Opinion
Case No. 2:18-cv-00216-RMG-MGB
09-30-2019
Penny Sambrano, Plaintiff, v. Palmetto Heights Management, LLC, d/b/a Airport Inn; Archdale Development, LLC; and Kamlesh Shah, individually, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36) be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was hired as a sales representative and front desk clerk at the Clarion Inn & Suites ("Clarion") in North Charleston on September 27, 2012. (Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 36-2 at 50:16-52:24.) The Clarion is owned and operated by Defendant Archdale Development, LLC ("Archdale"), a South Carolina limited liability company owned by Defendant Kamlesh Shah ("Shah"). (Dkt. No. 40 at 1-2; Dkt. No. 36-1 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 36-3 at 26:3-29:10.) Shah is the sole member of Archdale. (Id.) Additionally, he is the sole owner and member of Defendant Palmetto Heights, LLC ("Palmetto Heights"), which owns and operates a neighboring hotel called the Airport Inn. (Id.)
During the course of her employment at the Clarion, Plaintiff contends that she was "subjected to ongoing sexual harassment" by Shah. (Dkt. No. 40 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Shah pressured her to wear short skirts and tight, low-cut shirts that would expose her breasts in order to increase sales (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 80:14-15, 81:2-4, 82:19-83:2; Dkt. No. 40 at 2-4; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); directed Plaintiff to flirt with customers and essentially "go sell sex," (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 84:22-85:2; Dkt. No. 40 at 2, 4); made frequent remarks to Plaintiff about her breasts (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 87:23-88:7; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); made comments to Plaintiff about "wet pussy" and "getting head," (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 102:25-103:8; Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); told Plaintiff that his two favorite things in life are "money and good pussy," (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 89:13-19; Dkt. No. 40 at 2-4; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); commented that he liked "big asses," (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 94:1-9, 109:11-22; Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); grabbed his genitals in front of Plaintiff and stated, "it's large," (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 110:17-20; Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); and remarked that a woman is nothing without a man behind her (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 89:13-19, 91:21-92:2; Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6).
Plaintiff found Shah's gestures and comments to be offensive, embarrassing, shocking and abrasive, (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 84:22-85:2, 88:4-11, 89:20-91:11; 94:19-22, 100:15-20, 104:3-12), and despite telling him to stop, Shah continued to make inappropriate sexual remarks to Plaintiff. (Id. at 85:18-23, 111:2-16; Dkt. No. 40 at 4.) In fact, Plaintiff claims that she came to expect Shah's "unethical" behavior on a daily basis. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 111:2-16.) Although Plaintiff informally complained about Shah's ongoing conduct to the Airport Inn's General Manager Tiffany Slawson ("Ms. Slawson"), Plaintiff did not officially report Shah's conduct for fear that he would retaliate against her and terminate her employment. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 87:7-12, 91:1-11, 92:19-24, 108:20-25, 113:6-14, 120:11-121:12.) Plaintiff claims, however, that Regional Manager Tom Slawson ("Mr. Slawson") was generally aware of Shah's inappropriate behavior. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 119:25-120:10, 145:23-146:4, 146:21-147:8; Dkt. No. 40 at 4.)
Tom Slawson is Tiffany Slawson's father. (Dkt. No. 48 ¶ 2.)
In April 2014, Plaintiff's employment at the Clarion was terminated by the new General Manager Vivian Faulk ("Ms. Faulk"). (Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 36-1 at 6; Dkt. No. 36-2 at 122:16-21, 147:12-14.) Following the termination of her employment, Plaintiff claims that she met with Ms. Slawson and other now former Clarion/Airport Inn employees to discuss, among other things, their individual experiences with Shah's sexual harassment and possible recourse for his behavior. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 113:3-5, 115:1-23, 117:1-19; 147:19-24.) Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination ("Charge") with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission ("SCHAC") and Equal Employment Opportunity Committee ("EEOC") on or around July 2, 2014, alleging sex discrimination. (Dkt. No. 40-4.) Notably, Plaintiff did not allege a claim of retaliation in her Charge. (Id.) Plaintiff provided the following narrative in support of her discrimination claim:
I was sexually harassed from on or about March 1, 2013, through on or about April 13, 2014 by Mr. Kam Shaw [sic], Owner. On several occasions, Mr. Shaw made unwelcome sexual advances and sexual comments about my appearance. In fear of retaliation, I did not report the sexual harassment. Similarly-situated males were not subjected to such treatment.(Id. at 1.)
I therefore believe I was discriminated against because of my sex (female/including sexual harassment) in violation of the SC Human Affairs Law, as amended and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Plaintiff testified that the aforementioned dates are only an approximation. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 79:23-80:20.)
On August 30, 2017, the EEOC issued its determination on the merits of Plaintiff's Charge and found that the evidence was sufficient to show that Plaintiff "was subjected to severe and pervasive unwelcome sexual comments by [Shah]." (Dkt. No. 40-8.) The EEOC therefore determined that there was "reasonable cause to conclude that [Plaintiff] was discriminated against because of sex (female/sexual harassment), in violation of Title VII." (Id.)
After receiving notice of her right to sue, Plaintiff filed this action in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, Charleston County, on or around December 27, 2017, (Dkt. No. 1-1), and Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on January 25, 2018 (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff's Complaint alleges two causes of action against Defendants: retaliation and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). (Dkt. No. 1-1.) On March 29, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims. (Dkt. No. 36.) Plaintiff filed her Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on April 24, 2019, (Dkt. No. 40), and Defendants filed their Reply on May 13, 2019, (Dkt. No. 45).
In addition to the instant action, two now former employees of Shah—Ms. Slawson and Shyan Barnett ("Barnett")—have filed companion cases alleging similar claims of sexual harassment and retaliation against those same Defendants named in Plaintiff's Complaint. See Slawson v. Palmetto Heights Management LLC et al, No. 2:18-CV-00217-RMG-MGB and Barnett v. Palmetto Heights Management LLC et al, No. 2:18-CV-00204-RMG-MGB. The instant action was consolidated with these companion cases for discovery purposes only. (Dkt. No. 40 at 1 n.1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor." See id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). However, "the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
I. Retaliation in Violation of Title VII
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because she opposed any unlawful employment practice, or has made a charge or has participated in an investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). However, before filing an action for retaliation under Title VII, the claimant must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC addressing the retaliatory conduct. See Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the purpose of administrative exhaustion is to notify the employer of the alleged discrimination and provide for a less adversarial process through which the EEOC may investigate and attempt to resolve the conflict); see also 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the EEOC finds a violation of Title VII and is unable to secure a resolution or settlement among the parties, the agency may issue notice of a right to sue to the claimant. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b). As a general rule, the scope of the subsequent lawsuit "is defined by the scope of the administrative charge from which it arises and from any findings that arise out of the investigation of the charge." EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 1976); see also Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that in any subsequent lawsuit alleging unlawful employment practices under Title VII, a federal court may only consider those allegations included in the EEOC charge).
Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim because "the claim was not articulated in her charge" and therefore "has not been administratively exhausted." (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 9.) In response, Plaintiff "concedes she failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect solely to the charge of retaliation insofar as Plaintiff failed to check the 'box,' and articulate facts which support a claim of retaliation in her EEOC charge. Plaintiff concedes only that the claim of retaliation may be subject to summary dismissal." (Dkt. No. 40 at 6.) Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36) be granted as to Plaintiff's retaliation claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
As Defendants correctly note, any attempt by Plaintiff to refile her retaliation claim would be procedurally barred as untimely. (See Dkt. No. 36-1 at 9, referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).)
II. Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII
Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Sexual harassment represents a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); see also Langley v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 804, 821 (D.S.C. 2013). In order to establish a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show that the offending conduct was (1) unwelcome, (2) based on the plaintiff's sex, (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment, and (4) that there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer. See Williams v. NHC Healthcare/Bluffton, LLC, No. 9:16-CV-2677-DCN-BM, 2017 WL 9690360, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 14, 2017), adopted, No. 9:16-CV-2677-DCN, 2018 WL 1175099 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2018).
In the instant case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the third element of her sexual harassment claim because her allegations "do not suffice to rise to the level of either severe or pervasive actions resulting in an abusive atmosphere at work." (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 25.) To satisfy the "severe or pervasive" standard under Title VII, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive, and that the conduct was such that "an objective reasonable person would perceive [the plaintiff's] work environment to be hostile or abusive." See Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., No. 18-1507, 2019 WL 4018288, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2019). "Incidents that would objectively give rise to bruised or wounded feelings will not on that account satisfy the severe or pervasive standard." Evans v. Int'l Paper Co., No. 18-1448, 2019 WL 4018287, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2019) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, "rude treatment from coworkers, callous behavior by one's superiors, or a routine difference of opinion and personality conflict with one's supervisor are not actionable under Title VII." Id.
The objective inquiry "is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test." See E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008) (referencing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)).
Rather, when determining whether the harassing conduct was objectively severe or pervasive, we must look at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. No single factor is dispositive, as the real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.See id. (internal citations omitted). Ultimately, "whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment is quintessentially a question of fact for the jury." See Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2000) (referencing Smith v. First Union Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 2000)). "Thus, while summary judgment is appropriate in cases where the facts are clearly insufficient to satisfy the standard, when there is a close question and reasonable minds could differ when weighting all the facts against the law, then summary judgment is inappropriate." Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Viewing the record as a whole—including all "surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships"—and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was exposed to an objectively hostile work environment during the course of her employment at the Clarion. Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315. Specifically, Plaintiff was frequently subjected to humiliating comments about her breasts by Shah (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 87:23-88:7; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); was pressured to flirt with customers and increase hotel sales by selling her body and wearing clothing that would reveal her breasts (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 80:14-15, 81:2-4, 82:19-83:2, 84:22-85:2; Dkt. No. 40 at 2-4; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); was subjected to sexually-explicit comments and gestures (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 89:13-19, 94:1-9, 102:25-103:8, 109:11-22, 110:17-20; Dkt. No. 40 at 2-4; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); and was subjected to other demeaning statements about women (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 89:13-19, 91:21-92:2, 94:1-9, 109:11-22; Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6). According to Plaintiff, Shah engaged in this "unethical" conduct so often that she began expecting it on a daily basis. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 111:2-16.)
Notably, as the owner of the Clarion, Shah "controlled" the workplace and operated as Plaintiff's boss, which likely enhanced the severity of the harassment. (Dkt. No. 40 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6-7.) See Sanchez v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., No. GJH-18-3106, 2019 WL 3717771, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2019) (explaining that comments made by a supervisor generally will be considered more severe than those made by co-equals or subordinates); Wheeler v. Virginia, No. 7:17-CV-00337, 2019 WL 758611, at *5 (W.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2019) ("The Court has also explained that 'the status of the harasser may be a significant factor' in measuring the severity of harassing conduct, since harassment perpetrated by a manager or supervisor against a subordinate employee has a 'particularly threatening character.'") (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998)). Indeed, Plaintiff testified that she found Shah's remarks particularly embarrassing due to his position as her boss, and that she did not officially report his conduct because, as owner of the Clarion, Shah had the power to terminate her employment. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 84:22-85:2, 87:7-12, 88:4-11, 120:11-121:12.) Further, the undersigned notes the apparent futility in filing an internal complaint, as Regional Manager Mr. Slawson was allegedly aware of Shah's behavior and yet it continued nonetheless. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 119:25-120:10, 145:23-146:4, 146:21-147:8; Dkt. No. 36-5 at 140:6-15; Dkt. No. 40 at 4.)
Plaintiff's subjective perception of Shah's behavior is corroborated by the fact that other female employees joined Ms. Slawson and Plaintiff in exploring potential legal recourse against Shah for his mistreatment of women in the workplace. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 114:22-115:23, 117:1-19.) Although in no way dispositive, the shared experiences and frustrations among the female employees suggest, at the very least, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an objective, reasonable individual in Plaintiff's position could have found the work environment abusive. See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 696 (4th Cir. 2007) (considering harassment directed at both plaintiff and her female co-workers in order to examine all relevant circumstances in the objectivity inquiry) (emphasis added); Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d at 209 (considering comments made to other employees for purposes of the objectivity inquiry because "the totality of the circumstances includes conduct not directed at the plaintiff") (internal citations omitted); Williamson v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 754 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (E.D.N.C. 2010) ("Other employees' notice and vocal disapproval of the harassment highlighted its objective severity.").
In the same vein, although the undersigned does not decide the merits of the companion cases here, these similar claims of sexual harassment further suggest that other women employed by Defendants also found Shah's conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to impede their work performance and that there likely is a genuine issue of fact as to the objectively hostile and abusive nature of this work environment. See Slawson v. Palmetto Heights Management LLC et al, No. 2:18-CV-00217-RMG-MGB and Barnett v. Palmetto Heights Management LLC et al, No. 2:18-CV-00204-RMG-MGB.
The undersigned acknowledges that while some of the above factors support a finding that Shah's behavior is actionable, other factors may not. However, we are not called upon to weigh that evidence at this stage; "[i]nstead, the court's task is simply to examine whether the record contains proof from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude 'that the environment was pervaded with discriminatory conduct aimed to humiliate, ridicule, or intimidate, thereby creating an abusive atmosphere.'" Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d at 209. In light of the sexual nature of Shah's comments to Plaintiff, the frequency of his offensive remarks towards Plaintiff and other female employees, and the fact that such conduct occurred while Shah was Plaintiff's boss, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has presented enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the harassment alleged was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive atmosphere. See, e.g., Mosby-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326, 335 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding plaintiff's allegations sufficient to satisfy the severe-or-pervasive standard at summary judgment where "sexist comments" were frequently made to plaintiff or in her presence, including demeaning references to women such as "bitches" and "crazy"); Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697-99 (finding that the defendant's frequent, open discussion of sex, including his own sex life, could create a pervasively hostile work environment); Wheeler, 2019 WL 758611, at *6 (finding question of fact regarding severity of harassment where manager voiced his opinions about sex, licked his lips when plaintiff walked past, and expressed pleasure in being able to see plaintiff's cleavage); see also Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that a plaintiff may prove sex-based discrimination even though she is not subjected to sexual propositions or physical touching).
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment appropriately cites a series of prior case law in which district courts from the Fourth Circuit have found certain sexual comments and behaviors insufficient to satisfy the severe-or-pervasive standard under a Title VII harassment claim. (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 19-29.) However, conduct alleged in previous cases does not conclusively "mark the boundary of what is actionable." Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Indeed, the fact that our courts have reached different decisions surrounding similar conduct highlights the fact-intensive nature of sexual harassment claims and the importance of examining the totality of circumstances influencing the specific workplace behavior at issue. Wheeler, 2019 WL 758611, at *6; see also Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d at 210 ("That there are also arguments that suggest that this conduct may not be sufficiently severe or pervasive does not mean that a reasonable jury could not conclude otherwise.").
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim so that a jury may undertake the fact-intensive inquiry of whether Shah's harassment went beyond the "ordinary tribulations of the workplace" and created a hostile work environment. Strickland v. Acevedo Restaurants, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-2566-RMG, 2014 WL 798402, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2014); see also Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d at 208 (explaining that whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment is a question of fact for the jury when reasonable minds could differ).
III. Individual Liability Under Title VII
Lastly, to the extent Plaintiff's Complaint survives Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Shah should be dismissed as a party to this action because Title VII does not provide causes of action against defendants in their individual capacities. (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 29-31.) In response, Plaintiff claims that Shah is the alter ego of Defendants Palmetto Heights and Archdale and therefore "should be treated as one and the same and held jointly liable on all theories of liability." (Dkt. No. 40 at 9-10.)
As stated above, Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the word "individual" to mean the company-employer and has concluded that "supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations." Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998). The court reasoned in Lissau that the only reasonable interpretation of Title VII is "to foreclose individual liability" because Title VII exempts small employers and "it would be incongruous to hold Title VII does not apply to the owner of a five-person company but applies with full force to a person who supervises an identical number of employees in a larger company." Id.
Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, this holding also applies where an individual is effectively the alter ego of a closely held company or corporation. See Alford v. Wang, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 3d 584, 595-96 (D.S.C. 2014) (rejecting alter ego theory of individual liability in Title VII lawsuit). Indeed, this Court has found that individual liability does not exist under Title VII even if "a sole shareholder abused the corporate form and the corporate veil were pierced." Id. (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff may not maintain a Title VII claim against Defendant Shah in his individual capacity and the undersigned therefore recommends that he be removed from this action.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36) be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's retaliation claim and DENIED as to Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim. The undersigned further recommends that Defendant Shah be removed as a party to this action.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE September 30, 2019 Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).