As a consequence, he has waived all defenses except that the indictment charged no crime, including the issue of whether the offenses merged as a matter of law or fact. Regent v. State, 306 Ga.App. 616, 618(2), 703 S.E.2d 81 (2010); Sanders v. State, 282 Ga.App. 834, 835–836(1)(a), 640 S.E.2d 353 (2006). “When a criminal defendant pleads guilty to counts of an indictment alleging multiple criminal acts, and willingly and knowingly accepts the specified sentences as to such charged counts, the defendant waives any claim that there was in fact only one act and that the resulting sentences are void on double jeopardy grounds.”
(Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 837 ( 640 SE2d 353) (2006). Johnson made various claims that his right to a direct appeal was frustrated by erroneous advice of counsel; by failure of counsel to properly investigate the basis for the charges; by failure of counsel to raise the issue of his mental competency; and by counsel's false statements which coerced him to plead guilty. Because none of these claims can be resolved by facts contained on the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the out-of-time appeal on these grounds.
However, the Court of Appeals has a long line of cases extending Smith to apply a similar waiver rule to merger claims raised in direct appeals challenging convictions based on guilty pleas. See, e.g., Carson v. State, 314 Ga.App. 225, 228–229, 723 S.E.2d 516 (2012) (holding that the defendant's entry of a guilty plea “waived all defenses except that the indictment charged no crime, including the issue of whether the offenses merged as a matter of law or fact,” and affirming the denial of a motion to withdraw the plea based in part on a claim that the trial court erred in not merging his convictions for aggravated assault and armed robbery of the same victim before sentencing him); Regent v. State, 306 Ga.App. 616, 617–618, 703 S.E.2d 81 (2010) (holding that the defendant's entry of a guilty plea waived his claim on direct appeal that the trial court erred in failing to merge his convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery of the same victim before sentencing him); Sanders v. State, 282 Ga.App. 834, 836, 640 S.E.2d 353 (2006) (vacating an order merging an aggravated assault conviction into an armed robbery conviction on a “motion to correct illegal sentences” because the defendant “ ‘admitted to committing both crimes' ” by entering his guilty plea and therefore was “ ‘estopped from now claiming that any of the counts to which he pled guilty should have merged’ ” (citation omitted)); Carr v. State, 282 Ga.App. 134, 134, 136 n. 6, 637 S.E.2d 835 (2006) (holding that the defendant “waived any objection to his sentence by entering a guilty plea” and affirming the denial of the defendant's “petition to correct [a] void sentence” that argued that his sentence was illegal because his conviction for armed robbery merged with his conviction for voluntary manslaughter (citing Smith, 266 Ga. at 56, 464 S.E.2d 198)). The more recent of these cases draw support from this Court's decision in Turner v. State, 284 Ga. 494, 668 S.E.2d 692 (2008).
(Punctuation omitted.) Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 836 (1) (a) ( 640 SE2d 353) (2006). See Harmon v. State, 281 Ga. App. 35, 39 (4) ( 635 SE2d 348) (2006).
Turner v. State, 284 Ga. 494, 497 (2) ( 668 SE2d 692) (2008). See also Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 836 (1) (a) ( 640 SE2d 353) (2006). Judgment affirmed. Blackburn, P. J., and Doyle, J., concur.
Syms v. State, 244 Ga. App. 21 ( 534 SE2d 502) (2000). See also Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 835 (1) (a) ( 640 SE2d 353) (2006). Therefore, since the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the motion filed by Barthell in 2006, and the orders entered in 1999 and 2000 were nullities, this case is remanded back to the trial court with direction to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Barthell's 2006 motion.
(Punctuation omitted.) Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 837 (3) (a) ( 640 SE2d 363) (2006). See id. at 837-838.