Opinion
Civil No. 3:06cv778 (JBA).
March 24, 2008
Jarell Sanderson, Brooklyn, CT, pro se.
Richard T. Couture, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Jarell Sanderson, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was provided constitutionally inadequate medical care while housed at the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution ("CRCI"), a state facility in Enfield, Connecticut. Sanderson named as defendants Dr. Mark Buchanan, the Clinical Director of the Correctional Managed Health Care Program; Rob Durkcel, a medical supervisor; Agnes Gergely, a Registered Nurse at CRCI; and Bruce Cuscovitch, the CRCI Warden. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the basis that (1) Plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated, (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, (3) Defendants are entitled to state statutory immunity, (4) Buchanan and Cuscovitch had no involvement in Plaintiff's medical treatment, and (5) there is no employee at CRCI named Rob Durkcel. Because the Court concludes that there is no evidence of a constitutional violation on this record, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 18] is granted.
The case caption reflects a different, and presumably incorrect, spelling of Dr. Buchanan's last name.
I. Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record after discovery "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue of fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and is "genuine" if it could lead "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant "need not prove a negative," but "need only point to an absence of proof on plaintiff's part, and, at that point, plaintiff must `designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The non-moving party, in order to defeat summary judgment, must then come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. But if the record as a whole, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial," and summary judgment should follow. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quotation marks omitted).
II. Factual Background
III. Discussion
Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825830114 S.Ct. 1970128 L.Ed.2d 811Wilson v. Seiter501 U.S. 294296-99111 S.Ct. 2321115 L.Ed.2d 271Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 9710597 S.Ct. 28550 L.Ed.2d 251Smith v. Carpenter316 F.3d 178184Id. Estelle429 U.S. at 10697 S.Ct. 285Id.97 S.Ct. 285see also Salahuddin v. Goord467 F.3d 263279-81
Applying these principles to the record before the Court, there is no evidence of any deliberate indifference to Sanderson's serious medical needs while at CRCI. In opposing summary judgment, Sanderson emphasizes his history of stomach pain (including his symptoms while at a previous prison facility), the three weeks he claims he waited before being treated, and his belief that he had an ulcer in March 2006. Plaintiff characterizes the Defendants' unconstitutional conduct as "inadequate medical care, deliberate indifference, neglect and what is believed to be medical malpractice." (Def.'s Aff. [Doc. 23] at 1.) But as explained above, Eighth Amendment claims premised on medical negligence cannot form the basis for a § 1983 action. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. As to Plaintiff's allegations of deliberate indifference, he offers no evidence that the Defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable mental state or that his health was ever at serious risk. Although an H. pylori infection may cause an ulcer, the record shows that Plaintiff did not have an ulcer in March 2006, and there is nothing in Plaintiff's medical history that would have indicated to the Defendants that the prescription of Pepto-Bismol and the subsequent course of treatment was inappropriate.
Reading Sanderson's assertions liberally and even assuming that he did have an ulcer in March 2006, the conduct of the prison staff was still not constitutionally deficient, for all that could be drawn from the facts is that Gergely unadvisedly gave him Pepto-Bismol and his symptoms continued for several more days. Because there is no evidence that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a sufficiently serious condition, this is not a lapse of constitutional magnitude.
Therefore, with no Eighth Amendment violation demonstrated by this record, Plaintiff's derivative allegations that Defendants failed to provide competent medical staff at CRCI must also fail. It is unnecessary, then, to reach Defendants' alternative bases for summary judgment.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 18] is granted. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.