Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 03-0176, SECTION: "R"(2)
August 25, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of plaintiff for summary judgment on his claim of negligence against defendants. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2002, a freightliner, driven by defendant Lafayette Thomas and owned by defendant Schneider National Carriers, collided with plaintiff's Ford F150 while it was traveling west in the right-hand lane of Interstate 10 in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. Plaintiff asserts that Thomas rear-ended plaintiff when plaintiff slowed down due to traffic congestion, forcing plaintiff's car against a guardrail and causing plaintiff neck, back, shoulder, knee, and leg injuries and headaches. On January 17, 2003, plaintiff filed suit against defendants for negligence under Louisiana law.
There is some confusion in the briefs as to whether this defendant's name is Larvelle Lafayette or Lafayette Thomas. For consistency's sake, the Court will refer to this defendant as Lafayette Thomas.
Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is proper because under Louisiana law, "the driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:81. Further, plaintiff argues that under Louisiana law, the following motorist in a rear-end collision is presumed negligent. See Hopstetter v. Nichols, 98-185, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/28/98); 716 So.2d 458, 461.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323; 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Under Louisiana law, exceptions to this rule have been recognized: "In summary judgments, the burden of initial production of evidence is with the mover, but when . . . the presumption [of negligence] is applied, the burden shifts to the offending motorist." Gautreaux v. W.W. Rowland Trucking Co., 99-1002, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/29/00); 757 So.2d 87, 90. Although Gautreaux addressed a different vehicular presumption of negligence, Louisiana law applies a similar presumption of negligence in this situation under LA. REV. STAT. 32:81. The burden is therefore on the offending motorist to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Tolbert v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 1998-637, p. 3; 719 So.2d 738, 740.
B. Duty of Care Under La. R.S. 32:81
As cited above, Louisiana Revised Statute 32:81 furnishes the standard of care required of motorists who follow other vehicles. Louisiana courts have determined that a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of liability against the following vehicle. See Eubanks v. Brasseal, 310 So.2d 550, 553 (La. 1975) ("[A] following motorist who strikes a preceding motorist from the rear is presumed to have breached the standard of conduct prescribed in R.S. 32:81 and, hence, is presumed negligent."). Once it is established that the following motorist has rear-ended a car, the following driver may rebut the presumption that he violated LA. REV. STAT. 32:81 by showing that he kept his vehicle under control, that he observed the preceding vehicle, and that he followed at a safe distance under the circumstances. See Eubanks, 310 So.2d at 553.
In addition, the offending motorist may overcome the presumption of negligence by showing that the unpredictable driving of the preceding motorists created a sudden emergency that the following motorist could not reasonably have anticipated. See id.; see also Layfield v. Altazan, 255 So.2d 363, 364 (La.Ct.App. 1971). The doctrine of unavoidable or inevitable accident relieves an offending motorist of liability, as long as the motorist invoking the doctrine shows that he was not to blame for the accident. See Seals v. Morris, 410 So.2d 715, 718-19 (La. 1982). It is well-settled Louisiana law that a driver of a following vehicle is not negligent per se for failing to maintain a specific distance between his car and the preceding vehicle. See Volkswagen Ins. Co. v. Tamburello, 210 So.2d 136, 139 (La.Ct.App. 1968). Rather, "negligence is to be determined by all of the facts." Id.
The Court determines that defendant presents adequate evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of negligence. Defendant contends that the erratic driving of plaintiff and of other unknown drivers preceding plaintiff contributed to the accident. Mem. In Opp'n to Mot. For Summ. J., Ex. 1 at 41. Defendant points to the plaintiff's deposition testimony in which plaintiff testified that the brakes of the preceding automobile "locked up," causing the preceding vehicle to swerve. Id. at 39-40. Plaintiff admits in his deposition to his own "abrupt" braking due to the erratic swerving of the automobile preceding him. Id. at 39-40. If the brakes of the preceding automobile did indeed "lock up," such evidence, if true, could rebut the presumption of negligence attributed to a following motorist under LA. REV. STAT. § 32.81. Accidents caused by the sudden maneuvers of preceding automobiles are situations in which Louisiana courts have relieved the offending motorist of liability. See Layfield, 255 So.2d at 364. The determination of whether plaintiff himself and/or another driver caused an unforeseeable emergency that contributed to the accident is a question for the jury. The Court finds the defendant's evidentiary references to plaintiff's own deposition testimony adequate to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for all of the above and foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Defendant has raised a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Court therefore DENIES plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.