Opinion
No. 10-17-00147-CR
08-28-2019
Francisco Martinez SANCHEZ, Jr., Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
In one issue, Appellant Francisco Martinez Sanchez, Jr. challenges the punishment assessed in connection with his conviction for three separate felony offenses: (1) burglary of a vehicle; and (2) two counts of theft of less than $2,500. Sanchez additionally entered pleas of "true" to two enhancements. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years on each count, to be served concurrently.
Sanchez argues that $133.00 of the costs assessed against him should be vacated because the statute under which they were imposed has been held unconstitutional by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Salinas v. State , 523 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Specifically, Sanchez challenges those portions of the costs that were assessed under §§ 133.102(e)(1) and (e)(6) of the Local Government Code that relate to "abused children's counseling" and "comprehensive rehabilitation." TEX. LOC. GOV. CODE ANN. §§ 133.102(e)(1) and (e)(6). The State concedes error, noting that these sections have been declared unconstitutional by Salinas . The State argues, however, that Salinas does not apply to Sanchez because the Court of Criminal Appeals directed that it have only limited retroactive effect.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held in Salinas :
[W]e will also apply our constitutional holding in this case to any defendant who has raised the appropriate claim in a petition for discretionary review before the date of this opinion, if that petition is still pending on the date of this opinion and if the claim would otherwise be properly before us on discretionary review. Otherwise, our holding will apply prospectively to trials that end after the date the mandate in the present case issues.
Salinas , 523 S.W.3d at 113. Mandate issued in Salinas on June 30, 2017. See Salinas v. State , No. PD-0170-16 (Tex. Crim. App. June 30, 2017) (mandate).
Sanchez's sentences were imposed on April 13, 2017, and the judgments were signed by the presiding judge on April 26, 2017. The bill of costs that imposed the challenged $133.00 fee was filed on April 28, 2017.
Because no petition for discretionary review is pending on Sanchez's claim and the proceedings in the trial court ended prior to issuance of the mandate in Salinas , the court's holding in that case does not apply. See also Hawkins v. State , 551 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref'd) ; Hernandez-Valdez v. State , No. 12-17-00136-CR, 2018 WL 1324800 at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); James v. State , No. 05-16-01313-CR, 2017 WL 4944877, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Love v. State , No. 08-17-00030-CR, 2017 WL 4675614, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 18, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Garrett v. State , No. 03-17-00030-CR, 2017 WL 3897270, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Austin v. State , No. 06-16-00135-CR, 2017 WL 2265679, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 24, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Sanchez argues that we reject the holding in Salinas regarding retroactivity. However, as an intermediate court, we must follow the majority holding in that case. Villarreal v. State , 504 S.W.3d 494, 509 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, pet. ref'd) ; see also Gonzales v. State , 190 S.W.3d 125, 130 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd).
We overrule Sanchez's sole issue and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting with opinion)
DISSENTING OPINION
TOM GRAY, Chief Justice
The Constitution has not been changed. Sanchez briefed the issue. The State concedes the fees are unconstitutional. In holding that the fees are unconstitutional in Salinas v. State , 523 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the retroactive application of the holding. Id. at 113. The discussion about retroactive application is dicta because it was not necessary to the disposition of the proceeding before it. See Tong v. State , 25 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that a conclusion not necessary to the holding of a case is dicta); State v. Brabson , 976 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (referring to dicta as "unnecessary to [the Court's] ultimate disposition of" the case). See also Ford v. State , 334 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding "[t]he court of appeals erred to rely on dicta in ..." when reversing a Waco court opinion). Moreover, as written, it seems to have been contemplated as being applicable to judgments that were otherwise final and whether this was the type error that could be attacked collaterally, not to those judgments that were subject to direct appeal.
Regardless, Sanchez is entitled to relief in this proceeding. The cost are a violation of the separation of powers, and Sanchez has properly placed that issue before us in this proceeding. See Salinas v. State , 523 S.W.3d 103, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
Because the Court affirms the assessment of unconstitutional court cost against Sanchez, I respectfully dissent.