"While a guilty plea cannot ordinarily be collaterally attacked, since it is considered an admission of all of the elements of the crime, it may be challenged on collateral review if it was not knowing and voluntary." Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 368 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989)); accord Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998). In Broce, the Supreme Court explained that

Id. (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 (1988). Savin's situation is analogous to the defendant in Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 1998). Salas pleaded guilty to using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c).

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). This is both because of the broad interest in finality that attends a criminal judgment, see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982), and the general precept that pleas, which are "considered an admission of all the elements of the crime," are "not ordinarily subject to collateral attack," Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998). A petitioner may seek collateral relief to challenge the constitutional validity of a guilty plea where a subsequent substantive constitutional or statutory holding creates "a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal."

If one of the Section 924(c)(1) offenses were no longer a crime under the present decision, the plea would not have been knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 164 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (stating that when definition of element of crime changes, prior guilty pleas based upon old definition "may be challenged as not having been knowing and voluntary" (citing Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998))). Although I agree with the characterization of Finley's sentence as draconian, I am less certain that the rule adopted by my colleagues will always seem as attractive as it may in the present context.

In the glaring light of these inculpatory statements, any reasonable juror could only conclude that both Rosario and Ramirez "carried" firearms in violation of § 924(c). See Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 2377, 141 L.Ed.2d 744 (1998); see also Muscarello v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 1915, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) ("[n]o one doubts that one who bears arms on his person `carries a weapon'"). (b).

In a case involving a post- Bailey collateral challenge to a conviction following a guilty plea to a section 924(c) charge, we held that, because of a change in the law, the plea may be challenged as not having been knowing and voluntary. See Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998). However, we made it clear in Salas that the facts admitted in the course of that guilty plea were not open to challenge.

Pizzuti v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 199 (LAP) (HBP), 2014 WL 4636521, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (emphasis added); see Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400; United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 67 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Herrera and noting that actual innocence has not been recognized as an independent basis for habeas relief). Second, by virtue of his guilty plea to the Offense, Hawkins “waived a challenge to the facts themselves.” Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); Stern v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 6044 (PAC) (FM), 2013 WL 71773, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2013) (holding that guilty plea precluded petitioner from “contest[ing] the facts to which he pleaded guilty, ” and therefore he was “unable to establish a freestanding innocence claim”), adopted by, 2013 WL 989382 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2013).

Normally, a guilty plea may not be collaterally attacked, since it constitutes an admission to all elements of the charged crime. Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998). However, a defendant may challenge a guilty plea on the grounds that it was not knowing and voluntary.

Normally, a guilty plea may not be collaterally attacked because it constitutes an admission as to all elements of the charged crime. Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998). However, a defendant may challenge a guilty plea on the ground that it was not made knowingly and voluntarily.

Normally, a guilty plea may not be collaterally attacked because it constitutes an admission as to all elements of the charged crime. Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998). However, a defendant may challenge a guilty plea on the ground that it was not made knowingly and voluntarily.