In particular, several cases involving adverse action prompted by unsatisfactory performance or misconduct have framed the relevant element much more broadly, as requiring a showing of "circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004); see Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1101 (10th Cir. 2005); Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 296 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002); Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 753 (10th Cir. 2000). While this broader requirement may be (and often is) satisfied by proof that the employer treated similarly situated employees more favorably, such proof is just one sufficient means to do this and should not itself be mistaken as an indispensable element of the prima facie case.

Most generally, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified and satisfactorily performing his job; and (3) he was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir.2004). Plaintiffs can establish evidence of the third prong in various ways, such as “actions or remarks made by decisionmakers,” “preferential treatment given to employees outside the protected class,” or “more generally, upon the timing or sequence of events leading to plaintiff's termination.”

Id. Citing Salguero v. City of Clovis , 366 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2004), Defendants argue that the material facts submitted establish that the Village's determination of "just cause" collaterally estops Plaintiff from relitigating the issue of just cause as part of her breach of contract claim. Doc. 133 at 2.

"Applying the principles of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, to decisions of state administrative bodies serves to promote federalism, conserve judicial resources, and encourage parties to minimize the expense and burden of repetitive litigation." Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986)); Zamora v. Village of Ruidoso Downs, 907 P.2d 182, 185 (N.M. App. 1995) (finding that personnel board was acting in quasi-judicial capacity when it convened to investigate facts surrounding employee's discharge and to determine whether termination violated ordinance); see also Reed v. McKune, 298 F.3d 946, 949-50 (10th Cir. 2002) (a decision from a state court has the same preclusive effect in federal court as the decision would have in a subsequent state court action).

EEOC v. PVNF, LLC, 487 F.3d at 800. See Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005)(holding that a "prima facie case for discrimination" requires the "plaintiff to show that (1) he belongs to the protected age group; (2) his job performance was satisfactory; (3) adverse employment action was taken against him; . . . [in (4)] 'circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination'" (quoting Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004))(citing Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d at 1101; Hysten v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 296 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002))); Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 753 (10th Cir. 2000)). A prima facie case of disparate discipline may be established if the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the plaintiff is a racial minority, (2) the plaintiff was disciplined by the employer, and (3) the employer imposed the discipline under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination.

EEOC v. PVNF, LLC, 487 F.3d at 800. See Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a "prima facie case for discrimination" requires the "plaintiff to show that (1) he belongs to the protected age group; (2) his job performance was satisfactory; (3) adverse employment action was taken against him; ... [in (4) ] ‘circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination’ " (quoting Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004) )(citing Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d at 1101 ; Hysten v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 296 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002) ) ); Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 753 (10th Cir. 2000). A prima facie case of disparate discipline may be established if the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the plaintiff is a racial minority, (2) the plaintiff was disciplined by the employer, and (3) the employer imposed the discipline under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination.

"Applying the principles of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, to decisions of state administrative bodies serves to promote federalism, conserve judicial resources, and encourage parties to minimize the expense and burden of repetitive litigation." Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2004)(citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986)). Accord Cordova v. N.M. Tax. & Rev. Dep't, No. CIV 08-0681 JB/ACT, 2011 WL 7164459, *10 (D. N.M. Dec. 28, 2011)(Browning, J.).

See Motion for SJ at 7. The Defendants contend that, under the Tenth Circuit's standard for collateral estoppel established in Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2004), Judge Summerfield's opinion should receive the same preclusive effect that it would receive in state court. See Motion for SJ at 7.

The Court should note, first, that Defendants assert a collateral estoppel argument regarding the entirety of Plaintiff's constitutional claims in Count I. Mem to Mot. 1 at 22. Defendants point to Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2004), which uses a three-step test to determine whether a state agency's findings can be given preclusive effect. These three steps require that the state agency (1) act in a judicial capacity; (2) resolve disputed issues of fact properly before it; and (3) give the parties an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue before it.

For example, to show a prima facie case for racial discrimination under Title VII, Dorris must demonstrate that she was a member of a protected class, qualified for and satisfactorily performing her job, and terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004).The elements for the other claims are similar. Thomas, 803 F.3d at 514 (retaliation); Macon, 743 F.3d at 713 (workers' compensation).