Opinion
No. 04-16-00247-CR
03-15-2017
Leandra M. SALINAS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the County Court, Karnes County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2014-012507
Honorable Walter R. Long Jr., Judge Presiding Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice REVERSED AND REMANDED
Leandra Salinas pleaded nolo contendere to the misdemeanor offense of possession of a substance listed in Penalty Group 2-A of the Texas Health and Safety Code and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision. On appeal, Salinas challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of a statement that Salinas contends was the product of an unwarned custodial interrogation. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
Deputy Jimmy Loya of the Karnes County Sheriff's Office stopped the vehicle in which Salinas was a passenger for having an obscured license plate. Loya approached the vehicle on the passenger side, and as he spoke with the occupants, he smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana. Two additional deputies in a single vehicle arrived a short time later to assist with the traffic stop. Salinas and the driver, Albert Farias, were removed from their vehicle and placed in handcuffs. Loya informed them he was searching the vehicle because of the marijuana odor. As Loya searched the vehicle, Salinas voluntarily informed him there was a blunt, or rolled marijuana cigarette, in her purse.
Loya verified the purse he found belonged to Salinas and located the marijuana cigarette. He then asked Salinas if she had anything else on her, and Salinas responded she did. Loya discovered through further questioning that a baggie of synthetic marijuana and a plastic container with an unknown substance were hidden in Salinas's shirt. Loya placed Salinas under arrest after she retrieved the synthetic marijuana and a plastic container holding what Loya believed to be methamphetamine. According to the complaint authored by Loya, as well as Loya's testimony, Salinas was not given the Miranda warnings any time prior to being placed under arrest.
Although Loya testified he believed the substance to be methamphetamine based on his experience, the record in this case does not indicate whether later testing showed the substance to actually be methamphetamine.
Loya also testified he did not give Salinas the Miranda warnings following her arrest.
The State charged Salinas by information with the offense of "Possession of Dangerous Drug ... a substance listed in PG 2-A." The information identified the substance as "a synthetic chemical compound that is cannabinoid receptor agonist and mimics the pharmacological effect of naturally occurring cannabinoids." Salinas filed a motion to suppress the synthetic marijuana, arguing the reason for the traffic stop became moot once Loya was able to view the license plate and the synthetic marijuana was illegally obtained as a result of unwarned custodial interrogation. The trial court denied Salinas's motion to suppress.
ANALYSIS
Salinas contends she was in custody for purposes of Miranda when she answered Loya's question of whether she had anything else on her. Salinas argues that at the point Loya collected the marijuana cigarette, she had committed the offense of possession of marijuana and probable cause existed for her arrest, she was deprived of her freedom, and believed she was under arrest. As a result, she argues, the synthetic marijuana and her statement were erroneously admitted into evidence.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We review the trial court's factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We afford almost complete deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, "especially if those are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor." Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 436 (quoting Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). We give the same deference to the trial court's conclusions with respect to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor, as well as purely legal questions, de novo. Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 436.
When, as in this case, the trial court did not make explicit findings of fact and neither party timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court's ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those implied findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We assume the trial court resolved any issues of historical fact or credibility consistently with its ultimate ruling. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We will reverse the trial court's ruling "only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or 'outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.'" State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). We afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732; see also State v. Copeland, No. PD-1549-15, 2016 WL 5952000, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2016).
Custody
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court mandated that suspects be warned of their constitutional rights before being subjected to custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-70 (1966). A routine traffic stop does not automatically place a person in custody for Miranda purposes, but such a stop "may escalate from a non-custodial detention into a custodial detention when formal arrest ensues or a detainee's freedom of movement is restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest." Ortiz v. State, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). An assessment of whether a suspect has been detained to the degree associated with arrest is made on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In determining whether an individual was in custody, we must determine whether, given the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, a reasonable person would have perceived detention by law enforcement officers to be a restraint on her movement comparable to the restraint of formal arrest. Thomspon v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
The Court of Criminal Appeals described "at least four general situations that may constitute custody:"
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave.State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255). The first three situations "require that the restriction on a suspect's freedom of movement must reach 'the degree associated with an arrest' instead of an investigative detention." Id. (quoting Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255). Although the fourth situation requires that an officer's knowledge of probable cause be manifested to the suspect, custody is not established unless that manifestation of probable cause combined with other circumstances, such as duration or factors relating to the exercise of police control over the suspect, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest. Id.
In evaluating whether a reasonable person would believe his freedom has been restrained to the degree of formal arrest, [we] look only to the objective factors surrounding the detention. The subjective beliefs of the detaining officer are not included in the calculation of whether a suspect is in custody. But if the officer manifests his belief to the detainee that he is a suspect, then that officer's subjective belief becomes relevant to the determination of whether a reasonable person in the detainee's position would believe he is in custody. Conversely, any undisclosed subjective belief of the suspect that he is guilty of an offense should not be taken into consideration—the reasonable person standard presupposes an "innocent person."Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d at 372-73 (references omitted).
On the other hand, a person held for investigative detention is not in "custody." Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255. An investigative detention involves detaining a person reasonably suspected of criminal activity in order to determine his identity or to momentarily maintain the status quo in order to garner more information. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). This sort of "Terry stop" must be a temporary detention, must last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, must involve actual investigation, and must use the least intrusive means possible. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that detention may continue only so long as "articulable facts" support reasonable suspicion that suspect was engaged in criminal activity). A person who is being held for an investigative detention is not in custody. Campbell v. State, 325 S.W.3d 223, 233 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255).
Applicable Case Law
Salinas relies on Ortiz v. State and Ramirez v. State to support her argument that Loya was required to give her the requisite warnings prior to asking whether she had anything else on her. See Ortiz v. State, 382 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Ramirez v. State, 105 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). In response, the State relies on Estrada v. State as support for its argument that Salinas was not in custody until Salinas produced the synthetic marijuana and Loya formally placed Salinas under arrest. See Estrada v. State, No. PD-0106-13, 2014 WL 969221 (Tex. Crim. App. March 12, 2014) (not designated for publication). The State asserts Salinas was the subject of an investigative detention and the questions asked by Loya were follow-up questions related to the marijuana scent and discovery of the marijuana cigarette in Salinas's purse rather than interrogation. A. Ramirez v. State
In Ramirez, an officer who arrived at Ramirez's home in response to a neighbor's complaint noticed marijuana paraphernalia, marijuana residue, and the odor of marijuana as Ramirez stepped out of the garage and closed the door behind him. Ramirez, 105 S.W.3d at 735. A second individual, Reynosa, exited the garage and left the door partially open. Id. at 736. The officer called for back-up because he recognized Reynosa as a suspect in a shooting and became concerned that Reynosa or Ramirez may have weapons. Id. Reynosa was subjected to a pat down, which revealed a knife and a plastic bag containing marijuana. Id. Reynosa was arrested and moved away from the garage. Id. Ramirez was also subjected to a pat down. Id. While conducting the pat down, the officer told Ramirez he was being detained and placed him in handcuffs. Id. The officer informed Ramirez that he could see drug paraphernalia and drug residue in the garage and asked, "Is there anything else I'm going to find in there that's illegal, any more marijuana?" Id. Ramirez replied, "Well, I guess there's some pot in the red cooler." Id.
The Austin Court of Appeals determined Ramirez was in custody at the time the officer asked whether he was going to find anything else in the garage because a reasonable person in Ramirez's position would likely believe his freedom of movement had been restrained to the degree associated with an arrest. Id. at 740. The court determined that when officers handcuffed Ramirez, told him he was being detained, and informed him they had seen illegal items in the garage, a reasonable person would have thought he was under arrest. Id. B. Ortiz v. State
In Ortiz, an officer discovered drugs on the passenger during a routine traffic stop. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d at 374. The officer accused the driver, Ortiz, of having drugs by asking, "How much drugs are in the car?" Id. at 373. The officer later asked, "What kind of drugs does she have?" after letting Ortiz know something had been found on the passenger during a pat-down search. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted this was the type of question that "by its very nature, conveyed to [Ortiz the officer's] presupposition that he knew what kind of drugs the passenger possessed." Id. Thus, in Ortiz, the officer's overt attitude regarding Ortiz's complicity was an important factor in the court ultimately concluding the driver was in custody at the time of questioning. Id. C. Estrada v. State
In Estrada, an officer smelled the odor of burnt marijuana during a traffic stop. Estrada, 2014 WL 969221, at *1. The officer ordered the driver and passenger out of the vehicle, and during a search of the vehicle, he found marijuana and other drug paraphernalia inside a makeup bag. Id. The officer then asked both occupants who the drugs belonged to. Id. Estrada confessed they were hers, and she was arrested. Id.
Estrada filed a motion to suppress arguing the officer's question was similar to that in Ortiz, and therefore, she was in custody when she provided an incriminating statement without receiving Miranda warnings. Id. The court acknowledged a reasonable person in her position would have recognized the officer suspected her of possessing drugs, but any communicated suspicion did not "approach the overtly communicated suspicion present in Ortiz." Id. at *3. Unlike the officer in Ortiz, the officer did not point blank ask only Estrada if the drugs were hers, but rather directed his question at both occupants. Id. That general inquiry was neither as coercive and accusatory as the direct questions made by the officer in Ortiz, nor was the inquiry made while the two occupants were physically separated, as in Ortiz. Id. The court concluded the officer's general attempt to gather information and general expression of suspicion towards both passengers did not provide "substantial support" that a reasonable person in Estrada's position would have believed she was in custody when she was confessed to ownership of the drugs. Id.
Discussion
In this case, Loya was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. The traffic stop and subsequent search and interaction between Loya and Salinas were not recorded. Loya testified his backup — two additional deputies in one vehicle — arrived before Salinas and Farias were ordered from their vehicle. Once Salinas and Farias exited the vehicle, they were immediately detained in handcuffs so Loya could conduct a "probable cause search" of the vehicle. Loya testified he did not inform Salinas and Farias they were free to leave at any time.
Loya testified Salinas was detained for the purpose of the search and he communicated the reason for the search — the burnt marijuana odor — to her. According to Loya, Salinas volunteered the information regarding the marijuana cigarette and directed him to where he could find it in her purse. During the suppression hearing, Loya testified that once he collected the marijuana cigarette, he asked Salinas if there was anything else he needed to know about. Loya's complaint/affidavit states he asked Salinas if she had anything else on her person. Salinas, through further prompting, revealed the existence and location of synthetic marijuana and what was thought to be methamphetamine. Loya testified he did not arrest Salinas until she produced the synthetic marijuana.
Although the number of law enforcement officers outnumbered the suspects and Loya testified Salinas was handcuffed and not free to leave as he searched the vehicle based on the marijuana odor, Loya's conduct at that time did not elevate the situation beyond an investigative detention. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. Even when Salinas told Loya she had a marijuana cigarette in her purse, the situation did not exceed a permissible Terry stop because Salinas volunteered the information without prompting. See id.
The pivotal point occurred when Loya collected the marijuana cigarette, and Salinas was aware he collected the marijuana cigarette from her purse. At that point, Loya had probable cause to arrest Salinas based on her possession of the marijuana cigarette, Salinas was handcuffed, and Loya did not tell her she was free to leave. Loya then asked Salinas if she had anything else on her. In response to that question, Salinas told Loya about the baggie of synthetic marijuana and the plastic container.
Applying the facts of this case to the situations identified by the Court of Criminal Appeals as constituting custody, it appears Salinas was in custody at the time Loya asked her if she had anything else on her. First, Loya physically deprived Salinas of her freedom of action in a significant way when he handcuffed her to search the vehicle. Second, Loya told Salinas she was handcuffed so that he could search the vehicle because of the marijuana odor, which indicated Salinas could not leave during the duration of the search. Third, Salinas was aware Loya found and collected the marijuana cigarette. Fourth, Salinas's continued detention in handcuffs after Loya's discovery of the marijuana cigarette created a situation that would lead a reasonable person in Salinas's position to believe that her freedom of movement was significantly restricted.
These factors paired with the fact that Loya never told Salinas she was free to leave satisfy the standards of defining custody.
Interrogation
In Miranda, the Supreme Court established that custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980). The Supreme Court clearly distinguishes between volunteered custodial statements and those made in response to interrogation. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299-300.
The need for Miranda safeguards arises when a person in custody "is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Id. at 300-01. "Interrogation" for Miranda purposes, refers both to express questioning and to any words or actions by the police — other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody — that police "should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 301. "Incriminating response" refers to both inculpatory and exculpatory responses that prosecutors may seek to introduce at trial. Id. at 302 & n.5. The likelihood of eliciting a response focuses on the perception of the suspect, not the intent of the police. Id. at 301. The Court noted that any practice the police should know is "reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect" constitutes interrogation. Id.
Based on these guidelines, we conclude Salinas was "interrogated" within the meaning of Miranda. Before Salinas made the statement regarding the synthetic marijuana, she was in custody. By asking Salinas whether she had anything else on her, Loya engaged in express questioning of Salinas. Loya did not first provide Miranda warnings to Salinas.
At a minimum, Loya's inquiry was the "functional equivalent" of interrogation. When Loya asked Salinas whether she had anything else on her, he had just collected the marijuana cigarette from her purse. Further, Salinas was already in handcuffs, and Loya had not administered the warnings required by Miranda.
A law enforcement officer "should know" that asking Salinas whether she had anything else on her was "reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response" from Salinas. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Further, a law enforcement officer should know that, if Salinas responded in the affirmative, the response would be one prosecutors would seek to introduce at trial. Loya should have known that the combination of having just collected the marijuana cigarette with his questioning would encourage Salinas to provide an incriminating response. See id.
In this case, Salinas's incriminating statement directly responded to an inquiry from Loya made while she was in custody. Under these facts, we cannot conclude Salinas's statement was made voluntarily. Accordingly, Salinas's statement was made pursuant to improper custodial interrogation and the synthetic marijuana evidence discovered as a result of that interrogation was seized in violation of her constitutional rights.
Harm Analysis
Having determined that constitutional error occurred, we must now determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). In making this determination, we consider the entire record and weigh the following factors: "(1) the importance of the [complained-of] evidence to the State's case; (2) whether the ... evidence was cumulative of other evidence; (3) the presence or absence of other evidence corroborating or contradicting the [complained-of] evidence, ...; (4) the overall strength of the State's case"; and (5) any other factor in the record that affects the probable impact of the error. Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
In this case, the State used evidence seized after an impermissible custodial interrogation that violated Salinas's constitutional rights. The State's case rested upon the seized evidence. Not only did the seized evidence cause Salinas to plead guilty, but a jury would probably place great weight on the evidence for the same reason — it is the only direct evidence of the crime charged. Finally, declaring Loya's custodial interrogation without Miranda protections to be harmless error could substantially undermine the protection afforded individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures and erode the protections afforded by Miranda.
Based on the facts of this case, the trial court's error contributed to Salinas's conviction. In any event, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not. Accordingly, we conclude the error caused Salinas harm.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing reasons, we hold the trial court erred by overruling Salinas's motion to suppress. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Irene Rios, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH