Opinion
E053664 Super.Ct.No. J234321
01-20-2012
In re R.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.L., Defendant and Appellant.
Matthew I. Thue, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Adam E. Ebright, Deputy County Counsel, for plaintiff and respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Matthew I. Thue, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Adam E. Ebright, Deputy County Counsel, for plaintiff and respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
T.L. (father) appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating his reunification services. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that he had been provided reasonable reunification services. We find no error, and we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
R.D. (the child) came to the attention of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) at her birth in August 2010, when hospital staff expressed concern that T.L. (father) and D.D. (mother) appeared to be having difficulty in caring for the child, and mother had not received adequate prenatal treatment.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
CFS took the child into protective custody and filed a petition alleging she came under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged the child was at risk because the parents were "developmentally delayed and lack[ed] the . . . parenting skills to bond, nurture, and adequately care for and provide for [the child]"; the parents "suffer[ed] from substance abuse;" and father had "a history of violence, lack[ed] effective anger management skills, and exhibit[ed] aggressive and violent behaviors . . . ."
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
An additional allegation under section 300, subdivision (d) was later stricken from the petition.
CFS filed a detention report, in which the social worker stated she had learned from father's mother that father had a "long history of violence to others." At the hospital, father had engaged in verbal altercations with mother and the hospital staff. Police officers had escorted him from the hospital after he barricaded himself, mother, and the child in a hospital room.
When a social worker visited the parents' trailer home, father prevented her from entering on the grounds the trailer housed about 30 pet rats, and it was too dirty for the child. Father said mother and the child would be living in a second trailer, which appeared to be stripped down to bare wood inside and had many holes. The social worker saw no provisions for human habitation in that trailer. Water was provided from a hose running from a neighbor's property.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that a prima facie case had been established and detained the child.
CFS filed a jurisdiction/detention report in September 2010. The social worker noted that father's criminal record included charges in 1997 for vandalism and fighting in a public place; in 1999 for assault with intent to commit mayhem; in 1999 and 2001 for terrorist threats; in 2005 for obstruction of a public officer; and in 2006 for manufacture or possession of a dangerous weapon.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing in September 2010, the juvenile court found true the allegations of the petition under section 300, subdivision (b). The court ordered reunification services for father, including that he complete a psychological evaluation with therapeutic recommendations, a 52-week anger management program, a parenting education class, and an outpatient substance abuse treatment program, and that he attend Narcotics Anonymous (NA) or Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings twice weekly. The court also ordered that services would not exceed six months, "[u]nless the court finds there is substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody" of her parents within 18 months from the initial removal.
CFS filed a status review report in March 2011. The social worker stated that the parents had become homeless in December 2010 or January 2011 and had gone to stay with friends who were past felons. Father had made threats to mother, who moved to a domestic violence shelter and obtained a restraining order against father. Father then moved to a homeless shelter.
In September 2010, father told his therapist that if she "started to talk about his past," he would walk out on her. He threatened that he had a relative whom he could get to revoke her license. During his counseling, he made minimal progress but did show improvement in his ability to control acting out his anger.
During a visit with the child in September 2010, father left the child unattended on a chair in a car seat where the child was at risk of falling. When the social worker intervened, father became irate and "explosive." During a visit in January 1011, father again "exploded" in front of the child and began swearing when a social worker attempted to redirect him.
In October 2010, the social worker referred father to Dr. Kenneth L. Meyer to begin the psychological evaluation; the referral specified that Dr. Meyer should submit a report of the evalution to CFS by January 1, 2011. Father insisted he did not need a psychological evaluation because he was seeing an individual therapist, and he made threats to the social worker. Father began his evaluation with Dr. Meyer in December 2010. Meanwhile, the social worker sent the parents a letter reminding them to begin an outpatient program and random drug testing. The parents brought in physicians' statements and medical marijuana identification cards and asked to be excused from drug testing. Thereafter, father provided one negative drug and three positive tests for marijuana, and he failed to show up for three other tests. Father was admitted to an outpatient drug treatment program but never attended any group meetings, and he was terminated from the program in February 2011. In September 2010, the social worker sent parents information on how to contact Inland Regional Center (IRC); however, by November, despite having been reminded, parents had failed to contact IRC. Father completed two parenting programs; however, he did not appear to have benefited from them.
CFS filed an addendum report in April 2011. The social worker reported that father had not been going to 12-step meetings and had lost his IRC paperwork. He was still smoking marijuana and was not doing random drug testing, and he did not go to counseling. He had been kicked out of a homeless shelter because he would not do his share of the chores, was belligerent, and did not take care of his dog. Father's therapist told the social worker father would not take responsibility for any of his actions, and she had almost called the police under Tarasoff because of father's choice of words.
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 431 [imposing a duty on a therapist to warn an intended victim or the police if the therapist determines a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another].
Dr. Meyer had completed his evaluation of father, and the social worker provided a copy of his report to the court. The report detailed father's history of unemployment, chronic pain, chronic marijuana use, homelessness, and irrational violent outbursts. Dr. Meyer's report stated that father's "prognosis for treatment is generally quite poor as he denies personal responsibility. His problems are chronic and long lasting. . . . [He] also presented, in his Mental Status Examination, as socially inappropriate suggesting he may not be concerned about the impact he might have on others. . . . [His] psychological condition of current concern and his personality pattern are significant enough to impair his ability to maintain relationships and to impair his ability to parent a child. It is recommended that [he] undergo a course of long term psychotherapy with a licensed mental health professional. Treatment should focus on not only the current psychological condition, but also on his dependent and compulsive personality style. His anger issues are likely related to the way he perceives his environment, those who share it with him, and the way he deals with it. It is suggested that a decrease of his dependency and his compulsive traits will decrease his anger." Dr. Meyer further stated that father should "consider the negative consequences of his drug use," and that "[t]his should be a focus in his psychotherapy." The report concluded: "In my professional opinion [father] can benefit from services, but it is problematic that he may not want to. This question should be addressed with his licensed mental health provider after a short course of psychotherapy."
At the review hearing, the social worker testified that father had not completed his anger management plan and had participated only sporadically in the program. Father had not participated at all in a drug treatment program, and he had often missed his drug tests. The juvenile court found that father had been provided reasonable reunification services but had failed to participate regularly in those services and had failed to make substantive progress in his treatment plan. The court therefore terminated father's reunification services.
III. DISCUSSION
Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that he had been provided reasonable reunification services. More specifically, father argues that because his psychological evaluation was not timely completed, his services could not have been tailored to his unique mental needs.
A. Forfeiture
CFS contends father has forfeited his challenge to the adequacy of his reunification services because he failed to assert the issue in the juvenile court. Ordinarily, this court "will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.]" (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) Thus, to the extent father complains about the adequacy of the reunification plan as ordered, his challenge has been forfeited by his failure to seek appellate review of the dispositional order or to file a petition to modify the dispositional order. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 47.)
However, to the extent father complains about the adequacy of the services provided, "[a] parent is 'not required to complain about the lack of reunification services as a prerequisite to the department fulfilling its statutory obligations.' [Citation.]" (Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158.) Thus, a parent does not forfeit the issue by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. (Ibid.; see also In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623 ["'The contention that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence . . . is an obvious exception to the rule'" that a point not argued in the trial court may not be raised on appeal].)
B. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court's finding that an agency offered reasonable reunification services under the substantial evidence standard. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598 [Katie V.].) In applying that standard, we must draw all legitimate inferences and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's findings. (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
"'[T]he focus of reunification services is to remedy those problems which led to the removal of the children.' [Citation.] A reunification plan must be tailored to the particular individual and family, addressing the unique facts of that family. [Citation.] A social services agency is required to make a good faith effort to address the parent's problems through services, to maintain reasonable contact with the parent during the course of the plan, and to make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult. [Citation.] However, in most cases more services might have been provided and the services provided are often imperfect. [Citation.] 'The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.' [Citation.]" (Katie V., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 598-599.)
Father argues that without Dr. Meyer's report, CFS could not identify the specific problems that led to his losing custody of the child. However, the problems that led to juvenile court jurisdiction—father's anger and violence, substance abuse, lack of parenting skills, and low level of functioning—were listed in the initial petition. Dr. Meyer's report merely confirmed those were the underlying problems. Father's case plan included a psychological evaluation with therapeutic recommendations, a 52-week anger management program, a substance abuse program and testing, a parenting education program, general counseling, and a 12-step program. Those services were specifically directed to remedy father's problems.
Father asserts that Dr. Meyer did not timely file his report. However, the parents did not begin to see Dr. Meyer for their evaluations until December 13, 2010, and Dr. Meyer noted that father had been unable to complete his evaluation until February 28, 2011, because of "scheduling and relationship issues."
Father also argues that although he was provided individual therapy, the therapist was not provided with his psychological evaluation, and "that therapy appears to have focused exclusively on father's anger issues and substance abuse." However, the pages of the record to which father cites do not support that contention—the therapist merely checked boxes on a form indicating that substance abuse and anger management were "concurrent counseling needs."
In Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, a mother argued the reunification services that were offered her did not adequately address her psychological impairments. A psychological report filed late in the dependency, on which the mother based her argument, showed mother had a personality disorder and an IQ of 72. (Id. at p. 762.) The court noted the psychological report also stated the mother was "in 'significant denial' regarding the role her drug usage has played in the loss of her children, and that she relies on a 'projection of blame' to deal with her inability to follow through with treatment objectives. The trial court on this record reasonably and implicitly concluded that these attributes have far more to do with petitioner's inability to comply with the reunification plan than any shortcomings in the range of services offered." (Id. at p. 762, fn. 4.) The court continued, "The fact that a parent suffers from emotional problems does not excuse her from the statutory requirement of participating in a reunification plan, as some capacity to achieve the reunification goals is presumed. [Citation.]" The court adopted the conclusion of the juvenile court: "'More often than not the mother has not only ignored the department[']s requests and suggestions, but also she has actively attempted to avoid and thwart the department[']s programs.' This finding is fully supported by the record which reveals that, throughout the reunification period, petitioner continued to test positive for drugs, continued to maintain an unstable lifestyle, and made only superficial stabs at participating in the court-ordered reunification plan—usually when a court date loomed in the foreseeable future. Petitioner's real problem was not a lack of services available but a lack of initiative to consistently take advantage of the services that were offered." (Id. at pp. 762-763.)
The present case is remarkably similar to Angela S. In both cases, a parent who failed to participate in extensive services offered contended that even more services should have been provided. Here, as in Angela S., we conclude that father's failure to take advantage of the services provided is fatal to his contention that services were inadequate.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P.J.
MCKINSTER
J.