Opinion
Case No. 3:99 CV 1573-AII
February 4, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER U.S. DISTRICT CLERK'S OFFICE
Pursuant to the District Court's Order in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) filed on November 5, 1999, and the written consents of the parties to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge, came on this day to be considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on January 10, 2000. As of the date of this opinion and order, the Plaintiff has not filed a response. The court finds and orders as follows:
Type of Case: This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Parties: The Plaintiff is an inmate currently incarcerated at the Boyd Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. He was formerly confined in the Dallas County Jail in Dallas, Texas. The Defendant, Steven Bowers, M.D., is the Medical Director of the Dallas County Jail.
Statement of the Case: The Plaintiff has brought this action alleging that the Defendant denied him reasonable medical care while he was confined in the Dallas County Jail.
On or about August 29, 1997, the Plaintiff attempted suicide by shooting himself in the neck (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Appendix ("Def. App.") at 61). He was initially treated at Parkland Memorial Hospital ("PMH") for his wounds (Def. App. 61, 66). While he was at PMH, a gastrointestinal tube ("G-tube") was placed in his abdomen so that he could be fed, as the injuries to his neck precluded normal feeding (Def. App. 61, 66). On September 23, 1997, the Plaintiff was booked into the Dallas County Jail by remote book-in procedures (Def. App. 66). The next day, on September 24, 1997, the Plaintiff began complaining about leaking from his G-tube (Def. App. 61, 67-68). Later that same day, the Plaintiff was transferred back to PMH for further treatment of his wounds (Def. App. 68).
The Plaintiff did not return to the Dallas County Jail until nearly two months later on November 21, 1997 (Def. App. 69). He was released from the Dallas County Jail two months later on January 21, 1998 (Def. App. 39). During that 61-day period of incarceration, the Plaintiff was transferred back to PMH no fewer than ten (10) times (Def. App. 60-219). Between September 23, 1997, when he was initially booked into the Dallas County Jail, and January 21, 1998, when he was finally released, the Plaintiff spent only 25 to 32 days in the Dallas County Jail (Def. App. 60-219). The bulk of his custody was actually spent at PMH (Def. App. 60-219).
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is proper when pleadings and the evidence on file, along with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of producing evidence to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to an essential element of the nonmovant's case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). Once the movant produces such evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence establishing each of the challenged elements of his case for which he will have the burden of proof at trial.Celotex Corn. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). In responding, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts which demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). Otherwise, summary judgment in favor of the movant is appropriate. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir.), cert denied 506 U.S. 825, 113 S.Ct. 82 (1992).
Discussion: The Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant denied him medical care while he was in the Dallas County Jail. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges the Defendant did not give him medications prescribed to him by the doctors at PMH, and that the Defendant was responsible for housing him in the general population, when he should have been in the infirmary (Plaintiff's complaint at 2-4).
In order for a plaintiff to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, he must show that the defendant acted under color of law, and that the defendant's actions deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 257, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). It is undisputed that the Defendant, as Medical Director of the Dallas County Jail, was acting under color of law. The issue before the court is whether he deprived the Plaintiff of his constitutional right to medical care.
Further, a plaintiff suing a governmental official under Section 1983 must show personal involvement of the official in the alleged constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between an act of the official and the constitutional violation.Douthit v. Jones. 641 F.2d 345-346 (5th Cir. 1981). Supervisory officials are not liable for subordinates' actions on any vicarious liability theory in Section 1983 litigation and can only be held liable if either of the following exists: (1) his personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violations. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-304 (5th Cir. 1987). In order to demonstrate a causal connection, the supervisor would have to "implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation." Id. at 304.
The Fifth Circuit has held that the standard for denial of medical care claims is as follows: the episodic act or omission of a jail employee does not violate a detainee's or prisoner's constitutional right to be secure in his basic human needs, such as medical care, unless the detainee or prisoner demonstrates that the employee acted or failed to act with subjective deliberate indifference to the detainee's or prisoner's needs.Hare v. City of Corinth. MS 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998). Deliberate indifference exists when an official knows of and disregards a serious medical condition and the official is "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw that inference." Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). Allegations of denial of reasonable medical care must demonstrate more than mere negligence. Thomas v. Kipperman, 846 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1988).
The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant failed to provide him with access to Methadone and Lortab, both of which the Plaintiff alleges were prescribed for him by the Defendant and/or the doctors at PMH (Plaintiff's Original Complaint at 1-5). The competent summary judgment evidence shows that the Plaintiff was prescribed Methadone by the doctors at PMH for his drug addiction, not for pain as the Plaintiff stated in response to the Questionnaire propounded by the undersigned (Def. App. 108; Plaintiff's Response to the Questionnaire, filed on July 15, 1999, at 3). In the PMH records, it states that if "patient does not receive this medication monitor closely for signs of withdrawal" (Def. App. 108). In his affidavit, the Defendant states that, in fact, Methadone is not available in the Dallas County Jail for treatment of addiction (Def. App. 63). As the records indicate, however, the Plaintiff was monitored very closely on a daily basis by both the jail and PMH (Def. App. 60-219), in accordance with the instructions of PMH (Def. App. 108). Thus, Defendant Bowers did not deny the Plaintiff access to Methadone with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
The Plaintiff also alleges he was denied access to Lortab (hydrocodone). When the Plaintiff was initially booked into the Dallas County Jail on September 23, 1997, he arrived with a filled prescription for hydrocodone for pain (Def. App. 63, 66). However, the very next day, September 24, 1997, he was transferred back to PMH (Def. App. 67-68). When he returned to the Dallas County Jail two months later, he did not have a prescription for Lortab, nor did he have the medication on his person (Def. App. 63, 66, 68-2 19). At no time after September 23, 1997, did PMH or the Defendant prescribe Lortab for the Plaintiff (Def. App. 60-2 19). Therefore, the Defendant did not deny the Plaintiff access to Lortab for his pain because Lortab was never prescribed for the Plaintiff by PMH or Defendant Bowers after September 23, 1997.
The Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Bowers acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by housing him with the general population instead of in the Jail's infirmary (Plaintiff's Original Complaint at 4). However, the competent summary judgment evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiff was housed in a medical tank the entire time he was housed in the Dallas County Jail (Def. App. 39, 56). Therefore, his claim is without merit.
Finally, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant Bowers implemented a policy that caused jail employees to act or fail to act with subjective deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff's serious medical needs. The policy of the Jail was to provide reasonable and adequate medical care to all inmates in the Dallas County Jail (Def App. 63). The policy also required that inmates in need of greater care than that provided for in the jail be transferred to PMH for more extensive care (Def. App. 63). Such was the case here as the records show that the Plaintiff was transferred to PMH no less than ten (10) times between the time he was returned to the Dallas County Jail on November 21, 1997, and the date he was finally released, January 21, 1997 (Def. App. 60-2 19).
The Defendant has asserted that he is entitled to qualified immunity of the Plaintiff's claims to the extent he is being sued in his individual capacity. The doctrine of qualified immunity affords protection against individual liability for civil damages to officials "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). The Supreme Court has explained that "the contours of the right" allegedly violated "must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton. 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987). Moreover, the "relevant inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable official in the defendant's position could have believed his conduct to be lawful, considering the state of the law as it existed when the defendant took his challenged actions." Poe Haydon 853 F.2d 418, 423-24 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 788 (1989).
The examination of a claim of qualified immunity is a two-step process. The first inquiry is whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley 500 U.S. 226, 231-32, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991).
The next step is to determine the standard by which to judge the reasonableness of the defendant's behavior. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 1992). In determining the objective reasonableness of the defendant's behavior the court must judge the behavior against the clearly established law at the time of the alleged incident. Johnson v. City of Houston 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1994).
The burden of negating the qualified immunity defense rests on the plaintiff. Foster v. City of Lake Jackson 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1994). In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff must allege "detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity cannot be sustained." Nieto v. San Perlita Independent School District, 894 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1990).
In the instant case, the record establishes that all of the actions taken by Defendant Bowers were taken in the good faith performance of his official duties as Medical Director of the Dallas County Jail and those actions did not result in a violation of the Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. The failure to provide Methadone was reasonable because the jail was not authorized to dispense it (Def. App. 60-65). The alleged failure to provide Lortab is no failure at all because it was not prescribed by the doctors at PMH or by Defendant Bowers (Def. App. 60-219). Finally, the Plaintiff, in direct contradiction of his allegation, was placed in the medical tank as ordered by Defendant Bowers and others on the medical staff, not the general population (Def. App. 39, 56). None of these actions violated the Plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights. Defendant Bowers is entitled to qualified immunity to the extent he is sued in his individual capacity.
To the extent the Defendant has been sued in his official capacity, he is also entitled to summary judgment. For purposes of liability, a suit against a public official in his official capacity is in effect a suit against the local government entity he represents. Kentucky Bureau of State Police v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Thus, the Petitioner's suit against Defendant Bowers in his official capacity is treated as a claim against the governmental entity — Dallas County. Brooks v. George County. Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948, 117 S.Ct. 359, 136 L.Ed.2d 251 (1996).
The Plaintiff did not specifically state if Defendant Bowers was being sued in his individual and/or official capacity. In an abundance of caution, the court construes the Plaintiff's claims as being brought against Defendant Bowers in both his individual and official capacity.
When a Section 1983 claim is asserted against a governmental entity, two issues must be addressed: (1) whether the plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the entity is responsible for that violation. Id. Dallas County may be held liable under Section 1983 only where the plaintiff demonstrates a policy or custom which caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. A violation must be caused by a policy or custom consisting of a deliberate or conscious choice by policy makers. Richardson v. Oldham 12 F.3d 1373, 1381 (5th Cir. 1994).
Policy and custom have been defined as:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision that is officially adopted or promulgated by the official to whom the governmental entity has delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of officials or employees, which although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the entity or to an official to whom the body had delegated policy-making authority.Eugene v. Alief Independent School Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1304 (5th Cir. 1995). Isolated violations are not the persistent, often-repeated, constant violations that constitute custom and policy, as required for Section 1983 liability. Campbell v. City of San Antonio. 43 F.3d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, the Plaintiff failed to show that he suffered any injury, that his alleged injuries were caused by a constitutional violation, and that the County is responsible for that violation. The Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a policy or custom consisting of a deliberate conscious choice made by a policymaker the resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. Thus, the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent that he is being sued in his official capacity.
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
A copy of this order will be transmitted to counsel for the plaintiffs and to counsel for the defendants.
ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2000.