Opinion
August 1, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Donovan, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Upon our review of the record, we find that the appellants failed to raise an issue of fact requiring a trial and summary judgment was properly granted to the plaintiffs. The parties do not dispute that a condition precedent to their 1984 agreement requiring the issuance of a confirmed or insured letter of credit in exchange for the plaintiffs' contribution of $60,000 was never met. Under the terms of the agreement, in the absence of the letter of credit issued by a date certain the appellants were to return to the plaintiffs the $60,000 contribution, plus 20% interest. The language of the agreement is clear and unambiguous. Contrary to the appellants' contention, the condition precedent was not waived by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were properly awarded damages in the amount awarded against each of the appellants. Because the conditions precedent remained unsatisfied, we need not reach the issue of whether the remaining provisions of the contract are legally enforceable. In this respect, the Supreme Court properly denied leave to the appellants to amend their answer to add a new affirmative defense alleging that the agreement between the parties constituted a usurious loan. Although leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted (see, CPLR 3025 [b]; Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 957), the court is not required to permit futile amendments which may lead to needless litigation (see, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v Shickler, 96 A.D.2d 926). Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.