Opinion
24A-CR-529
10-22-2024
Alvin R. Sanders, III, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Donald R. Shuler Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP Goshen, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit Court The Honorable Michael A. Christofeno, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20C01-2207-MR-7
Attorney for Appellant Donald R. Shuler Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP Goshen, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
TAVITAS, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Alvin Sanders, III, was convicted of murder as an accomplice and sentenced to sixty-three years in the Department of Correction ("DOC"). Sanders appeals and argues: (1) insufficient evidence supports his conviction; and (2) his sentence is inappropriate. We disagree and affirm.
Issues
[¶2] Sanders raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
I. Whether sufficient evidence supports Sanders' conviction.
II. Whether Sanders' sentence is inappropriate.
Facts
[¶3] In the afternoon of May 1, 2021, three teenagers, W.L., L.W., and T.M., were playing basketball at Tolson Park in Elkhart. T.M. was wearing a red hoodie. Around the same time, Sanders, who was known as "L.A.," was at the house of his friend, Da'quavion Wiley, who went by "Quavie." Tr. Vol. V p. 68. Sanders filmed a video on his cell phone that depicted him, Wiley, and their friend, Keondre Baker, posing with guns. Sanders posed with a tan Glock-17 handgun in his waistband. Wiley wore a white and black shirt with the number 93 on it. Soon after filming the video, Sanders and several individuals, including Wiley, left the residence in Sanders' dark grey Dodge Charger.
[¶4] At approximately 4:00 p.m., after playing basketball at the park, W.L., L.W., and T.M. were walking toward downtown when Sanders and the others pulled up near them in Sanders' Charger. A round of gunshots was fired, and the boys ran down an alley between McKinley Avenue and Benham Court. A second round of gunshots followed, and W.L. sustained a fatal shot to the back. The bullet hit his spine and exited through his neck. Sanders and the others then fled to South Bend. In total, over twenty-five shots were fired, and the bullets penetrated several houses in the neighborhood.
[¶5] According to Robert Davis, who lived in a house facing McKinley Avenue, the gunshots were fired at the boys from three individuals in the Charger. The individual in the passenger seat was "hanging out" through the open window to shoot and was wearing a "jersey [with] bright colors"; Davis could see "half of two numbers" on the shirt. Tr. Vol. II p. 181. The individual in the driver's seat had "an arm sticking up and [was] shooting from there," and the individual in the back passenger side seat was also shooting. Id. at 190.
Davis also claimed that W.L. turned and fired at the Charger before he was shot. Law enforcement later recovered a toy gun near W.L.'s body.
[¶6] Also around the time of the shooting, Jennifer Fox, who was working at a nearby thrift store, saw three individuals, one of whom was wearing a red hoodie, walking down Benham Court. Several other individuals then appeared to exit a vehicle parked on Park Avenue; one raised his arm, and Fox heard a gunshot. The vehicle then drove down Park Avenue, and the individuals who exited the vehicle ran in that direction. All six individuals disappeared from Fox's view, but she heard a second round of gunfire, and the vehicle then "pull[ed] out of the alley really fast." Tr. Vol. III p. 10.
[¶7] After the shooting, law enforcement began efforts to locate the Charger. On May 5, 2021, Elkhart Police Department Officer Larry Brooks located the Charger on Eden Street in Elkhart. Officer Brooks recalled that he had cited the Charger for a noise violation less than two weeks prior. Whereas the Charger previously had a metal license plate, this time, the Charger had a temporary license plate, which was registered to a different vehicle. Officer Brooks observed Sanders enter the Charger, but when Officer Brooks activated his emergency lights, Sanders fled in the vehicle. Sanders sped through red lights, crashed the Charger, fled on foot, and was apprehended. At the scene of the crash, a spent shell casing was found near the Charger.
[¶8] Inside the Charger, law enforcement located a Glock-17 handgun in the front passenger door; a tan drum with a fifty-bullet capacity on the front passenger floor; a Glock-23 handgun containing one round of ammunition in the center console; ammunition magazines in both driver's side doors; and marijuana. DNA results from the Glock-17 showed "very strong support" that Sanders' DNA was included along with "the possibility of three other contributors," who could not be identified. Tr. Vol. III p. 202. The DNA results from the Glock-23 showed a mixture of DNA and were inconclusive regarding specific contributors. Ballistic testing revealed that the spent casing recovered from the crash was fired from the Glock-17. The Glock-17 and Glock-23 were traced to many of the casings recovered from the scene of the shooting; however, law enforcement officers were unable to recover the bullet that struck W.L. The remainder of the casings from the scene of the shooting were traced to two different, unrecovered firearms.
[¶9] Wiley's fingerprint was located on the front passenger's side door of the Charger, and Baker's fingerprints were located on beverage bottles inside the vehicle. Location data from Sanders', Wiley's, and Baker's cell phones showed that the three were in the same general area in South Bend during the hours after the shooting.
[¶10] In custodial interviews after his arrest, Sanders admitted that the Glock-17 and Glock-23 belonged to him. He, however, claimed that he was not in Elkhart on the day of the shooting and that he had loaned his car to another person and left a gun in the car.
[¶11] After Sanders' arrest, his sister, Kimani Jones, participated in an interview with law enforcement. She stated that Sanders and Wiley left her house together in the Charger shortly before the shooting; there were rumors that Sanders and Wiley shot W.L.; she sent a text message to Sanders stating, "the kid that [Wiley] shot died"; Sanders and Wiley had "beef" with a lot of people; and, since the shooting, Wiley had been "missing in action" and "might be in Mississippi." State's Ex. 81 at 13:30, 14:45, 17:15, 18:30, 22:40. While incarcerated, Sanders made phone calls to Jones and told her that, despite her subpoena as a witness, she did not have to testify at trial and instructed her, if she did testify, to "tell them [she does not] remember nothing." State's Ex. 131, 9/13/2021 Call, at 3:20.
[¶12] L.W. initially told law enforcement that he could not identify the shooters "because [he] didn't want to be a snitch." Tr. Vol. II p. 122. Several months later, however, L.W. participated in another interview, during which a resource officer whom L.W. knew from school was present. This time, L.W. informed law enforcement that Sanders, Wiley, and Baker were the shooters.
[¶13] On July 21, 2022, the State charged Sanders and Wiley with murder, a felony, under the theory of accomplice liability. Sanders and Wiley were tried together before the bench in September 2023. At the prosecutor's office, on the Friday before trial, L.W. again identified Sanders, Wiley, and Baker as the shooters. At trial, however, L.W. testified that he lied regarding his previous identifications and that he could not identify the shooters. L.W. admitted that his mother told him not to testify. T.M. testified that he likewise could not identify the shooters.
[¶14] Davis and Fox testified regarding their recollections of the shooting. A surveillance video capturing Fox's view of the shooting was admitted as State's Exhibit 78. Michael Sutton, W.L.'s friend, testified that, approximately one month before the shooting, he was hanging out with W.L. and T.M., and the latter two boys were attempting to sell marijuana. A group of individuals wearing ski masks, including Sanders and another individual named Deshawn Gates, met the boys to purchase the marijuana. Gates was friends with Sanders and Wiley. Instead of purchasing the marijuana, Gates took it and ran, and when W.L. tried to chase after him, Sanders displayed a gun under his shirt and said, "Don't do that." Tr. Vol. III p. 59. Sometime later, a fight broke out in the area, and W.L. beat up Gates.
The transcript suggests Gates' name could also be spelled "Dashon." Tr. Vol. IV p. 139.
[¶15] Ma'Khyia Allen, W.L.'s cousin, testified that shortly before the day of the shooting, Sutton, W.L., L.W., and T.M. were at her house, left for a few minutes, and then returned upset. The boys had encountered "[Wiley] and a couple of his friends," and she overheard W.L. ask T.M., "Why would you give him the whole thing." Tr. Vol. III pp. 48-49.
[¶16] Jones testified that she could not recall her statements from her interview with law enforcement. The State presented the audio recording of the jail phone call between Sanders and Jones in which Sanders told Jones that she could "throw . . . away" her subpoena and testify that she did not remember anything. State's Ex. 131 9/13/21 Call at 4:45. The State argued that Jones' statements from the interview, although hearsay, should be admitted for substantive purposes because Sanders instructed Jones not to testify, and the trial court admitted the statements for substantive purposes.
[¶17] Wiley did not testify; however, Sanders testified in his own defense. According to Sanders, before the shooting, he was at Wiley's house with Wiley, Baker, and two other individuals: Taiquan Page, who went by "Red," and an individual named C.J. The group smoked marijuana and posed with guns. Sanders, Baker, Red, and C.J. left in Sanders' Charger to get food, and Sanders let Red hold one of his guns along the way. As they drove toward downtown, they saw "three dudes walking," and Baker told Sanders to pull over so Baker could talk to one of them. Tr. Vol. V p. 24. Sanders pulled over on Park Avenue, which intersects with McKinley Avenue and Benham Court. Baker, Red, and C.J. exited the car and headed north, and Sanders "pulled forward." Id. at 26. Sanders then heard gunshots and saw the "three dudes running in front of [his] car," one of whom was shooting toward his car. Id. at 28. Sanders then put his head in his lap. Baker, Red, and C.J. returned to the car and instructed Sanders to drive, and Sanders drove to South Bend. Sanders claimed that he had no knowledge of a planned shooting but admitted that he assisted the others in fleeing.
The name is spelled "Taiquan" in the trial court's order but spelled "Tyquan" in the trial transcript.
[¶18] On cross-examination, Sanders acknowledged that Baker, Red, and C.J. had all died before trial. Sanders admitted that he lied to law enforcement during custodial interviews regarding his location at the time of the shooting; that he told law enforcement he was not known as "L.A.," although "some people call [him] that"; and that, following Jones' testimony at trial, Sanders violated the no-contact order by calling Jones nine times. Id. at 68. On rebuttal, the State presented video evidence showing that Red was in a different location during the shooting.
[¶19] On January 23, 2024, the trial court issued a detailed order finding Sanders and Wiley guilty as charged. The trial court found that L.W. "was in a position to see the shooters, identified three shooters, and then changed his story in order to protect his mother and himself." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 114. Accordingly, the trial court credited L.W.'s prior statements identifying Sanders, Wiley, and Baker as the shooters. The trial court further found that Sanders, Wiley, Baker, and C.J. were present together at the scene of the shooting; Sanders and Wiley had "companionship with those at the scene"; that neither Sanders nor Wiley "did anything to oppose or stop the murder"; that Sanders drove with the others to South Bend; and that "the course of conduct of [Sanders and Wiley] before, during, and after the murder of [W.L.] establish[es] that [Sanders and Wiley] acted under accomplice liability in the murder of [W.L.] under Indiana law." Id. at 140.
[¶20] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on February 22, 2024. Sanders' counsel requested that the trial court sentence Sanders to an advisory sentence of fifty-five years; he argued that Sanders admitted to being at the scene of the shooting, to providing a gun, and to assisting the others in fleeing. Sanders gave an allocution statement in which he maintained his innocence but asked W.L.'s family to forgive him "for being irresponsible by letting any and everybody in [his] car for rides and letting any and everybody handle [his] guns." Id. at 195.
[¶21] The trial court sentenced Sanders to sixty-three years in the DOC. The trial court found as mitigators: "[Sanders'] statements, the statements of [Sanders'] counsel," Sanders' age of twenty-two years, and Sanders' addiction issues. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 170. The trial court found the following aggravators: (1) Sanders' criminal and juvenile history; (2) Sanders' Indiana Risk Assessment System ("IRAS") score, which categorized him at a "very high-risk" to reoffend; (3) Sanders' admitted frequent marijuana use; (4) that "other forms of sanctions have proved to be unsuccessful in keeping [Sanders] from engaging in criminal activity" and that Sanders had not taken advantage of "programming or alternative sanctions offered to him in the past"; (5) "the evidence shows [Sanders] and others planned this attack because [Sanders] dropped them off at the corner and then moved his vehicle up to the alley where the murder occurred"; (6) "[Sanders], with others, hunted and chased [W.L.]"; (7) the number of shots fired; (8) Sanders unlawfully possessed a firearm; (9) Sanders and the others "started this attack"; (10) Sanders did not render assistance to W.L.; (11) W.L. was a minor; (12) Sanders and the others shot W.L. as W.L. was running away; (13) Sanders displayed "cavalier" behavior during the trial; and (14) the shooting was "totally senseless ...." Id. at 171172. The trial court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators. Sanders now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficient evidence supports Sanders' conviction for murder as an accomplice.
[¶22] Sanders first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Sufficiency of evidence claims "warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility." Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020) (citing Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1242 (Ind. 1994)). When there are conflicts in the evidence, the fact-finder must resolve them. Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 262 (citing Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)). "We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 263. We affirm the conviction "'unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.'" Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).
[¶23] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-1(1), a person who "knowingly or intentionally kills another human being . . . commits murder." Under our accomplice liability statute, Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-4, however, "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense."
[¶24] Discussing the proof required to demonstrate that a person acted as an accomplice, our Supreme Court has explained:
Generally there is no distinction between the criminal liability of an accomplice and a principal, Wise [v. State], 719 N.E.2d [1192, ]1198 (Ind. 1999), although evidence that the defendant participated in every element of the underlying offense is not necessary to convict a defendant as an accomplice. Vitek v. State, 750 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ind. 2001). "There is no bright line rule in determining accomplice liability; the particular facts and circumstances of each case determine whether a person was an accomplice." Id. at 353. We consider four factors to determine whether a defendant acted as an accomplice: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of crime. That a defendant was present during the commission of a crime and failed to oppose the crime is not sufficient to convict [him or] her. Id. But, "presence at and acquiescence to a crime, along with other facts and circumstances" may be considered. Id. at 352-53.Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012). Additionally, in seeking to convict a defendant as an accomplice, the State need not show that the defendant "'was a party to a preconceived scheme; it must merely demonstrate concerted action or participation in an illegal act.'" Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1003-04 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (quoting Rainey v. State, 572 N.E.2d 517, 518 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991)).
[¶25] Considering the factors listed above, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Sanders' conviction for murder as an accomplice. Sanders admitted that he was present during the shooting, he had companionship with all of the other individuals who could have participated in the shooting, and nothing suggests that Sanders opposed the shooting. Additionally, Sanders' course of conduct before, during, and after the crime suggests culpability. Sanders owned at least two guns, a Glock-17 and a Glock-23, and Sanders was known to have disagreements with people in Elkhart. Approximately one month before the shooting, Sanders threatened W.L. with a gun when Gates, Sanders' and Wiley's friend, stole marijuana from W.L., and W.L. later beat up Gates.
[¶26] Shortly before the shooting, Sanders, Wiley, and Baker posed with guns for a video and then left in Sanders' Charger. Sanders testified that he gave a gun to one of the passengers while he drove, and Sanders pulled over when he and the others saw W.L., L.W., and T.M. L.W. identified Sanders, Wiley, and Baker as the shooters, and an eyewitness testified that the shots were fired from the Charger. The eyewitness described one of the shooters as the person in the driver's seat, which is where Sanders testified he was seated during the shooting.
[¶27] After the shooting, Sanders drove the others in the car to South Bend. He admitted that he was assisting the others in fleeing from the scene. See Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015) (noting that "[e]vidence of flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt"). Cell phone location data placed Sanders, Wiley, and Baker in South Bend hours later. Law enforcement later located the Charger in Elkhart. The Charger had a temporary license plate registered to a different vehicle. When law enforcement attempted to stop the Charger, Sanders fled and crashed, and a spent shell casing was found near the crashed Charger. Id. (noting that "[e]vidence of an attempt to avoid arrest [also] tends to show guilt"). The spent casing was traced to the Glock-17, and law enforcement traced many of the casings from the scene of the shooting to both of Sanders' guns.
[¶28] After he was arrested, Sanders lied to law enforcement regarding his location at the time of the shooting. Sanders also instructed Jones to disregard her subpoena and to testify that she did not remember her statements to law enforcement during her interview. After Jones testified at trial, Sanders attempted to call her numerous times. When Sanders himself testified, he claimed that Red was in the vehicle with him at the time of the shooting; however, the State presented evidence that Red was in another location at the time.
[¶29] Sanders argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that Sanders knew of any plan to shoot W.L. Sanders need not have had knowledge of a plan to shoot W.L. so long as he participated in the crime. Moreover, Sanders requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Sanders' conviction for murder as an accomplice.
II. Sanders' sentence is not inappropriate.
[¶30] Sanders next argues that his sixty-three-year sentence is inappropriate. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to "revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless "overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character." Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; rather, "a strong showing on one prong" may "outweigh a weak showing" on the other prong. Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127.
[¶31] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. "Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case." Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). "Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
[¶32] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Fullerv. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). In the case at hand, Sanders was convicted of murder. "A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years." Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). Sanders was sentenced to sixty-three years in the DOC.
A. The nature of the offense does not warrant revision.
[¶33] Our analysis of the "nature of the offense" requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1182 (Ind. 2020). Here, Sanders assisted in the shooting of a teenage boy. Two other teenagers were also shot at during the exchange, and the evidence showed that the shooters chased the boys down the alley while firing at them. Over twenty-five shots were fired, many of which were fired from guns Sanders owned, and the bullets penetrated several houses in the neighborhood. After the shooting, Sanders fled with the shooters to South Bend.
[¶34] Sanders argues that the nature of the offense here is not as severe as in the murder cases of Martin v. State, 179 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), trans. denied, and Elliot v. State, 152 N.E.3d 27 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied. The defendants in those cases, however, received higher sentences than Sanders; Martin was sentenced to a total sentence of eighty-two years, and Elliot was sentenced to a total sentence of seventy-five years. The nature of the offense does not warrant revision of Sanders' sentence.
B. The character of the offender does not warrant revision.
[¶35] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence vary based on the "gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense." McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). "Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character." Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020).
[¶36] Here, Sanders has a lengthy juvenile and criminal history. Sanders was released from the Indiana Boys' School in February 2021, but he continued to engage in criminal activity. Sanders has juvenile adjudications for burglary, robbery, and theft, and he has criminal convictions for carrying a handgun without a license, resisting law enforcement, possession of marijuana, and leaving the scene of an accident. Additionally, before he was arrested in this case, Sanders endangered the public by leading law enforcement on a chase through Elkhart. Sanders lied to law enforcement regarding his involvement in the case, and he attempted to influence witnesses both before and during the trial. None of this reflects well on Sanders' character.
[¶37] Sanders argues that most of his history consists of juvenile adjudications rather than adult convictions. Sanders' juvenile adjudications, however, include violent offenses. Moreover, the shooting occurred when Sanders was nineteen years old, and he spent much of the time thereafter incarcerated while awaiting trial. His limited criminal history as an adult, thus, does not speak volumes.
[¶38] We conclude that Sanders' character does not warrant revision of his sentence. Because neither the nature of the offense nor the character of the offender warrant revision, we conclude that Sanders' sentence is not inappropriate.
Conclusion
[¶39] Sufficient evidence supports Sanders' conviction, and his sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶40] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.