Opinion
No. 05-08-00867-CR
Opinion Filed April 27, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F07-73828-PX.
Before Chief Justice THOMAS and Justices FITZGERALD and LANG.
OPINION
Casey Dean Salazar waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The trial court assessed punishment at five years' imprisonment. In two issues, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm. In his first issue, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary because he did not have a complete understanding of the charge against him and the consequences of the guilty plea, and he did not possess the requisite culpable mental state to commit the offense. In his second issue, appellant contends his guilty plea was obtained in violation of due process, and thus rendered involuntary, because nothing affirmatively shows the plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, and there was a "lack of any meaningful colloquy" between the trial court and appellant regarding appellant's understanding of the guilty plea and its consequences. The State responds that the evidence shows appellant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, he had the requisite culpable mental state for the offense, and the trial court was not required to engage in any particular dialogue. Because both of appellant's complaints address the voluntariness of his guilty plea, we will address them together. A guilty plea will be accepted as constitutionally valid only with an affirmative showing that such a plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. See Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). We determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea from the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of the entire record. See Drucker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). Under article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court must admonish a defendant of the applicable range of punishment before accepting a guilty plea. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 1999, pet. ref'd). The trial court's substantial compliance with article 26.13 establishes a prima facie showing that a defendant entered a knowing and voluntary plea. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (per curiam). Once we determine the trial court's substantial compliance, the burden shifts to the defendant to show he entered the plea without knowing its consequences and was thereby harmed. See id. Here, the record shows the trial court substantially complied with article 26.13 by orally admonishing appellant of the appropriate punishment range for the offense. Appellant also received written admonishment in the plea agreement. With this prima facie showing, the question becomes whether appellant met his burden to show the plea was not voluntary. As evidence that his plea was not voluntary, appellant points to testimony during the plea hearing which he contends negates the intent element of the offense. Appellant testified he did not intend to cause bodily injury to the complainant when he "slammed his head against her head" after he threw her on the ground. He acknowledged that the complainant sustained a broken nose and a laceration on her forehead that required seven stitches. According to appellant, he was arguing with the complainant about her "unfaithfulness throughout their relationship" and put his head against her head "a little too hard." Because his testimony shows he did not understand the intent element, appellant contends, the record shows he met his burden to show his plea was not voluntarily entered. At the hearing, appellant stated he had a complete understanding of the charges in the indictment, he understood the punishment range for the offense, and he understood that an "open plea" meant he was "placing himself on the mercy of the court." Appellant stated he "went over everything" with his lawyer and was "freely and voluntarily entering a guilty plea to the charges" against him. Appellant also stated he freely and voluntarily signed a judicial confession and stipulation of evidence that he committed the offense exactly as alleged in the indictment. After weighing the advantages of pleading guilty against the chance of acquittal, appellant could enter a voluntary guilty plea despite having an explanation for his behavior, at odds with the physical evidence, that he could assert as a defense if he proceeded to trial. See Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 350 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). There is nothing in the record that shows appellant did not understand the nature of the charges against him or the consequences of his guilty plea. Moreover, the record shows the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the voluntariness of appellant's guilty plea. We conclude appellant has failed to rebut the prima facie showing of voluntariness of his guilty plea. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197. We resolve appellant's first and second issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.