Opinion
C/A 8:19-cv-00113-TMC-JDA
12-13-2021
Kinjta Kadeem Sadler, a/k/a Kinjta Sadler Kadeem, Petitioner, v. Charles Williams, Warden, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on a status report filed by Warden Charles Williams (“Respondent”) on December 1, 2021. [Doc. 61.] Kinjta Kadeem Sadler (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Judge. Upon review of the record in this case-including Respondent's December 1, 2021, status report-and the records from Petitioner's state court cases, the undersigned concludes that this action should be dismissed as moot for the reasons explained below.
When Petitioner commenced this action, he was an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and was incarcerated at the McCormick Correctional Institution. [Doc. 1 at 1.] On August 7, 2020, the Court received a notice of change of address from Petitioner, which indicated Petitioner had been transferred to the Kershaw Correctional Institution. [Doc. 47.] However, it now appears that Petitioner has been released from SCDC custody. When the undersigned conducted a search of SCDC's online incarcerated inmate search portal, Petitioner's name could not be located. See https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (search by Petitioner's name) (last visited Dec. 9, 2021). Petitioner has not provided the Court with an updated address, despite being instructed to do so on numerous occasions. [Docs. 5 at 2; 10 at 2; 45.]
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Petitioner commenced this action by filing a Petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 11, 2019. [Doc. 1.] On May 14, 2019, Respondent filed a motion to stay, hold in abeyance, or dismiss without prejudice the Petition filed in this case in light of a pending state habeas corpus action filed in the South Carolina Supreme Court. [Doc. 26.] On May 21, 2019, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Roseboro Order”), directing Petitioner to file a response to that motion. [Doc. 28.] However, Petitioner did not file a response. Additionally, on May 31, 2019, Respondent filed a motion to stay the time for filing the Return, which the Court granted by Order dated June 10, 2019. [Docs. 30; 31.] On July 3, 2019, the undersigned entered an Order granting Respondent's motion to stay, hold in abeyance, or dismiss without prejudice and directed as follows:
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). The Clerk of Court received the Petition on January 14, 2019, and opened this case that same day. [Docs. 1; 1-2 at 1.] Petitioner's documents were not stamped by the prison mailroom with the date the pleadings were delivered to prison authorities for forwarding. However, the Petition is dated January 11, 2019, and the envelope is postmarked with that same date. [Docs. 1 at 15 (Petition dated January 11, 2019); 1-2 at 1 (envelope postmarked on January 11, 2019).] Accordingly, the undersigned considers the date of filing of this action to be January 11, 2019.
Petitioner has filed a state habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court of South Carolina that raises basically the same ground he asserts in Ground Two of this federal habeas corpus petition (the “Petition”). The State has asked the Supreme Court of South Carolina to accept jurisdiction of the state habeas corpus petition and to have the parties brief the merits of the claim; thus, Respondent asks this Court to stay, hold in abeyance, or dismiss this Petition without prejudice
pending the outcome or resolution of the pending state habeas corpus petition. Petitioner has not opposed Respondent's motion. It is unclear whether the pending state habeas corpus petition would toll the one-year statute of limitations applicable to this case. Additionally, given that Ground Two of the Petition raises a claim stemming from the South Carolina Court of Appeals' reversal of Petitioner's co-defendant's conviction, which reversal was based on a Batson challenge that the Court of Appeals noted was preserved as to Petitioner, but because Petitioner has completed his post-conviction review, he cannot file a successive post-conviction application raising the claim, the Court finds that a stay is warranted in this case pending resolution of Petitioner's pending state habeas corpus petition. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005) (holding that a district court should stay, rather than dismiss, a mixed petition “if the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics”). Respondent shall file updates in this case regarding the status of the pending state habeas corpus petition every 60 days or within 10 days of the resolution of the state habeas corpus petition, whichever occurs earlier.[Doc. 33.] Thereafter, Respondent periodically filed status reports apprising the Court as to the status of Petitioner's state court proceedings. [Docs. 36; 37; 39; 41; 42; 43; 44; 48; 50; 51; 53; 55; 57; 59; 61.] As explained in detail below, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for habeas relief; however, Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction relief (“PCR”) action in the state court, wherein he successfully attained a vacatur of his conviction. Respondent's latest status report, filed on December 1, 2021, explained as follows:
On September 17, 2021, the Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh signed an Order Granting Post-Conviction Relief, and same was filed with the Greenville County Clerk of Court on September 23, 2001.... On October 29, 2021, this office wrote to the Honorable William W. Wilkins, III, Thirteenth Circuit Solicitor to advise that the Office of the Attorney
General has decided not to appeal the grant of relief to [Petitioner].[Doc. 61 at 1.] Respondent attached to the status report a copy of Judge McIntosh's Order dated September 17, 2021, and the Attorney General's letter dated October 29, 2021. [Docs. 61-1 and 61-2.]
Petitioner's Criminal Case History
The undersigned has compiled this background summary of Petitioner's criminal case history from the filings in the present action as well as the records from Petitioner's state court cases. The Court is permitted to take judicial notice of the records in Petitioner's state court cases. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
This case arises from Petitioner's conviction for attempted murder and his sentence to a 20-year term of imprisonment imposed on January 12, 2013, in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions. [Doc. 1 at 1.] Specifically, Petitioner and three co-defendantswere charged with various crimes for their alleged involvement in a shooting in Greenville County. [Doc. 26-1 at 4.] The grand jury issued indictments against Petitioner for seven counts of attempted murder as well as counts for criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and assault and battery by mob in the second degree. [Doc. 25 at 1.]
Petitioner's co-defendants were Michael Antonio Williams, Esaiveus Frantrez Booker, and Raymond Lewis Young. [Doc. 26-1 at 4.]
Petitioner was charged with seven counts of attempted murder at indictment numbers 2011-GS-23-09239, -09240, -09241, -09242, -09243, -09244, and -09245; with criminal conspiracy at indictment number 2011-GS-23-9238; with possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime at indictment number 2011-GS-23-09237; and with assault and battery by mob in the second degree at indictment number 2012-GS-23-3840A. See State v. Sadler, Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, 4 available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers J992363, J992364, J992365, J992366, J992367, J992368, and J992369) (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
The four men were tried together in a single trial and all four men were convicted. [Docs. 25-1 at 1; 26-1 at 1-2.] As to Petitioner, the jury convicted him of attempted murder but acquitted him on the charges of criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and assault and battery by mob in the second degree. [Doc. 61-1 at 4.] Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 20 years. [Id.]
Each of the four co-defendants appealed their convictions. [Id.] On January 14, 2015, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal after a review pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). [Id.]; see also State v. Sadler, No. 2015-UP-013, 2015 WL 164165, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2015).
Petitioner then filed a PCR action in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas on April 29, 2015, asserting as grounds for relief ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call an alibi witness. [Docs. 1 at 3; 61-1 at 5.] After conducting an evidentiary hearing on April 22, 2016, the PCR court denied Petitioner's application for PCR on July 29, 2016. [Docs. 1 at 3; 61-1 at 5.] Petitioner's PCR counsel filed a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Johnson v. State, 364 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1988), and the Supreme Court of South Carolina transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. [Doc. 61-1 at 5.] The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on January 29, 2018. [Doc. 1 at 4.]
See Sadler v. State, No. 2015-cp-23-02831, Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2015cp2302831) (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
In the meantime, however, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of Petitioner's co-defendant, Raymond Lewis Young, on November 15, 2017, holding the trial court erred in denying Young's motion pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). [Doc. 61-1 at 5]; see also State v. Young, No. 2013-000149, 2017 WL 5483256, at *4 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2017). Thereafter,
[w]hen [Petitioner] learned of the Young decision, he wrote to the Court of Appeals asking to amend his pro se brief to include a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Batson issue on appeal. The Court of Appeals agreed to allow [Petitioner] to amend his brief on January 29, 2018. Thereafter, on November 1, 2018, the Court of Appeals denied [Petitioner's] petition for writ of certiorari. In a footnote, the Court “acknowledge[d] it reversed the conviction of [Petitioner]'s co-defendant based on a Batson issue.” Nevertheless, the Court explained “the question of whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not briefing the Batson issue was not presented to the PCR court and thus [was] not preserved for review.”
Subsequently, [Petitioner] filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction asking the Court to grant the writ of habeas corpus based upon appellate counsel's failure to raise the Batson issue on appeal. The State agreed that extraordinary reasons existed to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction. Although the Court denied [Petitioner's] petition, the Court made clear that [Petitioner] could raise his “issue in a successive application for postconviction relief as it involves unique circumstances.”[Doc. 61-1 at 6.]
Petitioner then filed a second application for PCR on October 8, 2019, in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas. [Id. at 7.] The State filed a return and motion to dismiss the PCR on August 3, 2020, and the PCR court entered a conditional order of dismissal on August 24, 2020. [Id.] Petitioner filed a response to the State's motion to dismiss on August 26, 2020, and a response to the court's conditional order of dismissal on September 9, 2020. [Id.] Thereafter, by order dated December 23, 2020, the PCR court denied the State's motion to dismiss. [Id.] Finally, on September 23, 2021, the PCR court entered an order granting Petitioner's PCR and vacating his conviction. [Id. at 14.]
See Sadler v. State, No. 2019-cp-23-05813, Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2019cp2305813) (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
After Petitioner's original conviction was vacated, he pled guilty to a single count of attempted murder at indictment number 2011-GS-23-09239 and was sentenced by the Honorable Letitia H. Verdin to 3, 788 days, with credit for time served in the amount of 3, 788 days. See State v. Sadler, Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number J992363) (last visited Dec. 9, 2021). The remaining counts at indictment numbers 2011-GS-23-09240, -09241, -09242, -09243, -09244, and -09245 were all dismissed pursuant to prosecutorial discretion on December 2, 2021. Id. (search by case numbers J992364, J992365, J992366, J992367, J992368, and J992369).
Allegations in Petition
As noted, Petitioner commenced this action by filing his Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking habeas relief from his conviction and 20-year sentence for attempted murder. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner asserts the following two grounds for relief. First, Petitioner asserts a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. [Id. at 5.] Specifically, Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective because the solicitor was allowed to discriminate against Petitioner by striking three black jurors under the same circumstances that he did not strike white jurors. [Id.] Second, Petitioner asserts that he was subjected to disparate treatment resulting in manifest injustice. [Id. at 7.] Specifically, Petitioner contends that his appeal from his initial PCR was denied, even though his co-defendant raised the same claim and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded that case for a new trial. [Id.] Petitioner contends his counsel did not raise the issue even though Petitioner and his codefendant had similar cases. [Id.] For his relief, Petitioner requests a new trial. [Id. at 15.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Petition
Petitioner brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se petition is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the petitioner's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Habeas Corpus
Because Petitioner filed the Petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision, ” and “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101-02 (2011). Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Federal law establishes this Court's jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This statute permits relief when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” and requires that a petitioner present his claim to the state's highest court with authority to decide the issue before the federal court will consider the claim. Id. The separate but related theories of exhaustion and procedural bypass operate to require a habeas petitioner to first submit his claims for relief to the state courts. A habeas corpus petition filed in this Court before the petitioner has appropriately exhausted available state-court remedies or has otherwise bypassed seeking relief in the state courts will be dismissed absent unusual circumstances.
DISCUSSION
This habeas action should be dismissed as moot. As noted, Petitioner commenced this action on January 11, 2019. The undersigned stayed the action to allow the parties to pursue relief in the state court. On October 8, 2019, Petitioner filed his second PCR action in the state court and, on September 23, 2021, the PCR court granted Petitioner relief and vacated his conviction.
Petitioner raises the same grounds for relief in this action that he did in his state court PCR action. Therefore, the claims raised in the instant Petition are moot because they were resolved in Petitioner's favor by the state court when it vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence. Keever v. Jackson, No. 3:14-cv-641-FDW, 2015 WL 540570, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 10, 2015) (noting also that the court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner was no longer “in custody” under his vacated conviction).
“Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the adjudication of actual cases and controversies.” Sane-Aka v. Evans, No. 2:16-cv-298, 2016 WL 6561571, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2016) (discussing the mootness doctrine in the context of habeas corpus proceedings), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 6518628 (E.D. Va. Nov. 2, 2016). An action is moot when “the issues presented are no longer ‘live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “‘[i]f an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.'” Miller v. Nohe, 740 Fed.Appx. 381, 382 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Because “[t]he Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases or controversies[, a] federal court has no authority to render a decision upon moot questions or declare rules of law that cannot affect the matter at issue.” Clay v. LaManna, No. 8:08-cv-328-GRA, 2008 WL 4680579, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2008) (discussing mootness of a habeas petition).
Here, Petitioner's conviction and sentence were vacated. Accordingly, because Petitioner challenges a conviction that has already been vacated by the state court, this Court should deny the Petition as moot as it is not possible for this Court to grant the relief requested. See Madison v. Johnson, No. 3:09-cv-8, 2011 WL 4502801, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2011). Because “there is no longer a case or controversy to litigate and no concrete and continuing injury exists, this case and the petition now before the court should be dismissed as moot.” O'Neal v. Lamanna, No. 2:06-cv-1795-HFF-RSC, 2008 WL 759089, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2008). “Petitioner has received all of the relief he could receive through his Petition and he does not face any collateral consequences from the State charges complained of, the matter is now moot.” Goode-Bey v. Campbell, No. PWG-18-cv-595, 2019 WL 2453761, at *2 (D. Md. June 12, 2019).
RECOMMENDATION
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Petition be DENIED and DISMISSED as moot.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.