Opinion
Civil No. 02-1275 (RHK/RLE)
July 31, 2003
James H. Sallis, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, pro se.
Mark B. Rotenberg and Brian J. Slovut, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. In this pro se action. Plaintiff James H. Sallis has sued his employer, Defendant University of Minnesota, for "race discrimination age in the area of reprisal." (Compl. at 1.) The University originally moved to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that Sallis's claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) that Sallis's race discrimination failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Following a change in Minn. Stat. § 1.05, however, which clarified Minnesota's waiver of sovereign immunity for certain federal statutes including the ADEA, the University filed a supplemental memorandum withdrawing its Eleventh Amendment defense and stating that Sallis's race and age discrimination claims should both be dismissed for failure to state a prima facie case. For the reasons below, the Court will deny the University's Motion.
Standard of Decision
"Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) serves to eliminate actions which are fatally flawed in their legal premises and destimed to fail, thereby sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity."Young v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001). A cause of action "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Svs. Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (citing Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1148 (8th Cir. 1993)). In analyzing the adequacy of a complaint's allegations under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint liberally and afford the plaintiff all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those allegations. See Turner v. Holbrook, 278 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2002).
Analysis
As an initial matter, the Court notes that "[a] pro se complaint is to be liberally construed and should not be dismissed unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support the claim." Ouzts v. Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Holloway v. Lockhart, 792 F.2d 760, 761-61 (8th Cir. 1986)).
The University has moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that it fails to state a prima facie case under Title VII or the ADEA. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema. N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), however, the United States Supreme Court resolved this question in a manner directly contrary to the University's position. In upholding the sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint alleging race and age discrimination in violation of Title VII the ADEA, the Supreme Court stated: "we hold that an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination . . . to survive a motion to dismiss." Id. at 515. In so holding, the Court sided with the Eighth Circuit, which since 1993 has held:
The University "assumes from Plaintiff's use of the word `reprisal'" that Sallis intended to state a claim of retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA. (P1.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 4). The Court, however, does not read the Complaint so narrowly. Construing this pro se Complaint liberally, as is the Court's obligation, see Ouzts, 825 F.2d at 1277, it seems that "race discrimination age in the area of reprisal" could embody at least race discrimination under Title VII, age discrimination under the ADEA, retaliation under Title VII, and retaliation under the ADEA.
[T]he prima facie case . . . is an evidentiary standard— it defines the quantum of proof plaintiff must present to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination that shifts the burden to defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an evidentiary standard is not a proper measure of whether a complaint fails to state a claim.Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993).
While the spartan allegations in the Complaint do raise questions about the longterm viability of Sallis's claims, "[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Here, given that the University's sole ground supporting dismissal is defective, and the liberal pleading standards afforded pro se claimants, the Court finds that dismissal is unwarranted.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED.