Opinion
1:22-CV-00355-SPB-RAL
05-31-2024
ORGUNA SANDERS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF ERIE; DANIEL SPIZARNY, CHIEF OF POLICE FOR CITY OF ERIE; SUZANNE C. MACK, DISTRICT MAGISTRATE JUDGE; NICHOLAS A. MASKERY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY; JEREMY C. LIGHTNER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY; K.M. MULLANEY, ERIE POLICE DEPT PTLM; AND JOSEPH SCHEMBER, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF ERIE; Defendants
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
ECF NO. 74
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Orguna Sanders' motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 74) be DENIED.
II. Report
Plaintiff Orguna Sanders, an individual presently incarcerated at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Pine Grove, initiates this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sanders' Amended Complaint asserts constitutional claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and cruel and unusual punishment, as well as a civil rights conspiracy claim, against the City of Erie, Erie Police Chief Daniel Spizamy, District Magistrate Judge Suzanne C. Mack, Assistant District Attorneys (“ADA”) Nicholas A. Maskery and Jeremy C. Lightner, Erie Police Officer K.M. Mullaney, and City of Erie Mayor Joseph Schember. See ECF No. 43. In doing so, he invokes rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See id. Sanders alleges that in October 2021, while he was released on bail, the Defendants filed two criminal charges against him without probable cause and maliciously prosecuted him on those charges, which resulted in a modification to his bail. In turn, he alleges, he was unlawfully detained because he was unable to pay his increased bail amount. Sanders seeks injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief.
Pending before the Court is Sanders' motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). In his TRO, Sanders avers that “the Commonwealth is using [this civil action] against [him] in his direct appeal” of his criminal charges, in “violation of [his] rights” under “the [Fifth] and [Fourteenth] Amendments.” ECF No. 74, ¶¶ 1,3. He contends that the Commonwealth is subjecting him to “Double Jeopardy” because it “is still saying [he] had East High Middle School locked down for two hours” even though he “was acquitted of all charges from case 3152-2021.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 5, 4 (cleaned up). He argues that the Commonwealth has unlawfully consolidated criminal case 3152-2021 with criminal case 3050-2021, and “is not using facts in their brief.” Id. ¶ 9. He adds that his public defender, Atty. Tina Fryling, “is ineffective,” and “ADA Michael E. Bums step[ped] outside of his job scope, subject to ‘ 1983 lawsuit.'” Id. ¶¶ 2, 9. For relief, he seeks a “[TRO] or an injunction ordering the removal of the fraudulent brief filed by the Commonwealth.” Id.
Sanders appended this brief to his TRO. See ECF No. 74-1.
A. Standard of Review
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. Ill. 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”
The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Sanders bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). He must allege facts and produce evidence that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). The grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Finally, “where an individual seeks ‘immediate or more speedy release,”' as Sanders seeks here, he is “asserting a remedy available through a habeas [corpus] petition,” rather than an action pursuant to §1983. Jose M. C. v. Tsoukaris, 467 F.Supp.3d 213, 221 (D.N.J. 2020) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); Camacho Lopez v. Lowe, 452 F.Supp.3d 150, 158 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2020)).
B. Discussion
Sanders' motion for emergency injunctive relief satisfies none of the requirements for issuance of a TRO and is facially frivolous. As an initial matter, Sanders cannot obtain injunctive relief against the Commonwealth because a State “is not a ‘person' subject to suit under section 1983,” Whiteford v. Penn Hills Municipality, 323 Fed.Appx. 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1989) (states or governmental entities that are “arms of the State” are not “persons” for purposes of section 1983)), or against Attorneys Fryling and Burns because neither is a party to this case, Pryor v. Harper, 2021 WL 3563372, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2021) (citing McLaughlin v. Zavada, 2019 WL 5697347, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2019) (citing Victor v. SCI Smithfield, 2011 WL 6003923, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011) (“pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), non-parties to litigation cannot be bound by injunctions unless they have been found to be acting ‘in active concert or participation' with the party against whom injunctive relief is sought”))). The Court therefore cannot direct Atty. Bums, or any other counsel for the Commonwealth, to withdraw their brief.
Sanders also fails to plead a sufficient connection between the claims and actions set forth in his TRO and his underlying Complaint. He does not elaborate upon his contention that “the Commonwealth is using [this action] against [him] in his direct appeal,” and the relief he seeks concerns a criminal case brought against him after he initiated this action. ECF No. 74, ¶ 1. “As such, there are no underlying claims brought in this action that might for the basis for the relief that [Sanders] seeks.” McLaughlin, 2019 WL 5697347, at *2. See Brathwaite v. Phelps, 602 Fed.Appx. 847, 849 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)) (“Because the preliminary injunction motion dealt with claims and actions by prison employees unrelated to the suit at that time, the District Court appropriately held that Brathwaite could not establish any right to injunctive relief.”). For these reasons, Sanders' request for relief should be denied.
Even if Sanders' TRO survived these procedural and substantive hurdles, he has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to an emergency injunction. Sanders ask the Court to intervene in his state court criminal proceedings. However, the TRO is devoid of factual allegations to support any conceivable claim of irreparable harm absent emergency injunctive relief. “It is well established that it is improper for federal courts to interfere in state criminal proceedings absent a showing of irreparable injury which is clear and imminent.” Roy v. Jones, 349 F.Supp. 315, 324 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (citing Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 L.S. 157 (1943) (additional citations omitted)), aff'd, 484 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1973). See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (discussing “some of the reasons why it has been perfectly natural for [the Supreme Court's] cases to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not issue such injunctions.”). Sanders' failure to plausibly plead an imminent injury therefore forecloses the Court from granting his TRO.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Sanders' motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 74) should be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).