Opinion
D073731
07-16-2018
In re ISAIAH J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TYLER V. et al., Defendants and Respondents; ISAIAH J., Appellant.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant, a minor. Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Tyler V. Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Kristy J. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SJ13283) Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J. Popkins, Judge. Affirmed. Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant, a minor. Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Tyler V. Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Kristy J. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Isaiah J. seeks review of an order extending reunification services for his father Tyler V. (Father) to the 24-month review date. Isaiah contends the juvenile court had no authority to extend reunification services under the circumstances, and there was no substantial evidence to support the required findings. Father and the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) maintain the ruling was not in error, and Isaiah's mother, Kristy J. (Mother), joins in Father's arguments. We reject Isaiah's arguments and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Background
Isaiah was born in July 2016. He tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, and Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The Agency filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) on Isaiah's behalf, noting the drug test results, Mother's history of drug use, and her lack of interaction with Isaiah. Isaiah was placed in the foster home of S.K.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Mother alleged Father was Isaiah's father. It appears Father was married with other children at the time. The Agency tried to contact him, but he did not come forward. Father was incarcerated in September 2016, and social worker Lovelette de la Cruz visited him in jail. He denied having a child with Mother.
In March 2017, the juvenile court terminated Mother's reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The Agency notified Father. He asked for paternity testing and said if he was the biological father, he would like to see if he could get custody. He was released from jail in May 2017, and placed in the CRASH short-term residential treatment program. On June 5, a social worker informed him that he was Isaiah's father, and he said he wanted to try to get custody. On June 8, he requested visitation. The court ordered supervised visitation, and Father and Isaiah began weekly visits, which appeared to be positive.
The Agency recommended termination of parental rights. In the Agency's section 366.26 report, it noted Father had an extensive substance abuse and criminal history. Father petitioned under section 388 for reunification services. The juvenile court found him to be Isaiah's presumed father and set a combined hearing in September 2017. The court granted Father's section 388 petition and found the section 366.26 hearing moot. The court set an 18-month review hearing for January 23, 2018.
Isaiah appealed from the order granting Father's section 388 petition. (In re Isaiah J. (Apr. 5, 2018, D072959 [nonpub. opn].) While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court proceeded with the 18-month review hearing and entered the order at issue here. On April 5, 2018, this court reversed the order granting Father's section 388 petition, and remanded to the juvenile court with directions to consider the child's best interests in view of current circumstances. The remittitur issued on June 6, 2018, and we subsequently asked the parties for input as to what action was taken by the juvenile court in response to the above directions. This court became aware that the juvenile court vacated the 24-month review hearing set for July 24, 2018, set a contested section 388 hearing for that date, and was possibly contemplating a trailing 24-month review. We ordered the juvenile court to hold the 24-month review hearing immediately following the contested section 388 hearing, unless the 24-month review was rendered moot by the outcome of the section 388 hearing.
II. 18-Month Review Hearing
In January 2018, social worker de la Cruz prepared the Agency's 18-month review report. The report stated Father "was court-ordered to participate and show progress in the following," and described his participation in CRASH, the Lighthouse Community, and a confidential drug treatment facility (which the record elsewhere reflects was New Connections). Father was at CRASH from May 2017 to September 2017, and was discharged for using a personal telephone to make a call at work and not admitting to it. He was at the Lighthouse Community for a temporary placement from September 2017 to November 2017, and then moved to New Connections. He received services (including therapy and parenting class), attended NA and AA meetings, and was randomly tested. The treatment program took three months, and he hoped to complete it by February 2018, after which he would transfer to a sober living home. Father had also started working in November.
Father briefly returned to custody following his noncompliance at CRASH.
The report also addressed visitation, indicating that after Father learned he was Isaiah's father, he requested and began visitation in June 2017. He continued to have supervised weekly visits. He played well with Isaiah, changed his diaper, and talked to him. Isaiah seemed to enjoy the visits.
The Agency did not recommend placement with Father. Although he had "shown some progress" at his current facility, it was unknown how he would do outside a structured environment. The Agency also found Isaiah needed stability, and his foster mother S.K. (who was willing to adopt) was able to provide it and meet his needs. The Agency recommended that it was in Isaiah's best interests to remain in foster care, and for the court to terminate services for Father and set a section 366.26 hearing.
At the 18-month review hearing on January 23, 2018, county counsel indicated the Agency was changing its recommendation, and requested two weeks to submit it. Counsel stated, "it appears that [Father] does qualify for services to the 24-month date," because "he is currently enrolled in a residential substance abuse treatment program."
According to a February addendum report, Father's drug tests had been negative, and he was tentatively scheduled to complete residential treatment on February 9 and transition to a sober living facility. The Agency found, among other things, that Father had "made strides in complying with the conditions of his probation"; had been "visiting Isaiah regularly"; and started a new job. It was "looking forward to assisting the father in services that would benefit him in caring for Isaiah . . . ."
At the continued 18-month review hearing on February 5, the Agency confirmed its recommendation to continue services, and Isaiah's counsel requested a contested hearing. The juvenile court set the trial for March 15.
The Agency provided addendum reports in March. Father completed residential substance abuse treatment on February 8 and entered sober living. He moved to another facility, where a mental health services provider, Exodus, would pay his rent. He did not know if he could have Isaiah for overnight visits, because he shared a room. Father was learning budgeting and other skills at Exodus, and was participating in therapy. He also had a 12-step sponsor, R.C., and attended NA meetings three to five times per week. Father was terminated from his job in February due to a probation related scheduling issue, but started a new part-time job in late February. He attended job coach classes on the other weekdays.
In late January, the New Alternatives Family Visitation Center (Visitation Center) informed de la Cruz that Father requested Saturday visits. Father explained to her that he was unable to visit on Wednesdays because of work and other obligations. De la Cruz told him to call the Visitation Center and request a new schedule. The Visitation Center reported some February visits were cancelled due to Father's work schedule, and one was a no-show. Visits in January and February were also missed because the caregiver was out of town and Isaiah was sick. In March, the Visitation Center informed de la Cruz that the caregiver did not agree to weekend visits because she runs errands on Saturday. De la Cruz proposed doing both parents' visits on Saturday, so the caregiver could do errands during them, but she would not agree. Father and the caregiver later agreed to Thursday visits.
The Agency continued to recommend that Father receive reunification services through the 24-month date. It found he had "shown his commitment to reunification by complying with the Agency and probation."
On March 15, the contested 18-month review hearing was held. Father, his sponsor, R.C., and social worker de la Cruz testified. Father first discussed his treatment programs, AA and NA attendance, and his sponsor. He testified he had not tested positive for drugs since August 2016.
The juvenile court admitted Agency reports from January to March 2018 into evidence. Isaiah's counsel requested that all reports be entered, contending the court had to "consider the entire case . . . ." The court denied the request, explaining it already ruled that Father deserved services (notwithstanding his early lack of involvement) and would evaluate him on his performance since he became involved. We note the parties reference other reports in their briefing. They are part of the background of this case, we consider them for that purpose and, given the evidence entered at the hearing, the result would not differ if we did not do so.
Father then addressed work. He had been let go from his prior job because they could not work with his schedule. He was working three days a week at CEO, a copartnership with Caltrans, picking up trash on the side of freeways and cleaning up homeless camps. On the other weekdays he met with a job coach and filled out applications (explaining "[it]'s transitioning to a better job"). He intended to keep working.
When asked about steps he had taken to secure his own housing, Father said he had been "looking for places, calling programs that would be able to help out." A program called Just in Time might be able to help with furnishings. For childcare, he had done some research with the YMCA and Boys and Girls Club. He took public transportation, but he had passed his written driving test, R.C. said he could use his vehicle (i.e., for the road test), and he had the goal of having his own vehicle within six months.
With respect to visitation, Father testified he "tried to do it every week," but had not seen Isaiah since the end of January. He said he notified the Agency that he was going to be starting work, and they were going to let him know what schedule they had for him. He asked for visitation for certain days, but they were not open or available, and for weekends, "they've said that would affect the mother's schedule with her errands." When asked about missed visits in February, Father testified he did not have visitation scheduled. He then acknowledged he was aware that the Visitation Center had a slot available, but indicated he never received confirmation for a day and time.
R.C. then testified. He had been Father's sponsor for about four months. He confirmed that he was willing to lend Father his vehicle so he could take a driving test. When asked about Father's dedication to sobriety, R.C. stated, "he has done above and beyond everything that I've ever asked of him."
Finally, de la Cruz testified. She changed her recommendation to continuing services "[b]ased on [Father's] regular visits . . . and also how he progressed . . . at his program." She acknowledged he had not visited Isaiah in nearly two months, and when asked if she would consider that regular visitation, said, "I guess not." She was then asked if this concerned her, and she cited the conflict with Father's work schedule. She testified Father had not asked why he was not having visits, but agreed she "put [the burden] on" him to follow up on rescheduling and the Wednesday schedule stayed in place even though he indicated he could not attend. She also agreed it was safe to say that, in February, Father, the Visitation Center, and the foster parent were trying to figure out a day that worked. She would like to see three to four supervised visits (with no missed visits, and to see how he is doing), before moving to unsupervised visits.
De la Cruz also testified that Father could not have Isaiah with him at the sober living home, because he lived with other men. She provided housing referrals and his goal was to get out of the sober living home. She had no reason to believe he would not be able to follow through.
The juvenile court issued its ruling. With respect to whether Father was in a court-ordered residential treatment program, the court stated that he "was still in the residential treatment program at the time [this case] should have gone to trial and due to the delays in the trial, he shouldn't be punished for that."
The court then addressed visitation. It noted Father initially did not believe he was the father (and was married to someone else at the time), but had a paternity test, and once the test showed he was Isaiah's father, he "immediately requested visitation." The court stated, "[t]he visits he didn't have in February, mostly due to his work schedule, I don't find that they were willful on his part . . . ." The court also found that the caregiver's "position that [s]he has to run errands on weekends and that [there are] no weekend visits is unreasonable," stating, "I think he . . . was willing to visit the child on weekends . . . ." The court concluded Father had "consistently and regularly contacted the minor within the parameters of what he had to deal with."
Next, the court addressed Father's progress in the prior 18 months in resolving the problems that led to removal. It found "[h]e was in residential treatment and he was completing it successfully and making significant and consistent progress in that." The court explained: "For the prior 18 months, again, Dad was not involved . . . until June when he found out he was the father. . . . [A]s soon as he found out he was the biological father, he has done everything to not only visit the child, but to do everything possible to complete his services to make the opportunity to have Isaiah placed with him in the future." The court concluded that "the second prong has also been met."
Finally, the court turned to the third prong (i.e., whether Father demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete his treatment plan and provide for Isaiah's safety and needs). The court stated: "I think he has demonstrated . . . a total commitment to following the rules not only of his probation officer, but also the rules of the Agency. And I don't think we could find someone who does a better job than Dad's been doing with the services and everything else."
The court's minute order indicated the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Isaiah's best interests would be met by "providing additional reunification services to a parent . . . who is making significant and consistent progress in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program." The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial probability that Isaiah would be returned to Father and safely maintained in his home within the extended time period.
The court set a 24-month status review hearing for July 24, 2018, and ordered structured, unsupervised visitation. Isaiah timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
Under section 366.22, subdivision (b), a juvenile court can continue a dependency case to the 24-month date if it "determines by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child would be met by the provision of additional reunification services to a parent . . . who is making significant and consistent progress in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program, . . . or a parent recently discharged from incarceration, institutionalization, or the custody of the United States Department of Homeland Security and making significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe home for the child's return . . . ."
The court shall continue the case only if "there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of [the] parent . . . and safely maintained in the home" within that time. (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) To find substantial probability, the court is required to make the following findings:
(1) the parent has "consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child";
(2) the parent has "made significant and consistent progress in the prior 18 months in resolving problems that led to the child's removal from the home"; and
(3)(A) the parent has "demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her substance abuse treatment plan as evidenced by reports from a substance abuse provider as applicable, or complete a treatment plan postdischarge from incarceration, institutionalization, or detention, or following deportation to his or her country of origin and his or her return to the United
States, and to provide for the child's safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs." (Ibid.)Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4), permits reunification services to continue to 24 months, consistent with these requirements.
The statute also applies to certain minor and dependent parents, and cases can also be continued when reasonable reunification services were not provided. (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) The court found Father was provided with reasonable services.
See section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4) (services may be extended to 24 months "if it is shown, at the hearing [under section 366.22, subd. (b)], that the permanent plan for the child is that he or she will be returned and safely maintained in the home within the extended time period"; court "shall extend the time period only if it finds that it is in the child's best interest . . . and that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned . . . within the extended time period" (or reasonable services were not provided); if the court extends the time period, it "shall specify the factual basis" for the substantial probability finding, and make findings pursuant to §§ 366, subd. (a) and 358.1, subd. (e)).
"We review the juvenile court's findings for substantial evidence, and the juvenile court's decision-making process based on those findings for abuse of discretion." (San Joaquin Human Services Agency v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 215, 223 (San Joaquin) [juvenile court abused its discretion in extending services beyond 18 months, where facts necessary for required findings were not in evidence].) Alleged legal errors are reviewed de novo. (See In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.)
II. Authority To Extend Reunification Services
Isaiah contends the court erred as a matter of law by extending Father's reunification services to the 24-month date, because he "was in a sober living facility at the time of the 18 month review hearing," not a court-ordered residential treatment program. This argument lacks merit.
Section 366.22, subdivision (b), applies to a parent who "is making significant and consistent progress in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program . . . ." Father was in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program as of January 23, 2018, the scheduled date of the 18-month review hearing. He was still in that program as of the continued 18-month review hearing on February 5, during which the Agency recommended that services be extended to the 24-month date and the juvenile court set a contested hearing for March 15. Father did complete the program on February 8. But viewing the 18-month review as a whole—i.e., when the juvenile court was assessing whether services should be continued up to 24 months—Father was in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program and made significant progress in completing it. The court did not err in concluding the statute applied.
Isaiah appears to assume the court could only consider Father's status as of the contested March 15 hearing. The statutory text imposes no such limitation. Further, the purpose of the statute, in part, was so courts would consider the "special circumstance[s]" of a parent like Father who had been "court-ordered to a residential substance abuse treatment program." (See In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 565 (J.E.) [amendments to §§ 366.22 and 361.5 that permitted the extension of reunification services to 24 months "were intended to 'provide additional circumstances in which court-ordered services may be extended' and to 'require the court, in determining whether . . . services may be extended, to consider the special circumstances of an incarcerated . . . parent . . . , or parent . . . court-ordered to a residential substance abuse treatment program,' " citing Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2070, Stats. 2008, ch. 482 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 202.) Isaiah does not establish legal error.
Father contends he was also recently released from incarceration, and Isaiah and the Agency disagree as to whether a sober living facility is encompassed by the statute. Because the trial court did not err in finding Father was in a court-ordered residential treatment facility, we need not address these arguments. Isaiah also addresses visitation and Father's progress in resolving the problems that led to removal, in arguing the court could not make the required findings to extend services. If he is suggesting we should apply independent review to these issues, we disagree. (See Bower v. Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1043 ["Independent review is appropriate only when the facts permit just one reasonable inference."].) We address them in conjunction with his substantial evidence arguments.
III. Extension of Reunification Services
Isaiah contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in extending services because there was no substantial evidence to support the required findings. We disagree.
A. Best Interests
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that Isaiah's best interests would be met by providing additional reunification services to Father.
"[A] parent and a child share a fundamental interest in reuniting up to the point at which reunification efforts cease." (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.); see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 ["up until the time the section 366.26 hearing is set, the parent's interest in reunification is given precedence over the child's need for stability and permanency"]; In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 678 ["It is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the importance of reunification in the dependency system."].)
Here, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Isaiah's best interests would be served by extending reunification services. The court had previously granted Father reunification services, and found the section 366.26 hearing moot. Thus, the focus at the 18-month review hearing was on reunification, and Isaiah shared with father "a fundamental interest in reuniting." (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) Further, as discussed in more detail post, Father was taking steps that would support Isaiah's return, including engaging in consistent visitation (until the scheduling issues arose), continuing in his substance abuse treatment, and focusing on work and housing. Although the Agency initially had concerns about Father's ability to function outside a program, it subsequently found he had made progress and shown his commitment to reunification.
Isaiah maintains there was no evidence that continuing services was in his best interests. First, he argues Father initially denied paternity and did not form a parental relationship, while the caretaker had provided a stable home, formed a bond, and was willing to adopt. He states "[a]t this point, the needs of the minor take precedence over the wishes of his biological father," citing In re Micah (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 557, 566 (conc. opn. of Brauer, J.). Not so. The focus is on reunification, and parental bonding is not before us. (See David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 788 ["As for . . . whether [the minor] felt bonded to [the father], this is simply not the relevant inquiry at this juncture. Until services are terminated, reunification is the goal . . . ."]; ibid. ["The existence of a parental bond takes on independent significance only after the reunification effort is terminated and the case is sent to the permanency planning stage."].) Micah involved termination of parental rights, and is inapposite. (Micah, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 559.)
Second, Isaiah contends that because Father did not meet the statutory requirements to extend services beyond 18 months, good cause was the only way to do so; the court had to, but did not, consider the entire 18-month period (citing its denial of his counsel's request for all Agency reports to be admitted); and Father's denial of paternity was not in Isaiah's best interests and did not constitute good cause. (See J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 564 [court has discretion under § 352 to extend services to 24 months upon showing of good cause].) As discussed herein, there is evidence that Father met the requirements to extend services, so we need not address this argument. We note the juvenile court did address the 18-month period, including Father's late involvement, notwithstanding its denial of counsel's request as to the reports.
We also note the cases cited by Isaiah here are distinguishable. Among other things, they address the denial of services or other relief (not, as here, the continuation of services). (See, e.g., In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 443-445, 455-456 (Zacharia) [affirming denial of reunification services (and reversing contrary Court of Appeal ruling), where father did not request services until 18 months, did not file a § 388 petition, and evidence supported implied finding they were not in minor's best interests]; In re Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 388, 390-391 [affirming denial of § 388 petition and termination of parental rights, and finding failure to provide notice of right to become presumed father was harmless; father was incarcerated when minor was detained and delayed addressing parentage].) Zacharia predates the current statutory scheme altogether.
B. Substantial Probability of Return
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court's determination that there was a substantial probability Isaiah could be returned to Father by the 24-month date.
First, the record supports the finding that Father consistently and regularly visited Isaiah. Once Father learned he was Isaiah's father, he requested visitation and then had weekly visits. We recognize visits did not take place for nearly two months, and de la Cruz did not consider this to be regular visitation. But the visitation schedule conflicted with Father's work schedule and other obligations, the caregiver was unwilling to have visits on weekends, and the Agency did not meaningfully assist him in obtaining a new schedule. As for de la Cruz, the lack of visits did not appear to concern her (given she cited the conflict with Father's work when asked if she was concerned). The court could reasonably find that, on the whole, Father engaged in consistent and regular visitation.
As for the second prong, there is substantial evidence that Father made significant progress during the preceding 18 months in resolving the issues that led to Isaiah's removal. Isaiah's removal was primarily due to Mother's drug use. Although Father was not the offending parent, he too had a history of substance use. The record reflects he completed court-ordered residential drug treatment, was residing in a sober living home, and had been testing clean. He was also participating in NA and AA, attending therapy, and his sponsor R.C. testified he had "done above and beyond everything that I've ever asked of him."
Isaiah's arguments lack merit. He contends Father's denial of paternity, substance abuse, and instability with housing and employment were responsible for his inability to have custody of Isaiah. He also notes Father did not have a residence for him and had not progressed to supervised visits. The issue is whether Father was resolving the concerns that led to removal, not whether he was presently prepared to take custody. Regardless, he did make substantial progress on those issues. Father had participated in regular visitation until the scheduling conflicts arose, and de la Cruz indicated he could progress to unsupervised visitation after a few visits. He made significant progress in his substance abuse treatment, as discussed ante. He was looking for his own housing and calling programs that could assist, and de la Cruz had no reason to believe he would not follow through. He was working, and attending job coach training to find better work. He had also passed the written driving test, and was planning to take the road test and obtain a vehicle.
Second, Isaiah contends county counsel acknowledged it would be detrimental to place Isaiah with Father or to permit unsupervised visitation. Argument by counsel is not evidence. (Porterville Citizens for Responsible Hillside Development v. City of Porterville (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 885, 895, fn. 9.) Regardless, counsel's arguments did not call Father's progress into question. She indicated it was detrimental to place Isaiah with Father because he was in a sober living home where he could not have Isaiah, noting he was still "securing his stability outside of the residential facility." As for visitation, she did request supervised visits (stating they would like to "make sure everything goes well"), but explained that "after a couple of visits like that, the Agency would like to exercise its discretion with unsupervised."
Turning to the third prong, there was substantial evidence that Father had the capacity and ability to complete his substance abuse treatment plan, and to provide for Isaiah's safety and well-being. As discussed ante, Father had made progress in both completing substance abuse treatment, and in taking steps to secure better work, housing, and transportation. This evidence supports the conclusion that Father will complete his treatment plan, and be able to care for Isaiah. Father had also taken parenting classes, had positive visitation with Isaiah, and researched organizations about assistance with child care.
Isaiah's arguments again lack merit. He cites Father's present circumstances as evidence that he could not be safely returned or maintained in the home. He notes Father's residence in the sober living facility and inability to have Isaiah there; his part-time employment and lack of savings; and his reliance on public transportation. If Isaiah is implying that Father's efforts are inadequate because of the quality of his employment or living situation, we are not persuaded. (Cf. David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 792 [juvenile court erred in denying custody; stating in part that "a parent needs to have adequate resources to provide for his child, but . . . the bar cannot be set too high"]; In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401 ["A child's dislike of a parent's living arrangement, without more, does not constitute a substantial risk of detriment within the meaning of section 366.22, subdivision (a)."].) Further, there is evidence of Father's progress in these areas, discussed ante, which Isaiah fails to address. (See Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [appellants asserting a lack of substantial evidence "are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence"].)
Finally, Isaiah relies on San Joaquin, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th 215 to support his substantial evidence arguments. This reliance is misplaced. There, the juvenile court granted additional services at a review hearing held 19 months after detention. (Id. at p. 221-222.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding in pertinent part that there was no evidence to support extending services beyond 18 months under sections 366.22, subdivision (b) and 361.5, subdivision (a)(4). (San Joaquin, at pp. 223-224.) Here, there is substantial evidence that the requisite statutory factors are present.
We conclude the juvenile court did not err in extending reunification services to the 24-month review date.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J. I CONCUR: NARES, J. I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: HALLER, J.