However, after noting that there is no statutory authority for an involuntary dismissal under those circumstances ( id., at pp. 914-915), the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, concluding that it was "too drastic a remedy in light of the fact that arbitration was not intended to supplant traditional trial proceedings" ( id., at p. 919). Instead, the appropriate remedy for the plaintiff's behavior was that provided by section 128.5 (42 Cal.3d at p. 919; accord, Salowitz Organization, Inc. v. Traditional Industries, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 797, 802-806 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 493].) An award of sanctions under section 128.5 is a far more limited penalty than an award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 Sanctions may not be levied under section 128.5 unless the trial court finds that the action or tactic in question was in bad faith and was frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
However, because no final order was prepared at the time Carranza filed his notice of appeal, his appeal was initially premature. (Salowitz Org. v. Traditional Indus. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 797, 808 ["Where findings of fact or some other type of formal evidence of the judgment or order is required, an appeal does not lie from a minute order."]; see also Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953) 41 Cal.2d 300, 304- 306 [minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is not itself appealable].)
) Section 1008 purported to be neither jurisdictional nor exclusive. ( Id. at pp. 633-634; Salowitz Organization, Inc. v. Traditional Industries, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 797, 807-808). The trial court retained its inherent power to reconsider interim rulings.
"' [Citations.]" ( Salowitz Organization, Inc. v. Traditional Industries, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 797, 806.) III.