(Citation omitted.) Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 491 SE2d 517) (1997). Instead, "[t]he true basis for liability is the superior knowledge of the proprietor of the existence of a condition that may subject the invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm."

(Citation omitted.) Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 491 SE2d 517) (1997). In order to recover, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had superior knowledge of a dangerous condition that was unknown to the plaintiff and that caused the plaintiff's injuries.

To recover under Georgia law, Gootee must be able to prove that the defendant had superior knowledge of the allegedly perilous display of cookware and that the dangerous condition must have been known to Target and unknown to her. See Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 228 Ga.App. 314, 491 S.E.2d 517, 518 (1997). Like the plaintiff in Sams, Gootee has made no showing that Target was actually aware of the allegedly defective manner in which the cookware had been stacked.

Larsen, 240 Ga. App. at 352. See also Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 491 SE2d 517) (1997). When a plaintiff has been injured by an item falling off a store's shelf, we have held that the defendant store does not retain exclusive control over the item as a matter of law under circumstances where there is no evidence of how the item had been stacked prior to the incident, and where the uncontroverted evidence reflects that the item was within the reach of other customers.

"In order to recover, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had superior knowledge of a dangerous condition that was unknown to the plaintiff and that caused the plaintiff's injuries." Metts v. Wal-Mart Stores, 269 Ga. App. 366, 367 ( 604 SE2d 235) (2004); Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 491 SE2d 517) (1997). "The dangerous condition must have been known to [Home Depot], the proprietor, and unknown to [Green], the invitee, before [Green] could recover.

Plaintiff also suggests that res ipsa loquitur applies to these facts. Defendant cites Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 228 Ga. App. 314 (1997), and the Court finds this case to be directly on point. In Sams, two boxes of cookware fell from a shelf in a store and struck the plaintiff from behind.

Miller v. Gerber Products Co., 207 Ga. 385, 388 ( 62 SE2d 174) (1950). See also, e.g., Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 491 SE2d 517) (1997); Woolbright v. Six Flags Over Ga., 172 Ga. App. 41, 42 (2) ( 321 SE2d 787) (1984); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Stevens, 130 Ga. App. 363, 367, n. 1 ( 203 SE2d 587) (1973); YMCA v. Bailey, 112 Ga. App. 684, 693 ( 146 SE2d 324) (1965). If the jury can more reasonably infer from the facts presented that the injury was caused by the defendant than any other inference, the jury is authorized to conclude that the defendant was negligent.

Proof of an injury, without more, is not enough to establish a proprietor's liability. Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 491 SE2d 517) (1997). "[T]o recover for injuries sustained in a slip and fall action, an invitee must prove (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner or occupier."

In other words, Feazell's circumstantial evidence must provide the basis for a reasonable inference that Gregg created or had superior knowledge of a dangerous condition that was unknown to the plaintiff and that caused the plaintiff's injuries. See Padilla v. Hinesville Housing Auth., 235 Ga. App. 409, 410 ( 509 SE2d 698) (1998); Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 491 SE2d 517) (1997). "Without evidence of the existence of a dangerous condition, there can be no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge of the danger, and therefore no recovery for the plaintiff."

We are mindful that "res ipsa loquitur should be applied with caution and only in extreme cases; and [is not applicable] when there is an intermediary cause which could have produced the injury." Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 491 S.E.2d 517) (1997). In Sams, supra, the plaintiff was injured by cookware which fell off a shelf at Wal-Mart.