Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TC 021556, Josh M. Fredricks, Judge.
Jose V. Sanchez and Maria F. Sanchez, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Venable, Rebecca M. Aragon and Justin J. Lowe, for Defendants and Respondents.
FLIER, J.
Appellants Jose V. and Maria F. Sanchez, husband and wife, have appeared throughout in propria persona. The trial court dismissed their case for failure to prosecute. They appeal from that order, as well as two other orders set forth below. We conclude that none of the orders is appealable and we therefore dismiss the appeal.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 7, 2007, appellants filed a complaint for wrongful eviction and other torts against PHDC, Inc., Cherna Moskowitz, Myron Meyers, Paramount Housing Partnership, Patty Licon and Teresa Torres; we will refer to these parties collectively as the respondents, with the exception of Teresa Torres, who is not a party to this appeal. Respondents’ counsel has informed us that Teresa Torres died some time ago.
A routine notice emanating from our clerk’s office on May 29, 2008, to Torres was returned to us with the handwritten note “deceased.”
The complaint addresses various disputes arising between appellants as renters and the respondents who, broadly put, were on the other side of the rental relationship.
On January 9, 2008, respondents moved to quash the service of the summons and complaint. This motion was granted on February 4, 2008. Written notice of this ruling was given on February 15, 2008. No appeal was taken from this order.
There were five hearings between February 4, 2008, and May 19, 2008, when the case was dismissed.
On February 4, 2008, Attorney Paul Opel stated that he was going to be retained by appellants in this case. The trial court stated that the tentative ruling was to grant the motion to quash. After a short exchange, which also involved appellant Jose Sanchez, the court stated that the tentative would be the ruling of the court. The court advised Attorney Opel to serve the respondents and that there would be an order to show cause re a dismissal set for April 1, 2008.
On March 3, 2008, there was a hearing on a demurrer that had been brought by Teresa Torres. The tentative was to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. Torres was present and appeared in propria persona. Attorney Opel was also present. Opel stated that he was trying to resolve the case. As before, however, he stated that he had not been retained by appellants. After a very confusing hearing, which included the enlistment of respondent Licon as an interpreter because Torres could not speak English, the hearing ended with the tentative ruling becoming the ruling of the court. There was no appearance for respondents.
On June 12, 2009, respondents’ counsel filed with us an application for an extension of time to file a brief on behalf of the estate of Teresa Torres. We granted that request but no brief was ever filed on behalf of the estate. Because, as we discuss below, we dismiss the appeal taken from the order sustaining the demurrer, there is no need to file a brief for the estate.
The case was called on April 1, 2008, but there were no appearances for any of the parties. The court set a hearing for April 21, 2008, re a dismissal and for monetary sanctions.
On April 21, 2008, appellants appeared personally and in propria persona and with an interpreter. Appellant Jose Sanchez stated that they had no lawyer. The court stated that “Teresa Torres on 3/3 had a demurrer which was sustained without leave to amend.” The court explained that the motion to quash had been granted and that the case was now five months old without any action by appellants. “So today is the day for me to dismiss the case unless there’s something you can tell me. [¶] What efforts have you been making to prosecute your case?”
The following points emerged in the ensuing confusing exchange between the court and appellant Jose Sanchez. (1) Appellants believed that the attorneys they had approached to represent them were in league with respondents’ counsel. (2) Appellants were being sabotaged (their choice of words) by respondents’ counsel and the lawyers that appellants had approached. (3) All these lawyers had been privately meeting. (4) The lawyers were manipulating the system. (5) On March 27, 2008, appellants wrote a letter to the court that contained the foregoing four points. We have reduced these strange assertions into an understandable format; appellant Jose Sanchez’s actual remarks, delivered through the interpreter, were far from clear.
The court stated that it would continue the matter for 30 days “and if you don’t have an attorney and you have not moved this case along, I’m going to dismiss it.” The court went on to explain that if appellants did not retain an attorney, “that’s not fatal to the case. But if you haven’t moved it along, that will be fatal to the case.” Appellant Sanchez’s rejoinder to this was: “Your Honor, they’re manipulating the system.”
Appellants appeared in propria persona on May 19, 2008, and without an interpreter. Appellant Jose Sanchez stated: “I need it now offer for 7 million. This complaint finished maybe in the future or couple weeks.” The gist of the matter appears to have been that appellants were willing to dismiss the case if they were paid $7 million by respondents. Mr. Sanchez also stated repeatedly that the lawyers were manipulating the system. After repeatedly running up against the brick wall of these assertions, which were completely unresponsive to the court’s concerns, the trial court reviewed the history of the case that we have reproduced above and then dismissed the case without prejudice on May 19, 2008, because appellants had failed to prosecute the action. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on May 28, 2008.
Respondents represent in their brief that in order to save themselves the time and expense of this appeal, they voluntarily agreed to accept service of the summons and complaint on March 23, 2009. Respondents state that appellants need only to refile their complaint but that they refuse to do so and insist instead on proceeding with this appeal.
Appellants propound three contentions in their opening brief. They are: (1) The trial court erred in granting the motion to quash. (2) The trial court erred in sustaining the Teresa Torres’s demurrer. (3) Appellants were denied their right to a fair hearing.
DISCUSSION
1. The Oder Granting the Motion to Quash
We have no reason to doubt respondents’ representation that they have accepted service of process. As appellants should understand, this means that it is pointless for them to pursue the contention that the court erred in granting the motion to quash. The only reason that that motion was brought was that respondents had not been served properly. They now state that they have been served properly.
It is also true that there was no appeal from the order granting the motion to quash, which was an appealable order. (Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1248.) Appellants cannot raise in an appeal from the order of dismissal of May 19, 2008, the matter of the order granting the motion to quash, which should have been raised in an appeal from that order. (Ibid.) To the extent that they seek to appeal the order granting the motion to quash by means of their notice of appeal filed on May 28, 2008, the appeal from the order granting the motion to quash is dismissed as untimely. A notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days from the date that notice was given of the order granting the motion to quash (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)), which was February 15, 2008.
2. The Order Sustaining the Demurrer by Teresa Torres
Teresa Torres was named as a defendant on the causes of action for defamation and for infliction of emotional distress. Her demurrer, filed in propria persona, was filed on January 18, 2008. As noted, it was sustained without leave to amend on March 3, 2008.
Although this was the end of appellants’ action as far as Teresa Torres was concerned, the record does not contain a judgment in favor of Torres. In fact, the record only contains the minute order of May 19, 2008, dismissing the action without prejudice. But a minute order is not appealable. While a dismissal without prejudice is appealable, in order for such an order to be appealable, there must be a written order signed by the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d.) There is no such order in the record.
An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not an appealable order. (Lavine v. Jessup (1957) 48 Cal.2d 611, 613.) The appeal must be taken from the judgment that is entered after the order sustaining the demurrer has been entered. (Ibid.)
The purported appeal from the order sustaining Torres’s demurrer without leave to amend must be dismissed.
3. The Order of Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute
In addition to stating at the conclusion of the hearing of May 19, 2008, that the case was dismissed, there is an unsigned minute order in the record to the same effect. But “an unsigned minute order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is not an appealable order.” (In re Marriage of Macfarlane & Lang (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 247, 253, fn. 4.) An order of dismissal is appealable only if it is in writing, signed by the judge and filed in the action. (Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 326, 328, fn. 1; see generally Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 2:136, p. 2-72.2.) None of these requirements is met in this case.
Although we dismiss the appeal from the order of dismissal, we note with strong disapproval appellants’ claim that the trial court “falsely and corruptly” informed appellants that their case was failing because they had no lawyer. The record amply demonstrates that the trial court did nothing of the sort (the court stated the exact opposite), and over a course of five hearings made difficult by appellants’ intractability, it showed great patience and forbearance toward appellants.
DISPOSITION
The purported appeals from the order granting the motion to quash, the order sustaining Teresa Torres’s demurrer and the order dismissing the action are dismissed. Respondents are to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: RUBIN, Acting P. J. BIGELOW, J.