Opinion
E081145
12-19-2023
In re M.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. H.D. et al., Defendants and Appellants. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, H.D. Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, K.J. Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Tiffany Lok, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Nos. J289020, J289021 & J289022 Steven A. Mapes, Judge. Affirmed.
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, H.D.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, K.J.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Tiffany Lok, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
FIELDS J.
I. INTRODUCTION
H.D. (Mother) is the biological mother of J.J., L.D., and M.J. K.J. (Father) is the presumed father of L.D. and M.J. The San Bernardino Children and Family Services (CFS) filed dependency petitions pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq. on behalf of Mother's three children; the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petitions; and the children were removed from their parents' custody. At the 18-month permanency review hearing pursuant to section 366.22, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for both parents and suspended visitation between the parents and the children.
During the course of the dependency proceedings subject of this appeal, Mother gave birth to a fourth child, B.J., who is not a party to this appeal.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Mother and Father appeal from the order denying the return of the children to parental custody and suspending visitation. On appeal, they contend that three of the juvenile court's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence: (1) the finding that returning the children to parental custody would present a substantial risk of harm to the children; (2) the finding that continued visitation would be detrimental to the children; and (3) the finding that Mother and Father were offered reasonable reunification services. We conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports all three findings, and we affirm the orders.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural History
Mother is the biological mother of J.J., L.D., M.J. Father is the presumed father of L.D. and M.J. In March 2021, CFS received a referral alleging general neglect and physical abuse of the children. After conducting an investigation, CFS filed petitions pursuant to section 300 et seq. on behalf of all three children, alleging Mother's and Father's failure to protect and provide or care for the children, in part, as the result of Mother's mental health struggles and ongoing domestic violence in the home between the parents. The juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition, and the children were removed from Mother's and Father's custody.
B. Contested Permanency Review Hearing
On March 23, 2023, the juvenile court held a contested permanency review hearing pursuant to section 366.22. The juvenile court admitted the following reports into evidence: (1) the 18-month review report dated October 26, 2022; (2) an addendum report dated January 18, 2023; (3) a March 2023 addendum report; and (4) a March 2023 additional information to the juvenile court. The juvenile court also received live testimony from Mother and Father.
While the parties' briefs on appeal reference information contained in other reports submitted during the course of the dependency proceeding, we limit our consideration on appeal to the reports actually admitted into evidence by the juvenile court at the time of the contested section 366.22 hearing.
1. October 2022 18-month Review Report
At the time the 18-month review report was prepared, J.J., L.D., and M.J. were eight, five, and three years of age, respectively. All three children were developmentally on track but struggled with identified emotional, behavioral, and mental health issues. J.J. experienced repeated incidents at school involving defiant, aggressive, and violent behavior toward school staff and other children and was being treated with psychotropic medication to address mental health issues. L.D. also suffered from similar behavioral issues at school, had a documented incident involving an attempt to inflict self-harm during a tantrum, was undergoing counseling, and had an appointment scheduled for a psychiatric evaluation. M.J. was hyperactive, unable to focus, had difficulty sleeping, and displayed a tendency to engage in self-harm when upset, including hitting himself, biting and scratching himself and others, incontinence, and screaming. M.J.'s behavioral issues had recently regressed, and he was undergoing reevaluation to determine if increased services were necessary.
The report noted that the ongoing nature of Mother and Father's relationship was unclear. The two were living apart and reported no intention of cohabiting, but they gave conflicting information regarding the nature of their current relationship and could not articulate a clear plan for who would care for the children if they were returned to parental custody. Mother had received services including domestic violence classes, parenting education classes, a mental health evaluation, medication management, and individual therapy. Family therapy had been offered but had not yet been completed. Father had received and completed services that included domestic violence classes, parenting education classes, individual therapy, and a psychological evaluation.
The report detailed that both parents had been participating in visitation with the children. In July 2022, visitation was liberalized, and the parents had an opportunity to engage in weekly unsupervised visits with the children. However, shortly after unsupervised visits began, the children began displaying a regression in their behavioral and mental health issues. J.J. and L.D. began expressing their desire not to participate in visitation, and M.J.'s behavioral issues regressed to the point where he was in danger of losing placement. CFS reported that, at a CFT meeting to address the issues, Mother accused Father of encouraging the children's violent behavior during visitation, and Father responded by refusing to proceed with the meeting.
2. January 2023 Addendum Report
In its January 2023 Addendum Report, CFS assessed that there continued to be a "high propensity toward domestic violence between [the parents]." CFS based this assessment on the fact that Mother submitted multiple reports of inappropriate behavior by Father, but she appeared unable to separate herself from him. CFS observed that Mother could not give consistent reports regarding what boundaries she had in place to avoid her prior abusive interactions with Father and could not consistently describe the extent to which Father had access to her home. CFS noted that Mother recently gave birth to a fourth child with Father.
CFS reported that both parents resisted and minimized concerns expressed by social workers regarding applying parenting skills. When CFS provided Mother and Father with parent partners as assistance, the parent partners reported that Mother and Father were not receptive to assistance.
Since the October 2022 report, Mother's and Father's visits with the children were restricted to separate, supervised visits. CFS documented separate instances in which Mother and Father became aggressive with social workers in front of the children during visits. In one instance, a social worker reported that Father became upset with one of his children, told the child that the child was to blame for his removal from his parents, and told the child that his parents could always have other children if they did not reunify. The caregivers and CFT staff also reported that Mother and Father were verbally aggressive towards them in front of the children during visitation drop offs.
CFS reported that caregivers for the children had to work towards restabilizing the children's behaviors and emotional well-being following visits with Mother and Father. The caregiver for J.J. and M.J. reported that both children exhibited noticeable regression in their behavior after visits with the parents. The social worker also noted that J.J. and M.J. missed several visits over a two-month period and that, during this time, their behavioral issues noticeably improved. The report documented specific examples of improvement, including that J.J. experienced almost no aggressive episodes in school, and M.J. stopped having regular tantrums. When the visits were set to resume, J.J. refused to attend and M.J. also expressed his desire not to attend visits. Due to his age, the caregiver was able to bring M.J. to the visits, but M.J. experienced increased tantrums and incontinence in anticipation of each visit. L.D.'s caregiver reported that L.D.'s behavioral issues improved after visitations became more restrictive, with a reduction in school complaints regarding aggressive or disruptive behavior. The caregiver also noted that prior to visits, L.D. would become agitated and feign sickness in order to avoid attending visits with his parents.
3. March 2023 Addendum Report and Additional Information
In its March 2023 Addendum Report, CFS reported that neither parent had participated in visitation with the children since early January 2023. Both parents represented they could no longer attend the regularly scheduled visits and claimed that Saturdays were the only days they could attend visits with the children. Mother claimed that she could not attend visits as a result of formula deliveries for her youngest child, and Father claimed that his work schedule had changed.
CFS noted that J.J.'s therapy team had reported a noticeable improvement in J.J.'s emotional and behavioral problems since he stopped participating in visits; expressed concern regarding the prospect of J.J.'s "reengagement" with his parents; and assessed that J.J.'s reunification with his parents would be traumatic and lead to a regression in J.J.'s emotional and behavioral stability. CFS also reported that L.D. had since been assessed by a psychiatrist and had been diagnosed with severe emotional disturbance and post-traumatic stress disorder.
CFS noted that both parents had now received family reunification services for a total of 22 months, but a social worker opined that both parents continued to be resistant to the case plan, objectives, and recommendations. As a result, CFS recommended that the juvenile court terminate reunification services for Mother and Father.
On an additional information form to the juvenile court, CFS also submitted the declarations of Mother's and Father's assigned parent partners. Each parent partner reported that Mother and Father were resistant to suggestions, appeared uninterested in working toward reunification with their children, and spent the majority of their meetings complaining about social workers and the system. Each parent partner expressed the view that their assigned parent did not benefit from the offered services.
4. Father's Testimony
Father testified that he was not currently in a relationship with Mother, and that the two were only interested in co-parenting the children together. He expressed the belief that Mother was capable of caring for all of her children simultaneously, and he could also care for his children if he found adequate housing. However, when asked how he would arrange for childcare during working hours, Father stated that it would be Mother's responsibility to care for the children.
Father stated that he understood and took responsibility for past domestic violence in the home, but he later testified that he did not believe he was responsible for the fact that he had yet to reunify with the children. He did not believe the children exhibited any behavioral issues; believed that the children's caregivers were responsible for causing any behavioral issues; and believed that his own actions stopped negatively affecting the children "from the beginning."
Father disagreed with CFS's reports regarding his visits with the children, stating that the children "had a blast"; "were so happy to see [their parents]"; and that visits were "fantastic." He insisted that during visits, he would apply what he learned in his parenting classes to address behavioral issues, and he only encouraged positive behaviors during his limited visitation with the children. Father denied all of the reports regarding verbal arguments with Mother; arguing with his children during visits; or making disparaging statements about caregivers or social workers in the presence of the children. Father admitted that he had not seen the children for more than two months, but he explained it was due to a change in his work schedule. However, when pressed further, Father acknowledged that he was the one who initiated the change in his work schedule because "it was in [his] best interest" to "have the weekends off."
Finally, Father confirmed that he had been offered and participated in reunification services, including parenting classes and domestic violence classes, drug testing, individualized therapy, and a mental health evaluation. While he was participating in additional services, he expressed the belief that such services were not necessary; he did not understand why additional services were necessary and admitted that he had not adopted any of the suggestions regarding parenting that had been provided to him.
5. Mother's Testimony
Mother also expressed the belief that if all of the children were returned to her custody, she could manage caring for all four of her children on her own. She conceded that domestic violence in the home contributed to their behavioral issues, but she claimed that she was not responsible for the domestic violence and further claimed that none of her actions since the children were removed caused the issues to continue.
Mother disagreed with CFS's reports regarding the nature of her visits with the children. Mother opined that the children were bonded to her and were happy and excited to visit with her, described her older children as very engaged with her during their visits, and believed that the children disliked visits because they occurred in CFS's offices. She did not believe that her children had expressed a desire not to participate in visits and further did not believe that the children's behaviors regressed following visits. Mother admitted that she had not visited with the children since January and claimed that it was due to a scheduling conflict with the delivery of formula for her newborn. However, Mother later admitted that she never called to ask for a different delivery date and never called to arrange for pickup of the formula instead of accepting a delivery.
Mother confirmed that during the period of time when she had joint unsupervised visits with Father, she reported to social workers that Father had actively encouraged the children to respond with violence if threatened at school. She also testified that Father still exhibited controlling behavior but that he was "safe for the children" despite such behavior. Finally, on more than one occasion, Mother expressed that she would be willing to participate in more reunification services, but she did not believe any further reunification services were necessary.
C. Findings and Orders
After receiving the evidence offered by both parties, the trial court noted that the parents were "out of time" with respect to services because they had already received reunification services in excess of six months beyond the date provided for in section 366.22. The juvenile court found that there was clear and convincing evidence of substantial danger of emotional harm to the children if they were returned to their parents' custody and that Mother and Father had not benefitted from services. The trial court specifically noted that the children's behaviors all regressed following visits with the parents. As a result, the juvenile court also found continued visitation to be "detrimental." Based upon these findings, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and suspended further visitation between the parents and children. Mother and Father both appeal from these orders.
III. DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
By statute, the juvenile court must conduct a permanency review hearing within 18 months after the date a dependent child is removed from the physical custody of a parent. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).)
At the permanency review hearing, the juvenile court is required to "determine by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or legal guardian." (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) However, the failure to provide reasonable reunification services does not require the juvenile court extend services to a parent and does not prevent the juvenile court from moving forward with setting a permanency planning hearing to consider the termination of parental rights. (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 628-630.) Instead, such a failure may constitute grounds for a discretionary continuance of the permanency review hearing and a discretionary extension of services during the continuance. (Id. at pp. 632-635.)
If the juvenile court moves forward with conducting a permanency review hearing, the juvenile court "shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to their parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) In the event a child is not returned to parental custody, the juvenile court is required to order that reunification services be terminated. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) Even when reunification services are terminated, the juvenile court "shall continue to permit the parent or legal guardian to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).)
In this case, the claims of error asserted on appeal all involve factual findings made by the juvenile court at the section 366.22 hearing. We review the juvenile court's factual findings for substantial evidence. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400-1401; Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) "In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should 'not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.' [Citation.] The determinations should 'be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.' [Citations.] Uncontradicted testimony rejected by the trial court' "cannot be credited on appeal unless, in view of the whole record, it is clear, positive, and of such a nature that it cannot rationally be disbelieved." '" (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) As we explain, substantial evidence in the record supports each of the factual findings challenged on appeal.
With respect to the visitation order, Mother contends that the standard of review is unsettled, claiming that it may be subject to an abuse of discretion standard, substantial evidence standard, or some hybrid standard. It is true that "[v]isitation orders in dependency cases are typically reviewed for abuse of discretion ...." (In re J.P. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119.) That standard is applicable in this case. However, "[t]he abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious." (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) Thus, because this appeal involves challenges to the trial court's factual findings, this aspect of the trial court's ruling is reviewed for substantial evidence.
B. Substantial Risk of Harm Finding
We first address Mother's and Father's contentions that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that return of the children to parental custody represented a substantial risk of harm. We disagree.
In this case, the record shows that a dominant reason for removal of the children was the adverse effects of exposure to domestic violence in the home. According to CFS's reports, the children reported that Mother and Father argued constantly during unsupervised visits, and Mother and Father also acted aggressively toward social workers and caregivers in front of the children when visits were supervised. Social workers assessed that there remained a high propensity for domestic violence because Mother appeared unable to separate herself from Father. Mother's own testimony supports this assessment, as she admitted that Father continued to display controlling behavior, but she remained unconvinced that such behavior posed a risk to the children. This was substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Mother and Father had failed to correct one of the primary issues that led to the children's initial removal. (Crystal R. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 703, 718 ["[W]here a child has been in out-of-home placement . . . for 18 months and the parents . . . have failed to correct the problems which initially caused the child to be removed from the home, the court is entitled to terminate efforts to reunite the family and focus on providing an appropriate permanent placement for the child."].)
Additionally, J.J., L.D., and M.J. were all struggling with severe behavioral, emotional, and mental health issues. J.J.'s mental health issues were severe enough to require treatment with psychotropic medication; M.J.'s condition involved a documented history of inflicting self-harm; and L.D. had been clinically diagnosed with severe emotional disturbance and post-traumatic stress disorder. Social workers and caregivers reported that the children displayed noticeable regression in their mental health and behavioral problems following visits with their parents, but that these conditions would improve following prolonged periods without visits. By the time of the permanency review hearing, both J.J. and M.J. expressed their desire not to attend visits with their parents, and L.D. often displayed behaviors suggesting he wished to avoid visits. In fact, J.J.'s therapy team assessed that reunification with Mother and Father would be traumatic for J.J. and likely lead to regression in his emotional and behavioral stability.
L.D.'s caregiver reported that he would become agitated in anticipation of visits and would often attempt to make up reasons to avoid participating in visits.
The assessment of social workers, mental health professionals caring for the children, and the observations of the children's caretakers are all substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could rely to conclude that the return of the children to parental custody would present a substantial risk to the children's emotional well-being. (See In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 902 [Evidence in support of risk-of-harm findings included "the minor's expression of fear and desire not to return to [parental] custody" and "the social worker's testimony regarding the adverse effect that returning the minor to [the parent] would have on his emotional well-being."]; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 974-975 [The need for "counseling to address [the minor's] emotional trauma, his expression of fear and desire not to return to [the parent's] custody, and the opinion of the social worker that returning [the minor] would have an adverse effect on his emotional well-being, provide substantial evidence of substantial risk of detriment ...."]; Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 708 [expressed concerns of qualified mental health professionals constituted evidence in support of substantial risk of detriment].)
On appeal, Mother suggests that the juvenile court could not have found a substantial risk of harm because Mother had completed her case plan and remedied any risk of future domestic violence. However, as we have already detailed, there was substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could rely to conclude that Mother had not benefitted from the case plan and had not remedied the risk of ongoing domestic violence in her home. More importantly, "whether to return a dependent child to parental custody is not governed solely by whether the parent has corrected the problem which required court intervention." (In re Joseph B., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 894; In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143 ["[S]imply complying with the reunification plan . . . and visiting the children is to be considered by the court; but it is not determinative."].) Thus, even if we were to accept Mother's characterization of the record, her successful completion of the reunification plan would, at best, constitute conflicting evidence for the juvenile court's consideration, and reversal is not warranted simply because conflicting evidence in the record might support a conclusion different from that reached by the juvenile court. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
For the same reason, we are unpersuaded by Mother's arguments that: she did not suffer from an ongoing mental health issue, she could have managed the care of all her children with the support of additional services, or that she had a strong familial bond with her children. Even if we were to assume that evidence in the record supports each of these contentions, the question before the juvenile court at the time of a section 366.22 hearing is whether the return of the children to parental custody represents a continuing risk of harm to their physical or emotional well-being. (§ 366.22, subd. (a); In re Joseph B., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at 901 ["[I]f returning the child will create a substantial risk of detriment . . ., placement must continue regardless of whether the detriment mirrors the harm which had required the child's removal from parental custody ...."].) Indeed, at least one published decision has concluded that it would be inappropriate to order a child returned to parental custody upon a finding of substantial risk of harm to the child's emotional well-being, even if the risk persisted as the result of the social services agency's failure to provide sufficient services to the child and not the parent's action or inaction. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 974-975.) Thus, even assuming that Mother had made significant progress toward addressing some of the problems that initially resulted in removal by the time of a permanency review hearing, the juvenile court cannot return a child to parental custody if there continues to be a substantial risk of harm to the child.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the juvenile court relied on any of these factors to conclude that return of the children to Mother's custody represented a substantial risk of harm.
The focus on a child's well-being is clear throughout the statutory scheme. As our Supreme Court and this court have observed, removal of a child from parental custody in a dependency proceeding does not require fault on the part of a parent. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633-634 [juvenile court's finding of substantial risk of harm may be supported by substantial evidence even absent evidence parent was at fault for creating the risk]; In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245 [parent need not be dangerous to support a finding of substantial risk of harm supporting removal].)
We conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court's finding that the return of the children to parental custody continued to represent a substantial risk of harm to the children's emotional well-being. As such, we decline to reverse the juvenile court's order terminating reunification services on that basis.
C. Detriment Finding
Mother and Father also contend that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that continued visitation would be detrimental to the children. Again, we disagree.
Initially, we note that Mother's criticism of prior visitation orders is outside the scope of our appellate jurisdiction. "In juvenile dependency cases, an appeal must be filed within 60 days of the challenged judgment or order....' "An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed." '" (In re Cynthia C. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1488; In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532 ["' "[A]n unappealed . . . postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order."' "].) Thus, to the extent Mother and Father contend that unsupervised visits were "inappropriately ordered back to supervised" in October 2022 or "unfairly reduced to once a month" in January 2023, these orders are outside the scope of our appellate jurisdiction in this appeal, and we decline to address these arguments.
With respect to the visitation order entered at the time of the section 366.22 hearing, we agree with Mother that the juvenile court's explanation for suspending further visitation is not a model of clarity. Nevertheless, the juvenile court's statement on the record seems reasonably clear that it concluded continued visitation would be detrimental because both parents' behaviors in front of their children contributed to regression in the children's behaviors following visits. In our view, this conclusion was clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record.
By the time of the permanency review hearing, CFS reported that all three children had verbally expressed their desire not to participate in visits. L.D. would feign sickness in order to avoid visits, and M.J. would experience incontinence and engage in tantrums in anticipation of visits. J.J. refused to participate in visits, and his therapy team expressed concern that reengagement with either parent would be detrimental to his emotional stability. This was substantial evidence in support of a finding that visitation would be detrimental to the children. (In re T.M. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1220 ["[C]ourts may consider the child's aversion to visiting an abusive parent, so long as it is not the sole factor."], citing to In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 51 ["[A] child's aversion to visiting an abusive parent may be a 'dominant' factor in administering visitation ...."].)
Contrary to Mother's and Father's characterizations on appeal, the children's desires were not the sole evidence before the juvenile court on the issue of visitation. In her testimony, Mother acknowledged that the parents' acts of domestic violence in the home contributed to the children's behavioral issues. Yet the evidence supported a finding that Mother and Father continued to engage in these behaviors during visits with the children. The children reported that both parents continued to engage in verbally abusive behavior during visits, including engaging in regular arguments with each other during unsupervised visits; social workers reported specific instances in which both parents argued with them while in front of the children during supervised visits; and caregivers and CFS staff reported that parents would appear to verbally lash out at them in front of the children during drop-offs for supervised visits. CFS reported that the children's emotional well-being regressed after visits with parents, evidenced by an increase in harmful behavior and aggression toward others. These regressions occurred regardless of whether the visits involved both parents or a single parent. CFS also reported that the children's behavioral issues would dissipate during periods in which no visitation occurred. Given this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that continued visitation with either parent would be detrimental.
Mother suggests that information contained in CFS's reports are unreliable because they lack sufficient detail or appear inconsistent. However, under the substantial evidence standard of review,"' "[c]onflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify reversal of a [finding], for it is the exclusive province of the [juvenile court] to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends." '" (In re B.J. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 646, 651.) Thus, it is not our role to reevaluate the credibility of the accounts detailed in CFS's reports, so long as they support reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court's finding.
Mother also argues that the juvenile court did not suspend visitation at prior review hearings; no new evidence was presented on the issue of visitation at the section 366.22 hearing; and, as a result, there was no substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could rely to conclude that continued visitation would be detrimental. However, in making this argument, Mother completely overlooks the fact that the juvenile court received live testimony from both Mother and Father during the section 366.22 hearing. As we have already detailed, their testimony covered many of the events and issues detailed in prior reports. Thus, contrary to Mother's characterization, the juvenile court did have additional evidence before it at the time of the section 366.22 hearing on the issue of visitation. Even if Mother's and Father's testimonies recounted events that had been previously reported, the juvenile court was entitled to consider this testimony in reassessing the credibility and weight to be given previously reported events and prior assessments by social workers. Thus, the premise of Mother's argument on this point is not supported by the record.
We conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court's finding that continued visitation between the children and parents would be detrimental. As such, we decline to reverse the juvenile court's order suspending visitation on this basis.
D. Reasonableness of Services
Finally, we address Mother's and Father's argument that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable reunification services were provided to Mother. We conclude that this claim has been forfeited for failure to raise the issue in the juvenile court and further conclude that, even in the absence of forfeiture, the juvenile court's finding is supported by substantial evidence.
1. The Notices of Appeal Are Sufficient To Confer Appellate Jurisdiction
Initially, we briefly address CFS's argument that consideration of this issue is outside the scope of our appellate review because parents failed to identify this finding in their notice of appeal. In making this argument, CFS conflates specific factual findings with appealable orders. While it is true that a notice of appeal must sufficiently specify an appealable order to confer appellate jurisdiction (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2), 8.405(a)(3); In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75)," 'one does not appeal from a finding; one appeals from a judgment or from an order,'" and "review of findings is normally obtained by appeal from the ensuing judgment or order." (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 534; In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 580 [same].) So long as the appealable order is sufficiently identified in the notice of appeal, a reviewing court has jurisdiction to consider "any intermediate ruling, proceeding, order or decision which involves the merits or necessarily affects the judgment or order appealed from." (Code Civ. Proc., § 906; In re J.R., at p. 580, fn. 12.) Language suggesting an intent to challenge the identified order on a specific ground does not preclude a party from raising additional grounds in its briefs. (See In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272 [correct identification of appealable order permits review, even if notice included additional language that might suggest an initial intent to appeal only one aspect of order].)
Thus, we disagree with CFS's attempt to overly parse Mother's and Father's notices of appeal in this case. Section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), mandates that the juvenile court make a finding that reasonable reunification services were offered to parents. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) However, the orders specified in section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), are the order setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 or a statutorily authorized alternative plan; the order terminating reunification services; and orders related to visitation (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3)). CFS does not challenge the fact that the notices of appeal sufficiently identify the order terminating reunification services and the order suspending visitation. To the extent that a section 366.22 order has been sufficiently identified in the notice of appeal, this court has jurisdiction to consider the factual findings related to that order, regardless of whether the specific findings were specified in the notice.
2. The Claim Has Been Forfeited and Fails On the Merits
While we consider Mother's and Father's challenges to the juvenile court's finding that reasonable reunification services were provided as within the scope of our appellate jurisdiction in this case, we conclude that their challenges have been forfeited for failure to raise the issue in the juvenile court proceedings and further conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the findings even absent forfeiture.
"[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.... [¶] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Thus, "a parent is prevented from challenging the reasonableness of services on appeal if the issue was not first brought to the attention of the juvenile court." (Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1347, fn. 5.) At the time of the section 366.22 hearing, neither parent argued that CFS failed to provide reasonable reunification services as required by statute and neither objected to the recommended finding on this issue. Accordingly, we deem the issue forfeited.
Even in the absence of forfeiture, we would conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding on this issue. Generally, reunification services "will be found reasonable if the Department has 'identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parent during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult ....'" (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972-973; Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 625, fn. 6) In this case, both Mother and Father testified that they had participated in extensive reunification services up to the time of the hearing and both expressly stated that they did not believe any additional reunification services were necessary to address the problems leading to the loss of custody. Their testimony in the proceedings below that no additional services were needed to address the problems leading to the loss of custody is contrary to their assertions on appeal that they were not provided reasonable services. Moreover, their testimony constitutes substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could rely to conclude that reasonable reunification services were provided to both parents. Thus, reversal is not warranted on this ground.
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We concur: MILLER Acting P. J. CODRINGTON J.