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Sanchez v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eleventh District, Eastland
Sep 9, 2004
No. 11-03-00276-CR (Tex. App. Sep. 9, 2004)

Opinion

No. 11-03-00276-CR

Opinion September 9, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(B).

Appeal from Taylor County.

Panel consists of: ARNOT, C.J., and WRIGHT, J., and McCALL, J.


OPINION


After a bench trial, Shirley Campbell Sanchez was convicted of possession with intent to deliver morphine in the amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. The trial court found the two enhancement paragraphs to be true and assessed punishment at 25 years confinement. Appellant argues in two issues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that she had possession of the morphine. We affirm.

Standard of Review

In reviewing claims of legal insufficiency, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000). In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting guilt is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the evidence contrary to the verdict is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof could not have been met. Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, 2004 WL 840786 (Tex.Cr.App. April 21, 2004) ; Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618 (Tex.Cr.App. 2004); Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996). The trial court, as the trier of fact, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995).

Background Facts

Officer Susan Belver, a narcotics investigator with the Abilene Police Department, testified that she purchased some morphine from a woman named Charlie Redrick at 242 Chapel Hill Road in Abilene. After making the initial controlled drug purchase, Officer Belver obtained a search warrant to search the Chapel Hill residence. Before the search warrant could be executed, Redrick contacted Officer Belver (who was using a pseudonym), stating that she had an additional 70 morphine pills to sell. Officer Belver returned to the residence and purchased an additional 50 morphine pills for $300. Redrick poured out the pills from an amber prescription bottle that had its label scratched off; Redrick put the remaining 20 pills back in the bottle. After Officer Belver left the second time, Redrick again contacted Officer Belver's pager. When Officer Belver telephoned Redrick back, Officer Belver could hear Redrick talking to another female in the background. Redrick told Officer Belver that she also had some Soma pills for sale at $4 each. While Officer Belver was making the purchases, members of the Abilene narcotics investigation team had the residence under surveillance. Shortly after the second drug purchase, the narcotics investigation team executed the search warrant. One of the officers testified that, when they executed the search warrant, Redrick was in the west bedroom, and appellant was in the living room. Appellant's purse was found in the living room area; it contained the amber prescription bottle with its label scratched off and $250 of the marked purchase money that Officer Belver had used to buy the morphine. The bottle contained 20 morphine pills. The purse also contained prescriptions in appellant's name, prescription bottles with her name, and a Bank America notebook with her name in it. Appellant admitted that it was her purse but testified that her sister (Redrick) had given the money to her to go to the grocery store and that she had never seen the prescription bottle. Appellant stated that 242 Chapel Hill Road had been her mother's house and that appellant lived at 2029 North 20th Street. Appellant denied that she had ever had morphine in her possession but stated that she did take Lortab and Soma for her injured arm. Officer Belver was recalled to the stand and testified that the drug buy was to have originally been at 2029 North 20th Street, but that Redrick had changed it to 242 Chapel Hill Road. Officer Tommy Pope, an Abilene police officer, testified that he was a member of the surveillance team that had watched the residence from before the time when Officer Belver made her first purchase. The team saw no one leave the residence and only one car arrive at the residence. Some children came out of the residence to talk with the person in the car, but the person in the car did not go into the residence. Appellant testified that the surveillance team had to have been mistaken because she had driven up to the front of the house and then went inside with her grand baby. Appellant claimed that she did not see Officer Belver in the house with Redrick.

Evidence Was Sufficient to Affirmatively Link Appellant to the Morphine

In cases involving unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that the accused exercised care, custody, control, or management over the substance and that the accused knew that the matter possessed was contraband Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d 384 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988); King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995). The "intent to deliver" element may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such as the quantity of drugs possessed, the manner of pack-aging, and the presence of the accused on the premises. Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet'n). When the accused is not shown to have had exclusive possession of the place where the contraband was found, the evidence must affirmatively link the accused to the contraband Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 745-48 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995). The link need not be so strong that it excludes every other outstanding reasonable hypothesis except the defendant's guilt. Brown v. State, supra at 748. Courts have considered various factors in determining whether evidence affirmatively links an accused to contraband, including (1) whether the accused was present at the time of the search; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view or was recovered from an enclosed place; (3) whether the accused was the owner of the premises or had the right to possess the place where the con-traband was found; (4) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash; (5) whether the contraband was conveniently accessible to the accused; (6) whether the accused possessed other contraband when arrested; (7) whether the accused had a special connection to the contraband; and (8) the quantity of the contraband See Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 740-41 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet'n); Villegas v. State, 871 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet'n ref'd). The number of factors present is of less importance than the "logical force" or the degree to which the factors, alone or in combination, tend to affirmatively link the accused to the contraband Hurtado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet'n ref'd). Officer Belver testified that Redrick said that she had 70 morphine pills; that Redrick poured out the pills from an amber prescription bottle that had its label scratched off; that Redrick put the extra 20 morphine pills back into the prescription bottle; that she heard another female in the background when Redrick told her that Redrick had some Soma pills for sale; and that the original place for the drug buy was to have been 2029 North 20th Street. Another officer testified that appellant's purse was found near her; that the purse contained the prescription bottle with the label scratched off; that the bottle contained 20 morphine pills; that the purse contained other prescriptions and bottles in appellant's name; and that the purse contained marked bills that had been used in Officer Belver's drug buy from Redrick. The evidence also indicated that appellant was in the Chapel Hill residence during or near the time when Officer Belver purchased the morphine. Appellant admitted that the purse was hers; that she did take Soma for her injured hand; that she lived at 2029 North 20th Street; and that 242 Chapel Hill Road had been her mother's house. The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to affirmatively link appellant to the mor-phine. Appellant's issues are overruled.

This Court's Ruling

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.


Summaries of

Sanchez v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eleventh District, Eastland
Sep 9, 2004
No. 11-03-00276-CR (Tex. App. Sep. 9, 2004)
Case details for

Sanchez v. State

Case Details

Full title:SHIRLEY CAMPBELL SANCHEZ Appellant, v. STATE OF TEXAS Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Eleventh District, Eastland

Date published: Sep 9, 2004

Citations

No. 11-03-00276-CR (Tex. App. Sep. 9, 2004)