Opinion
J-A28014-17 No. 1662 EDA 2017 No. 1903 EDA 2017
06-04-2018
SAINT LUKE'S HOSPITAL OF BETHLEHEM, JOHN CAPUANO, DONNA CAPUANO AND MARIA MONTEIRO Appellants v. 736 DELAWARE ASSOCIATES, LLC Appellees SAINT LUKE'S HOSPITAL OF BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA JOHN CAPUANO AND DONNA CAPUANO MARIA MONTEIRO Appellees v. 736 DELAWARE ASSOCIATES, LLC Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 18, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Civil Division at No(s): 2015-C-3223 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and DUBOW, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Saint Luke's Hospital of Bethlehem, John Capuano, Donna Capuano and Maria Monteiro, and Appellee/Cross- Appellant, 736 Delaware Associates, LLC, appeal from the judgment entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas in this real property/restrictive covenant dispute. We affirm.
In its opinions, the trial court correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no need to restate them. We add that the court held a bench trial on July 1, 2016. The court dismissed Appellant's amended complaint for lack of standing on December 8, 2016. On Monday, December 19, 2016, Appellants timely filed a motion for post-trial relief. Appellee filed a cross-motion for post-trial relief and for sanctions on December 29, 2016, which the court denied on January 17, 2017. On April 19, 2017, the court denied Appellants' motion for post-trial relief. Appellants filed a praecipe to enter judgment on May 18, 2017, and the court entered judgment in favor of Appellee in part and in favor of Appellants in part that same day.
Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal on May 19, 2017. On June 2, 2017, Appellee timely filed a notice of cross-appeal. The court did not order, and the parties did not file, concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant/Cross-Appellees raise two issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING [APPELLANTS'] AMENDED COMPLAINT AND HOLDING THAT THE CAPUANOS AND MS. MONTEIRO HAD NO STANDING TO ENFORCE THE SINGLE DETACHED DWELLING RESTRICTION CONTAINED IN THE 1935 AND 1936 DEEDS,
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR UNDISPUTED STATUS AS DIRECT SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE OF THE GRANTORS/PROMISEES UNDER THOSE DEEDS, SAID GRANTORS BEING TRUMAN M. DODSON AND HIS WIFE FLORENCE C. DODSON?(Appellants/Cross-Appellees' Brief at 6).
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DID THE STIPULATED DEEDS AND FACTS OF RECORD ESTABLISH AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT ST. LUKE'S PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, WHO ACQUIRED PART OF ST. LUKE'S PROPERTY IN 1923, WAS AN INTENDED THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE 1920 DEED SINGLE DETACHED DWELLING RESTRICTION?
Appellee/Cross-Appellant raises three issues for our review:
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT [APPELLANTS], AS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST TO THE PROMISOR OF THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AT ISSUE, LACKED STANDING AS A PROMISEE TO ENFORCE THOSE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS?(Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 2). Appellee/Cross-Appellant's first and second issues are restatements of Appellants/Cross-Appellees' first and second issues.
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT [APPELLANTS] LACKED STANDING AS THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES TO ENFORCE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WHERE NEITHER [APPELLANTS] NOR THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED IN THOSE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND WHERE NO COMMON SCHEME OF DEVELOPMENT IS REFELCTED IN THOSE COVENANTS?
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [CROSS-APPELLANT'S] MOTION FOR SANCTIONS SEEKING ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO 42 PA.C.S.A. § 2503(7), (9), WHERE THE COURT DID NOT CONDUCT A HEARING ON [CROSS-APPELLANT'S] MOTION AND DID NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE RECORD UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS DECISION?
"Our review in a non-jury case is limited to 'whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed error in the application of law.'" Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exchange , 842 A.2d 409, 413 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal dismissed, 588 Pa. 231, 903 A.2d 1185 (2006) (quoting Bonenberger v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 791 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa.Super. 2002)).
We must grant the court's findings of fact the same weight and effect as the verdict of a jury and, accordingly, may disturb the non-jury verdict only if the court's findings are unsupported by competent evidence or the court committed legal error that affected the outcome of the trial. It is not the role of an appellate court to pass on the credibility of witnesses; hence we will not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Thus, the test we apply is not whether we would have reached the same result on the evidence presented, but rather, after due consideration of the evidence which the trial court found credible, whether the trial court could have reasonably reached its conclusion.Hollock , supra at 414 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Furthermore, our standard of review demands that we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner." Sovereign Bank v. Valentino , 914 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Additionally, "the trial court, as factfinder, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented...." Turney Media Fuel , Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 841 (Pa.Super. 1999). "[T]herefore, assessments of credibility and conflicts in evidence are for the trial court to resolve; this Court is not permitted to reexamine the weight and credibility determinations or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder." Id.Sovereign Bank , supra at 420.
This Court will not disturb a denial of attorneys' fees absent an abuse of discretion. In re Padezanin , 937 A.2d 475, 483 (Pa.Super. 2007). An evidentiary hearing is generally required for a trial court to decide a claim for attorneys' fees, unless the facts are undisputed. In re Estate of Burger , 852 A.2d 385, 391 (Pa.Super. 2004), affirmed, 587 Pa. 164, 898 A.2d 547 (2006).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Carol K. McGinley, we conclude the parties' issues merit no relief. The trial court opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed December 8, 2016, at 11-23) (finding: (1) original tract conveyed under 1920 deed contained certain restrictive covenants including prohibited uses and required setbacks; Mr. Dodson was original promisor or party who made promise to uphold restrictive covenants; original grantors of 1920 Deed were promisees and only persons entitled to enforce promise to uphold restrictive covenants; Appellants were not promisees of restrictive covenants; accordingly, Appellants have no right to enforce restrictive covenant as promisees of 1920 deed and restrictive covenants; (2) restrictions in 1920 deed and 1935/1936 deeds contained no language providing for third-party beneficiary status to properties which Appellants currently own; restrictions in 1920 and 1935/1936 deeds did not provide for any third-party beneficiaries; restrictions in deeds did not mention surrounding property owners in any manner; thus, deeds did not contemplate Appellants as third-party beneficiaries to single-detached-dwelling restriction; concerning whether parties' situation or surrounding circumstances during transfer of property evidenced intent to make Appellants third-party beneficiaries to restriction, 1920 deed specified single detached dwelling house may be erected along Delaware Avenue frontage only of original tract; original tract, however, included property in addition to Delaware Avenue frontage; original tract also included parcel two of Appellee's current property, which fronts Fiot Street, and Appellants' individual plots, which front Seneca Street; single-detached-dwelling restriction in 1920 deed applied only to property that fronts Delaware Avenue; per 1920 deed, any parcel that did not front Delaware Avenue or violate setback requirements could have been erected so long as purpose of building did not violate prohibited uses restriction; subsequent owners of lots not fronting Delaware Avenue were not intended to enjoy benefit of promises made by owners of parcels facing Delaware Avenue, because whole of area was not intended by 1920 deed as general plan or scheme of development, and there is no conformity with any general plan; deeds granting five parcels at issue to parties did not contain single-detached-dwelling restriction; these conveyances established no general plan or scheme of development; therefore, Appellants were not intended third-party beneficiaries of restrictive covenant in 1920 and 1935/1936 deeds and lacked standing to enforce single-detached-dwelling restriction). ( See also Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, filed January 17, 2017, at 2-3) (finding: (3) Appellants did not initiate current case to be arbitrary, vexatious, or in bad faith; timing of Appellants' suit did not warrant sanctions; court declined to address Appellee's alternative defenses, i.e., unclean hands and laches, because those theories are defenses to substantive issues, which court did not reach because Appellants lacked standing to bring claims; therefore, case did not progress so far as to put responsive defenses before court for disposition). We agree with the court's decision on Appellants/Cross-Appellees' lack of standing and lack of third-party beneficiary status. See Sovereign Bank , supra. Further, we defer to the court's decision to deny Appellee/Cross Appellant's request for attorney's fees. See In re Padezanin , supra. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinions.
Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/4/18
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