejudice [father] in unrelated dependency proceedings in the future."
We are not convinced. Father's claims of future prejudice are vague and speculative. His cited cases stand in stark contrast. In one case, a de facto parent could still challenge an order removing a child from her custody, even though the dependency was terminated, because it barred her from serving as a custodian if the child was removed from his mother's custody again. (In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193.) In the other case, a father could still challenge jurisdictional findings, even though the dependency was terminated, because they "resulted in [custody and visitation] orders which continue to adversely affect" him. (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548.) Here, father identifies no similarly specific threat of prejudice from the challenged jurisdictional findings. And unlike father's cited cases, the assertion of jurisdiction is amply supported by several unchallenged findings. Father's argument also misapprehends the purpose of juvenile court dependency jurisdiction. " 'The purpose of the California dependency system is to protect children from harm and preserve families when safe for the child. (§ 300.2.)' (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) . . . [Thus], the focus of the system is on the child, not the parents." (D.M. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1129.) "The paramount purpose underlying dependency proceedings is the protection of the child. [Citations.] 'The parents do not represent a competing interest in this respect.' " (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.)
"It is true that one provision of dependency law, section 361, subdivision (c)(1), distinguishes between 'nonoffending' and 'offending' parents. Subdivision (c)(1) requires the court to permit a nonoffending parent to retain custody of a child when the child is removed from the custody of an offending parent. Because [daughter] never resided with Father, however, he was ineligible for custody under subdivision (c)(1) even if nonoffending. [Citation.] Some courts have also referred to a noncustodial parent eligible for custody under section 361.2, subdivision (a) as a 'nonoffending, noncustodial parent.' [Citation.] In fact, the statute does not require a parent to be nonoffending [citation], . . . . Similarly, the jurisdictional finding can have no effect on Father's receipt of reunification services, since [the juvenile court ordered such services for father]. We find no potential impact of the challenged jurisdictional finding on the present dependency proceedings." (I.A., supra, _ Cal.App.4th at pp. _ [at pp. 15-17], fn. omitted.)
"Although raising the specter of a future impact, Father, too, fails to suggest any way in which [the findings] actually could affect a future dependency . . . proceeding, and we fail to find one on our own. In any future dependency proceeding, a finding of jurisdiction must be based on current conditions. [Citation.] A past jurisdictional finding . . . would be entitled to no weight in establishing jurisdiction, even assuming it was admissible for that purpose. Instead, the [Department] will be required to demonstrate jurisdiction by presenting evidence of then current circumstances placing [daughter] at risk. Other relevant dependency findings similarly would require evidence of present detriment, based on the then prevailing circumstances of parent and child. . . . Because we find no threatened prejudice to Father from [the] jurisdictional finding[s], we decline to exercise our discretion to review it." (I. A., supra, _ Cal.App.4th at pp. _ [at pp. 18-19].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
___________________________
Premo, J.
WE CONCUR:
___________________________
Rushing, P.J.
___________________________
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.