Opinion
C/A No.: 1:20-1277-TMC-SVH
04-09-2020
Eric Samuel, #277784, Plaintiff, v. J. Croom Hunter, Staff Attorney of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office of the State of South Carolina; Stephanie P. McDonald, Chief Administrative Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit; Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court of the South Carolina Supreme Court; and R. Markley Dennis, Ninth Judicial Circuit Court Judge, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Eric Samuel ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is an inmate incarcerated in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. He filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights by J. Croom Hunter, Staff Attorney of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office of the State of South Carolina ("Hunter"); Stephanie P. McDonald, Chief Administrative Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit ("McDonald"); Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court of the South Carolina Supreme Court ("Shearouse"); and R. Markley Dennis, Ninth Judicial Circuit Court Judge ("Dennis") (collectively "Defendants").
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the district judge dismiss the complaint in this case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges Hunter violated his rights by filing a motion in April 2014 to restrict Plaintiff's future filings after Plaintiff filed his Sixth application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). [ECF No. 1 at 7, ECF No. 1-2 at 1-10]. He alleges McDonald violated his rights when she signed an order on April 21, 2014, requiring Plaintiff to submit an affidavit and justifications for any future filings to the acting Chief Administrative Judge. [ECF No. 1 at 8, ECF No 1-2 at 11-19]. On July 31, 2015, the Supreme Court of South Carolina ordered that Plaintiff must receive permission from it to file any further collateral proceedings in state court. [ECF No. 1-2 at 20].
Plaintiff alleges the order was signed by Shearouse [ECF No. 1 at 8], but it appears to be signed by the Chief Judge of the South Carolina Supreme Court [ECF No. 1-2 at 20].
On April 29, 2019, Plaintiff sought review of his PCR application and affidavit from Markley, Chief Administrative Judge of the General Sessions for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina. Id. at 21. Markley replied to Plaintiff's letter, noting the Supreme Court had required Plaintiff to receive its permission before filing a PCR. Id. at 23. II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Prosecutorial Immunity (Hunter)
Prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings, such as a criminal trial, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial hearings. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff's claims against Hunter address actions Hunter took in connection with the defense of Plaintiff's PCR action(s), these claims are barred by prosecutorial immunity. The undersigned recommends Hunter be summarily dismissed from this case.
2. Judicial Immunity (McDonald and Markley)
It is well-settled that judges have immunity from claims arising out of their judicial actions. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). Judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, and such immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith. Id. at 11; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) ("A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'") (citation omitted). As Plaintiff's claims against McDonald and Markley are related to their judicial actions, they are entitled to absolute immunity.
3. Quasi-Judicial Immunity (Shearouse)
Assuming that Shearouse was involved in creating the July 31, 2015 order restricting Plaintiff's ability to file future PCR applications, he is also immune from suit. It is well-settled that judges and court support personnel have immunity from a claim for damages and injunctive relief arising out of their judicial actions. Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (finding the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been adopted and made applicable to court support personnel because of "the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts[.]"); Abebe v. Seymour, C/A No. 3:12-377-JFA-KDW, 2012 WL 1130667, *2-3 (D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2012) (finding Section 309(c) of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) amended § 1983 to bar injunctive relief against a judicial officer "for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable."). III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss the complaint with prejudice, as Plaintiff can not amend his complaint to state a claim without issuance and service of process.
When a plaintiff could cure the factual defects in his claim by filing an amended pleading, a dismissal for failure to state a claim should be without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, 807 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir. 2015). However, the complaint contains no "potentially meritorious but inartfully pleaded claim[s]" that "might be revived by competent pleading." United States v. McLean, 566 F.3d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 2009). Because amendment of the complaint cannot cure its defects, the court should dismiss the case with prejudice. Id.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. April 9, 2020
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/
Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).