Opinion
2014-04-9
In the Matter of Shannon L. SAMIDA, appellant, v. Christopher M. SAMIDA, respondent. (Proceeding No. 1) In the Matter of Christopher M. Samida, respondent, v. Shannon L. Samida, appellant. (Proceeding No. 2).
William A. Sheeckutz, East Meadow, N.Y., for appellant. Blodnick, Fazio & Associates, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Jessica A. Gould and Dana J. Finkelstein of counsel), for respondent.
William A. Sheeckutz, East Meadow, N.Y., for appellant. Blodnick, Fazio & Associates, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Jessica A. Gould and Dana J. Finkelstein of counsel), for respondent.
In two related family offense proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Shannon L. Samida appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Dikranis, J.), dated November 7, 2011, which, after a hearing, dismissed her petition, and (2) an order of protection of the same court, also dated November 7, 2011, which, after a hearing, and, in effect, upon a finding that she had committed certain family offenses, directed her, inter alia, to stay away from Christopher M. Samida until and including November 6, 2013.
ORDERED that the order and the order of protection are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Although the order of protection expired by its own terms on November 6, 2013, the appeal therefrom has not been rendered academic in light of the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from a finding that the appellant committed the subject family offenses ( see Matter of Saldivar v. Cabrera, 109 A.D.3d 831, 971 N.Y.S.2d 310;Matter of Hohn v. Guirand, 97 A.D.3d 578, 947 N.Y.S.2d 336;Matter of Scioscia v. Scioscia, 89 A.D.3d 739, 931 N.Y.S.2d 892).
The appellant contends that the Family Court erred in denying her request for an adjournment of a hearing and that the court thereby denied her a fair hearing. “An application for a continuance or adjournment is addressed to the sound discretion of the [hearing] court, and the grant or denial thereof will be upheld on appellate review if the trial court providently exercised its discretion” ( Nieves v. Tomonska, 306 A.D.2d 332, 332, 760 N.Y.S.2d 682). Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court, which had previously granted her application for an adjournment, did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying her request for an adjournment made on the date set for the hearing ( see Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 283, 481 N.Y.S.2d 675, 471 N.E.2d 447;Matter of Winfield v. Gammons, 105 A.D.3d 753, 963 N.Y.S.2d 272;Atwater v. Mace, 39 A.D.3d 573, 835 N.Y.S.2d 600;Matter of Steven B., 24 A.D.3d 384, 807 N.Y.S.2d 29,affd.6 N.Y.3d 888, 817 N.Y.S.2d 599, 850 N.E.2d 646).
Additionally, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to conduct an in camera interview of the appellant's 17–year–old child from a prior relationship ( see Matter of Asgedom v. Asgedom, 51 A.D.3d 787, 858 N.Y.S.2d 688;Matter of Neu v. Neu, 303 A.D.2d 509, 756 N.Y.S.2d 598;Matter of Cardarelli v. Cardarelli, 277 A.D.2d 225, 716 N.Y.S.2d 680). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the Family Court to deny the appellant's request to appoint an attorney to represent that child and the parties' children ( cf. Matter of Pamela N. v. Neil N., 93 A.D.3d 1107, 941 N.Y.S.2d 751).
Accordingly, the Family Court properly dismissed the appellant's family offense petition and issued an order of protection against the appellant. DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS, AUSTIN and DUFFY, JJ., concur.