Opinion
03 C 5369
November 6, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on Defendant Cook County Sheriff Michael Sheahan's ("Sheahan") motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Because this is a motion to dismiss, we accept all well plead facts and allegations in the complaint as true and construe all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. Thompson v. Illinois Dep't of Prof'l Regulation. 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). In October 2001 Plaintiff Sedrick Sampson ("Sampson") was incarcerated at a Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDQC") facility in Chicago. On October 26, 2001, Sampson was in his cell and lacerated his left elbow based on an unspecified condition created by another inmate's hammock and a sharp object placed on the floor by a different inmate. Following the injury, Sampson's requests for medical attention were refused for four days despite obvious lacerations to his elbow. By the time Sampson had received treatment on October 30, 2001, the laceration was infected. The laceration and infection resulted in Sampson experiencing pain and suffering, complications, and prolonged disability.
Sampson brings his complaint against two defendants: Sheahan, as the Sheriff of Cook County, and the County itself. However, because Defendant Cook County has not been served process, this opinion will only address Sheahan. Sampson's complaint alleges three counts. Count I alleges common law negligence on the part of Sheahan for failing to inspect and remove dangerous obstructions from Sampson's cell. Counts II and III allege that Sheahan's conduct violated Sampson's rights to procedural due process and right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the United States Constitution. In his unopposed motion, Sheahan moves to dismiss all three counts.
While Sampson fails to provide a jurisdictional basis for this state law claim, we presume it is a supplemental jurisdiction claim, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
LEGAL STANDARD
"The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits." Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 1989)). A complaint need only specify "the bare minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that he can file an answer." Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Beanstalk Group. Inc. v. AM General Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2002)). Dismissal is proper only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), With these principles in mind, we now address the motion before us.DISCUSSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 42 U.S.C.) ("PLRA"), creates a "comprehensive administrative-exhaustion requirement" for prisoners filing incarceration related complaints in federal courts. Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 1999). Congress enacted the PLRA to "reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits [by affording] correction officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case."Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). The PLRA applies to Sampson's claims as it "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Id. at 532. According to the PLRA:
[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
While the PLRA does not deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction, it "requires dismissal of any case in which an available administrative remedy has not been exhausted" by a prisoner plaintiff.Massey v. Wheeler. 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). Holding that under the PLRA, the "failure to plead exhaustion of all administrative remedies mandates dismissal of [the] claim without prejudice," theMassey court affirmed the district court's dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because the prisoner's complaint failed to allege that the plaintiff had exhausted his possible administrative remedies. Id.
As was the case with the Massey plaintiff, Sampson's Complaint contains no allegations that he initiated, let alone exhausted, an administrative remedy with the CCDOC. According to Sheahan, the CCDOC provides for a prisoner grievance procedure where prisoners can file complaints with the CCDOC, Because Sampson has failed to allege that he exhausted any available administrative remedies, his Complaint must be dismissed, without prejudice, in its entirety pursuant to Massey and the PLRA.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Sheahan's motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety.