Opinion
C. A. 2:23-04976-RMG-MHC
01-25-2024
Chief Silver Sanders, Plaintiff, v. City of Charleston, The Probate Court, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MOLLY H. CHERRY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff Chief Silver Sanders, a pro se litigant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. In an Order entered December 5, 2023, Plaintiff was directed to file certain documents to bring his case into proper form. Plaintiff has not filed the documents necessary to bring his case into proper form. On January 8, 2024, he filed documents that do not appear to be relevant to this case. ECF No. 9.
Specifically, he filed an unsigned statement that “[t]hey don't want bring the mail to my house[,]” a United States Postal Service Authorization to Hold Mail form that was partially completed by Bobby J. Sanders, and a letter to Bobby J. Sanders from the Social Security Administration dated November 26, 2023. ECF Nos. 9, 9-1.
I. BACKGROUND
In his unsigned Complaint, Plaintiff's entire statement of his claim is that “[t]he City of Charleston ha[s] no right to order a[n] executive chief on his reservation.” ECF No. 1 at 5. For relief he requests “[a] court order not to harass Chief Silver at 12 Gordon St[.] and to keep the executive order of the Chief on this Reservation.” Id.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is before the Court for pre-service review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (pleadings by non- prisoners should also be screened). Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint herein pursuant to the procedural provisions of § 1915, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
Section 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without paying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. However, to protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolousness can be made where the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 31. Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327.
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
It is recommended that this action be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Even if there is jurisdiction, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Plaintiff has also failed to bring his case into proper form.
A. Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a district court is charged with ensuring that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction. In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). The Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal without service of process because it fails to state a claim which this Court may consider under its federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or its diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
In response to a question on the Complaint form asking Plaintiff what his basis is for federal court jurisdiction (federal question and/or diversity of citizenship), he did not check either box. ECF No. 1 at 3. In response to a question asking him to list the specific federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or provisions of the United States Constitution that are at issue in the case if his basis for jurisdiction is federal question, Plaintiff wrote that “[t]he City Shood Not Order Executive Order on Indian Reservation Public Land laws of United States They do not have the Right.” Id. at 4 (errors in original). Even if Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims against state or local officials or entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983), he fails to name any federal constitutional, federal treaty, or federal statutory right he believes was violated and thus this court lacks jurisdiction over his claims.
Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012).
Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts to indicate that there is federal court jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction. A district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States...” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). Here, Plaintiff and Defendants all appear to be citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 1 at 4.
B. Failure to State a Claim/Frivolous Claims
Even if Plaintiff can establish jurisdiction, this action is also subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendants. The Complaint is fairly characterized as being composed of what some courts have described as “buzz words” or “legalistic gibberish.” See, e.g., Rochester v. McKie, No. 8:11-CV-0797-JMC-JDA, 2011 WL 2671306 (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2671228 (D.S.C. July 8, 2011). As such, a substantial portion of Plaintiff's allegations are so generally incomprehensible or filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, and unsupported comments or “gibberish,” that it is unclear what is to be made of them. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); see also Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434 (2nd Cir. 1998); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of prisoner's suit as frivolous where allegations were conclusory and nonsensical on their face).
Additionally, in his Complaint, Plaintiff fails to provide any specific factual information to support a claim that the named Defendants violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, in order to avoid dismissal, “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Although the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain” statement of the claim, a plaintiff must “offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff's complaint which “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
Additionally, Defendant City of Charleston is subject to summary dismissal to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring a claim against it based on a respondeat superior theory. A local governmental unit cannot be sued on such a theory for the alleged unconstitutional acts of their employees. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish municipal liability which requires that a plaintiff plausibly allege that the county's policies caused the alleged constitutional violation. McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997). A municipality is responsible only when the execution of its policy or custom, made by its lawmakers or individuals whose acts “may fairly be said to represent official policy[,]” inflicts injury. Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); Spell v. McDaniel 824, 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987). When the alleged constitutional deprivation is not an act of a municipality, relief under § 1983 must be sought against the officer in his individual capacity. Hughes v. Blankenship, 672 F.2d 405, 405-06 (4th Cir. 1982). Here, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant City of Charleston are subject to summary dismissal because he has merely made conclusory statements about this entity and has not identified any governmental policy or custom to demonstrate municipal liability.
Defendant the Probate Court is also subject to summary dismissal because it is a department, facility, or building and courts have routinely held that an inanimate object (such as a building, facility, and grounds) does not act under color of state law and is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison not “person[s]” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C. A. No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (Finding that a detention center, as a building and not a person, was not amenable to suit under § 1983); Chieves v. Richland Prob. Ct. Commitment Div., No. 623CV04195JFAKFM, 2023 WL 8703474 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8702741 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2023) (State of South Carolina Richland Probate Court Commitment Division not a “person” for purposes of § 1983); Ladd v. Clarence Mitchell Courthouse, No. CV CCB-20-0491, 2020 WL 6322606 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2020) (Clarence Mitchell Courthouse not subject to suit under § 1983 because it is not a person acting under color of state law).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) he or she suffered a deprivation of “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States; and (2) the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, at 48 (1988); see also Loftus v. Bobzien, 848 F.3d 278, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2017).
C. State Law Claims
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff may be attempting to bring state law claims, such claims should be dismissed. As Plaintiff fails to state any federal claim, only the state law claims would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. As Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, any state law claims are subject to summary dismissal as this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants”).
D. Failure to Get Case Into Proper Form
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to bring this case into proper form. In the Proper Form Order, Plaintiff was directed to bring his case into proper form by providing certain documents (a signed Complaint, a fully completed Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (Form AO-240) or payment of the filing fee, a summons form listing Defendants, a signed and completed Form USM-285 form for each Defendant, and a fully completed and signed pro se party's answers to Local Civil Rule 26.01 (D.S.C.) interrogatories form). ECF No. 6.
Plaintiff failed to provide the necessary documents to bring his case into proper form. The time for Plaintiff to bring this case into proper form has passed, and he has failed to provide all of the required proper form documents. Plaintiff was specifically warned (ECF No. 6) that the failure to provide the necessary information within the timetable set forth in the Order would subject the case to dismissal. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. Thus, in the alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. See Link v. Wabash Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holdin district court's dismissal following an explicit and reasonable warning was not an abu discretion).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action wi prejudice, without leave to amend,4 and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.