Opinion
2017–00628 Index No. 602767/13
11-20-2019
Jean–Luc SAMYN, et al., Appellants, v. ARIENS COMPANY, Respondent.
Eisenberg & Baum, LLP, New York, NY (Sagar Shah of counsel), for appellants. Bashwiner and Deer, LLC, New York, NY (Gregg Curry, pro hac vice, and Joseph A. Deer of counsel), for respondent.
Eisenberg & Baum, LLP, New York, NY (Sagar Shah of counsel), for appellants.
Bashwiner and Deer, LLC, New York, NY (Gregg Curry, pro hac vice, and Joseph A. Deer of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, JEFFREY A. COHEN, ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Denise L. Sher, J.), entered January 9, 2017. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
On February 21, 2011, the plaintiff Jean–Luc Samyn (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly was injured while operating a snow thrower manufactured by the defendant. The injured plaintiff, who had purchased the snow thrower in 1983, released the clutch lever, turned off the engine and, approximately five seconds later, after no longer hearing noise coming from the machine, placed his right hand inside the discharge chute to dislodge a blockage. The injured plaintiff's fingers came into contact with the impeller blade, which was still rotating at a high speed, resulting in the amputation of two of his fingers. The snow thrower had a label listing various warnings, including a warning of "ROTATING PARTS" and to "[s]top engine and remove spark plug ignition wire before removing obstructions." The injured plaintiff and his wife suing derivatively (hereinafter together the plaintiffs), commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries, asserting, inter alia, causes of action sounding in negligence and strict products liability. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the snow thrower was defectively designed because the defendant failed to provide a "clean-out tool" to clear the discharge chute, and that the warnings on the snow thrower were inadequate because they failed to warn of the danger that the impeller could continue to rotate after the engine was turned off. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the snow thrower complied with applicable industry standards, that the injured plaintiff did not perform routine maintenance of the subject snow thrower, and that the owner's manual provided sufficient warnings, including warnings not to "put hands or feet near rotating parts" and to use a "broom handle" to dislodge an obstruction from the impeller. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiffs appeal.
"Manufacturers may be held strictly liable for injuries caused by their products ‘because of a mistake in the manufacturing process, because of defective design or because of inadequate warnings regarding use of the product’ " ( Singh v. Gemini Auto Lifts, Inc. , 137 A.D.3d 1002, 1002–1003, 27 N.Y.S.3d 637, quoting Sprung v. MTR Ravensburg, 99 N.Y.2d 468, 472, 758 N.Y.S.2d 271, 788 N.E.2d 620 ; see Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. , 59 N.Y.2d 102, 106–107, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 450 N.E.2d 204 ). Here, the defendant's submissions in support of its motion for summary judgment demonstrate the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether the snow thrower was defectively designed at the time it was sold, whether it was feasible to design it in a safer manner, and whether the defect was a substantial factor in causing the injured plaintiff's injury (see McDermott v. Santos , 171 A.D.3d 1158, 98 N.Y.S.3d 646 ; Singh v. Gemini Auto Lifts, Inc. , 137 A.D.3d at 1003, 27 N.Y.S.3d 637 ; Cwiklinski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc. , 70 A.D.3d 1477, 1480, 894 N.Y.S.2d 277 ; Milazzo v. Premium Tech. Servs. Corp. , 7 A.D.3d 586, 588, 777 N.Y.S.2d 167 ). In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted, among other things, the affidavit of the plaintiffs' expert, who opined, inter alia, that the failure to sell the snow thrower with a clean-out tool rendered the product defective and not reasonably safe. According to the plaintiffs' expert, a clean-out tool "would have been technologically and economically feasible to include with the snow [thrower] in 1983" since the defendant manufactured a clean-out tool costing approximately $20 that was sold in Germany in 1983 as part of a "safety kit." Based on the foregoing, the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action sounding in negligence and strict products liability based on design defect.
The defendant also failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action premised upon a failure to warn. "A manufacturer has a duty to warn against latent dangers resulting from foreseeable uses of its product of which it knew or should have known" ( Liriano v. Hobart Corp. , 92 N.Y.2d 232, 237, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 700 N.E.2d 303 ; see Reece v. J.D. Posillico, Inc. , 164 A.D.3d 1285, 1287, 83 N.Y.S.3d 672 ; Singh v. Gemini Auto Lifts, Inc. , 137 A.D.3d at 1002–1003, 27 N.Y.S.3d 637 ). "A manufacturer also has a duty to warn of the danger of unintended uses of a product provided those uses are reasonably foreseeable" ( Reece v. J.D. Posillico, Inc. , 164 A.D.3d at 1287–1288, 83 N.Y.S.3d 672 ). "Issues regarding the adequacy of instructions or warnings ... are generally inappropriate for summary judgment relief" ( Haight v. Banner Metals, Inc. , 300 A.D.2d 356, 356, 751 N.Y.S.2d 770 ; see DiMura v. City of Albany , 239 A.D.2d 828, 829–830, 657 N.Y.S.2d 844 ). Here, although the defendant submitted evidence that certain warnings were placed on the snow thrower and in the owner's manual, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it adequately warned users that the impeller may continue to rotate after the engine is turned off (see Passante v. Agway Consumer Prods., Inc. , 12 N.Y.3d 372, 382, 881 N.Y.S.2d 641, 909 N.E.2d 563 ; Singh v. Gemini Auto Lifts, Inc. , 137 A.D.3d at 1003, 27 N.Y.S.3d 637 ; Barker v. Mobile Pallet Truck, Inc. , 71 A.D.3d 1542, 1543, 897 N.Y.S.2d 562 ; Milazzo v. Premium Tech. Services Corp. , 7 A.D.3d at 588, 777 N.Y.S.2d 167 ). The defendant also failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was aware of the danger of putting his hand inside the discharge chute after turning off the engine, or that he would not have heeded more prominent or express warnings on the snow thrower (see Passante v. Agway Consumer Prods., Inc. , 12 N.Y.3d at 382, 881 N.Y.S.2d 641, 909 N.E.2d 563 ; Palmatier v. Mr. Heater Corp. , 163 A.D.3d 1192, 1196–1197, 82 N.Y.S.3d 186 ; Garcia v. Woodgrove Sales, Inc. , 65 A.D.3d 516, 516–517, 882 N.Y.S.2d 917 ).
In light of the defendant's failure to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, we need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr. , 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
RIVERA, J.P., BALKIN, COHEN and MILLER, JJ., concur.