Summary
granting motion to dismiss John Doe defendants in a diversity case because the plaintiff "fail[ed] to provide the court with any basis for determining the citizenship or identity of the John Does."
Summary of this case from ANCIENT E. AR. O. v. MOST WO. PR. HALL GRAND L. OR VAOpinion
Civil Action No. 5:02CV00107
November 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Carl L. Sandier brings this personal injury action against Western State Hospital ("WSH") and other named and unnamed defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Sandier, a citizen of Maryland, seeks damages in the amount of $16,000,000. This case is now before this court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Although defendants style their motion as a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants offer no affidavits or admissible evidence to support the motion. Even though numerous possible defenses exist for both WSH and the individual defendants, such as state sovereign immunity and collateral estoppel, defendants do not provide sufficient supporting material to evaluate these possible defenses. Therefore, this court is left with the sole option of deciding defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. For the reasons stated, the court grants the Motion to Dismiss of WSH and the John Doe defendants, but denies the Motion to Dismiss of the other defendants, in so far as Sandier pursues claims against defendants in their individual capacity.
In his complaint and brief responding to defendants' motion, Sandier vaguely alludes to additional claims. First, to the extent Sandier attempts to incorporate various civil rights claims, this court finds those claims to be redundant. Since jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the court finds that any civil rights claims Sandier might attempt to assert are subsumed within his various tort claims. Second, Sandier moves to censure defendants for not providing sufficient material in discovery. Sandier, however, has made no motions to compel disclosure or has not sufficiently referenced the particular information he desires. Therefore, Sandier's Motion to Censure is denied. Finally, Sandier responded to the defendants' Motion to Dismiss with a motion titled "Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment." In that response, however, Sandier appears to merely assert that the court should deny defendants' motion. To the extent Sandier moves for summary judgment, Sandier provides no affidavits or supporting material. Therefore, Ms court denies Sandier's motion.
It should also be noted that defendants claim that Sandier fails to asserts sufficient facts to allow for a response. Defendants, however, do not move for a more definite statement or any other affirmative relief based on this claim. Therefore, the court declines to judge the merits of the defendants' accusations.
I.
Sandier suffered multiple injuries in an automobile accident on October 30, 2000, on U.S. Intestate 81. He received initial medical treatment at a nearby emergency room, but left against medical advice. The following day, Sandier went to Rockingham Memorial Hospital complaining of chest pains, and on November 3, 2000, physicians transferred Sandier to the University of Virginia Hospital ("UVA") for further medical treatment. During treatment at UVA, Sandier expressed grandiose thoughts and, as a result, UVA administered a psychiatric exam. After he was medically cleared by the surgical unit, UVA transferred Sandier to the psychiatry unit, where he was diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder.
Despite repeated assurances by medical personnel at UVA that he no longer needed medical intervention, Sandier insisted that his injuries were more severe than diagnosed. Yet, he refused all medication, including pain medicines, and claimed that he only required rehabilitation services. Since Sandler refused all medication and showed no signs of improvement, UVA physicians decided to transfer Sandier to WSH, where he could continue to receive psychiatric treatment. In accord with Virginia Code §§ 37.1-67.1 through 67.3, a civil commitment hearing was held before the General District Court of Charlottesville, Virginia, on November 15, 2002. In the hearing, the court ordered Sandier, who was represented by counsel, involuntarily admitted to WSH.
After WSH admitted Sandier, Dr. Joseph Cosgrove, the Supervising Psychiatrist at WSH, went before the General District Court for the City of Staunton on November 20, 2000, and sought authorization to treat Sandier. Pursuant to VA Code § 37.1-134.21, by clear and convincing evidence the court found Sandier, who was represented by counsel, unable to make an informed decision regarding his treatment. As a result, the court ordered WSH to treat Sandier with psychotherapy and mood stabilizing medication, and to administer all medically necessary examinations, tests, and services as deemed necessary by the treating physician.
While at WSH, Sandier continued to receive medical and psychological evaluations and treatments. During this period, however, Sandier denied his mental illness, made unsubstantiated claims about his physical condition, and refused medication. He expressed frustration about being at WSH, claiming he had "slipped through the cracks," and he refused to participate in psychological questioning and counseling.
On December 12, 2000, WSH medical staff evaluated Sandier after he complained of chest pain. Since a cardiac monitor led to inconclusive results, WSH transferred Sandier to Augusta Medical Center for further cardiac evaluation. The next day, December 13, Augusta Medical Center medically cleared Sandier, after ruling out cardiac involvement, and authorized his return to WSH. Before WSH could arrange transportation for Sandier, however, he left Augusta Medical Center without permission. Since Sandier left without permission, WSH followed its procedures and requested a criminal warrant for his return. On January 26, 2001, after learning that Sandier had left the Commonwealth of Virginia, WSH discharged Sandier.
II.
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants assert immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment limits suits against states in federal court. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment, in addition, "bars suits by private parties who seek to impose a liability that must be paid out of the state treasury; thus an `arm' or `alter ego' of the state is immune from money damages unless immunity is expressly waived" Herber v. Burns, 577 F. Supp. 762, 763 (W.D.Va. 1984) (holding Western State Hospital immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment because it is an "arm" of the Commonwealth of Virginia and state funds would be required to pay any judgment).
In this case, there is no indication that WSH has waived immunity. Therefore, WSH, as an "arm" of the Commonwealth of Virginia, is immune from suit in federal court. As a result, this court finds that the Eleventh Amendment bars Sandier's claims against WSH.
In addition to barring Sandier's suit against WSH, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the individual defendants acting in their official capacity. Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state officials, who are sued for damages in their official capacity, since a judgement merely constitutes a judgment against the state. See Buckhannon Bd. Care Home v. W.Va. Dep't of Health Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001) (citingEdelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)). Although a suit against the individual defendants in their official capacity is barred, the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to suits against the defendants in their individual capacity. See Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1315 (E.D.Va. 1973).
In this case, Sandier is silent on whether he seeks judgment against the individual defendants in their official or individual capacity. To the extent he seeks judgment against the defendants in their official capacity, the court finds Sandier's actions barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Sandier, however, is proceeding pro se and pro se complaints, even if unskillfully pled, must be liberally construed. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977). Therefore, this court will construe Sandier's complaint as asserting claims against defendants in their individual capacity.
III.
Sandier seeks relief against the following defendants in their individual capacity: Jack Barber, Director of WSH; Dr. Mary Clare Smith, Medical Director of WSH; Dr. Joseph Cosgrove, a WSH physician. Although summary judgment may be appropriate for this case, defendants have failed to submit any admissible evidence or affidavits. Therefore, finding that Sandier has stated various causes of action against defendants in their individual capacity and has based those claims on diversity jurisdiction, this court denies defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Sandier also alleges personal injury actions against various unnamed defendants, referred to in Sandler's complaint as "John Doe (1, 2, 3, . . .)." A plaintiff seeking relief in federal court, however, "has the burden of alleging and proving the jurisdictional facts." Sligh v. John Doe, 596 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1979). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Sandier must establish the citizenship of the various John Doe defendants. In this case, though, Sandier fails to provide the court with any basis for determining the citizenship or identity of the John Does. Since 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants, this court dismisses the John Doe defendants as defendants in this action.
IV.
For the reasons stated, the court finds that Sandier's action against WSH and the individual defendants in their official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the court grants WSH's Motion to Dismiss and grants defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the extent Sandier bases his claims against defendants in their official capacity. The court, however, denies defendants' Motion to Dismiss for claims against Barber, Smith, and Cosgrove in their individual capacity. The court also dismisses the John Doe defendants as parties to this action.
ORDER
In accordance with the written Memorandum Opinion entered this day, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that: (1) Western State Hospital's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; (2) the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Jack Barber, Dr. Mary Clare Smith, and Dr. Joseph Cosgrove is DENIED; (3) the Motion to Ksmiss the John Doe defendants is GRANTED; (4) Sandier's Motion to Censure is DENIED; and (5) Sandier's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, Western State Hospital and the John Doe defendants are DISMISSED as defendants to this action.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to send certified copies of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion to the counsel of record for the plaintiff and the defendants.