Opinion
No. 2021-C-00078
04-20-2021
Mohab SAID v. FEDERATED RURAL ELECTRIC INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et al.
PER CURIAM
Writ granted. The court of appeal found that the trial court's limitation of the testimony of the applicant's original, local treating physicians was erroneous, but concluded that no reversible error had occurred. In its analysis, the court of appeal noted that "error has been defined as harmless when it is ‘trivial, formal, merely academic, and not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and where it in no way affects the final outcome of the case,’ " citing Buckbee v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., Inc. , 561 So.2d 76, 85 (La. 1990), wherein the court cited State v. Britton , 27 Wash.2d 336, 341, 178 P.2d 341, 344 (1947), and Eastburn v. Ford Motor Co. , 471 F.2d 21, 22-23 (5th Cir. 1972), which applied Florida law, and found that the trial court's limitation of the testimony of the local physicians neither affected the outcome of the case, nor adversely affected the applicant's substantial rights. Specifically, the court of appeal found that the applicant was able to present the information and opinions that the local physicians would have given through the Washington, D.C. physicians. As such, the court of appeal found that the jury was aware of the expert medical opinion that the applicant suffered a brain injury that was related to the accident, and nevertheless did not find, as fact, that the allegation had merit, and therefore, the limitation of the local physicians’ testimony did not constitute reversible error.
While we agree that the trial court's limitation of the testimony of the local treating physicians was erroneous, we disagree with the court of appeal's assessment of the degree of prejudice of the excluded testimony. This case hinges upon the applicant's ability to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: 1) he suffered a brain injury ; and, 2) that the injury was caused by the accident. In this case, the applicant was initially treated by Dr. Hajmurad, a local neurologist, for approximately one year immediately following the accident. Although the applicant was symptomatic, the tests, including an MRI in 2012, appeared to be negative for any objective evidence of a brain injury. However, when a subsequent MRI was conducted in 2014, it was discovered that such objective evidence was, in fact, visible on the 2012 MRI, but was missed due to its location on the film. Pursuant to the trial court's ruling granting the respondent's motion in limine , the local physicians were prohibited from telling the jury of this subsequent discovery and the resulting change in their initial diagnosis. Consequently, the local treating physicians were only allowed to tell the jury that they treated the applicant, but found no objective evidence of a brain injury, even after conducting diagnostic tests. The trial court's ruling served to bolster the narrative championed by the respondent—that the local treating physicians found no objective evidence to support that the applicant suffered a brain injury in the accident, and that the testimony from the Washington, D.C. physicians was not credible because they were merely hired guns paid by the applicant's attorney. The court of appeal therefore appears to have erred insofar as it determined that the ruling had no effect on the outcome of this case. Rather, given Dr. Hajmurad's extensive treatment of the applicant throughout the months immediately following the accident, and in light of the substance of his proffered testimony, which was with benefit of the revised MRI result, the proffered testimony may have indeed changed the outcome of the trial, and its exclusion was prejudicial to the applicant's case.
If a trial judge commits consequential error by denying the jury relevant, admissible evidence, or by admitting evidence that should have been excluded, the fact finding process is interdicted; thus, the verdict is tainted. See McLean v. Hunter , 495 So.2d 1298, 1304 (La. 1986). Generally, when a legal error interdicts the fact finding process, the manifest error standard no longer applies. If the record is otherwise complete, the reviewing court should conduct a de novo review and decide which party should prevail by a preponderance of the evidence. Landry v. Bellanger , 02-1443, p. 15 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 943, 954 ; Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation , 254 La. 182, 320 So.2d 163 (1975) ; Ragas v. Argonaut Southwest Insurance Co. , 388 So.2d 707, 708 (La. 1980) ; Savin v. Allstate Insurance Company , 579 So.2d 453, 457 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991) ; Moore v. Clark , 517 So.2d 293, 302 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1987). There are, however, situations in which the ends of justice would best be served by remanding the case for a new trial. See Wegener v. Lafayette Ins. Co. , 10-0810 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So. 3d 1220 ; See also Herbert v. Travelers Indem. Co. , 193 So.2d 330, 337–38 (La. App. 1967). It is the duty of the appellate court to determine when "the court can fairly find a preponderance of the evidence from the cold record," or whether the case should be remanded. See Landry , 02–1443 at p. 15, 851 So.2d at 954 ; See also Franklin v. Franklin , 2005-1814 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So.2d 90, 94. As noted in Hebert , "Since the right of trial by jury in civil cases is granted by our law, it is the duty of the courts to protect that right and give it meaning and effectiveness." In this case, the applicant, who has exercised his right to trial by jury, was denied substantial justice when the jury was denied benefit of the local treating physicians’ complete testimony, and therefore the ends of justice would be served by remanding this case for a new trial.
The trial court's ruling, granting the motion in limine and limiting the testimony of the applicant's local, treating physicians is reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial.
WRIT GRANTED and REMANDED.
Weimer, C.J., would grant and docket.
Crichton, J., would grant and docket and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., would grant and docket and assigns reasons:
I would grant and docket this matter to review the lower court decisions with the benefit of a full record. Significantly, the per curiam makes multiple findings of fact that necessarily rely on arguments of counsel, not evidence submitted to the Court, due to the limited evidence available for review at this stage of plaintiff's application for writs. Moreover, I would not rely on the court of appeal finding, without addressing the merits thereof, that the district court erred in limiting the testimony of certain witnesses to lay testimony, as we defer to the great discretion of the district court – not the court of appeal – in reviewing the admission or exclusion of expert testimony. Blair v. Coney , 2019-00795 (La. 4/3/20), ––– So.3d ––––, reh'g denied, 2019-00795 (La. 7/9/20), 298 So. 3d 168 ("[A] district court is afforded broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony is admissible, and its decision with respect thereto shall not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion."). Accordingly, I would grant and docket this case to fully address the merits of plaintiff's writ application.